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Interiority, Control, and Anarchy: Reading Anti-Oedipus Politically (171pp.)
Director: FredMcGlynn
The twentieth century has witnessed the ideological and practical collapse of communism,
a devastating intellectual attack upon metaphysical totalities (God, subject, history), and
rapidly accelerating modes of scientific and technological advancement. Factories are
closing down and trade unions becoming sterile while interglobal communication networks
and new forms of transportation shrink and redefine the limits of our world. And with
“floating” banks and virtual businesses constantly deterritorializing the economic
configurations and movements of capital, questions concerning our existential condition
seem to be asking after shadows, while questions concerning what we should do (how to
politically and actively engage a shifting and unstable social field) emerge amidst the
contemporary whirlwind of theory as impotent and hollow.
The position forwarded by some contemporary French intellectuals argues for “tactical”
rather than strategic political engagement, fast-paced theory which locates malleable sites of
repression or injustice and attempts to re-appropriate them in new ways, in other guises,
before they are re-commodified and put back into the service of repression by “state-happy”
machines animated by capitalist motors. In Foucault’s words, they attempt to drop
theoretical bombs. Anti-Oedipus is one such political experiment, and it takes for its axis
the intersection of the “holy family” (Oedipus, the figurehead of the new order of
repressive capitalism, Mommy-Daddy-Me) and the schizophrenic production process. This
dynamic, which is made to serve the project of social reconfiguration whose motor is
control, offers insight into the way in which desire comes to turn back upon itself, the way
in which desire comes to desire its own repression.
By re-thinking Marxist and Freudian theories in such a way that militant existence and
non-repressive social involvement can remain operable possibilities in a post-disciplinary
“control” society, the authors of Anti-Oedipus mount a full-scale critique of “interiority”;
repression begins within the inner moral sphere of the self, the rampant unwillingness to
part with outmoded theories of resistance and modes of critique, the geographically stable
conception of social space that we hold. Oedipus animates the sedimented thinking which
is still entrenched with this myth of the interior. Oedipus fuels fascist tendencies,
tendencies that need to be “flushed out” of the back rooms and hazy interiors onto the
smooth surface of the social field. The goal of such a project is to make everything, first
and foremost desire, a productive process.
I offer here fives ways of “thinking into and out of” this complicated text. I hope,
through my focus upon a specific political project of the kind mentioned above, that this
essay will shed much needed light upon the general project of restructuring political theory
in accordance with newer, decentralized conceptions of interiorities, control, capital, and
the socius.
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INTRODUCTION

The other night at about two thirty in the morning, I
unchained myself from my computer, cooked a cup of Earl Grey
tea, and sat down in front of the television to mindlessly
absorb the all-night, all-news loop sequence on NBC.
things caught my eye.

Three

The first segment described a new

"floating" academic system; "students" from all over the
world are now taking classes from Duke, the University of
Maryland, the University of Florida, and many other
institutions without setting foot on campus.

In fact, these

virtual students hold virtual office hours with virtual
professors in virtual space; by spending enough time on line,
one can now receive a doctorate without ever going to class.
Students can pay for these hyperclasses by authorizing money
transfers from trust funds, credit companies, or financial
aid services over the internet, and even download and print
up their diplomas at the end of the degree sequence.
process marks the intersection, in hyperspace,

This

of flows of

capital, the dispersion of academic institutions, flows of
multi-media imagery, the thorough dissemination of
centralized research centers; it reconfigures all aspects of
a mentor/apprentice or teacher/student relationship, it makes
education a business, removes "people" from "places", etc.

The second segment revealed the newest technology in
television viewing.

A rectangular screen, with literally

millions of minuscule pixilated spaces, promising to produce
1

imagery sharper than the best 35 MM cameras.

I was informed

that I could experience vast and expansive terrains in what
amounted to a nearly three-dimensional clarity.

This "high-

definition" television allows me to go places I have never
dreamed of going, experience things I had never experienced,
etc.

The rectangular screen and digital THX sound system

supposedly help to construct a viewing experience better than
that offered up at the cinema.

I can watch a nature video of

Glacier National Park and see parts of the Park that I could
never witness as clearly or as quickly as I can on this new
contraption.

Thus the space of a whole wilderness, the

cinema, and the privatized sector of the family living room
converge along an axis which is invested by technological
market economy, scientific advancement, and virtual imaging.
My living room, the cinema, a national park, the economy of
information all being uprooted, deterritorialized,
reorganized and improved at the site of the "high-definition"
television.

The third segment described a new digital satellite
information system.

Conglomerates can now apparently bid

upon everything from television sitcoms to sporting events to
newscasts, and the highest bidder retains the rights to sell
these programs to national networking "institutions" which
never actually produce anything {they buy their only
products, TV programs) and never actually sell anything (they
serve only as a means of distribution for interglobal fiber
optic communication).

There are entire businesses which
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inhabit no physical spaces, produce no goods, employ no
workers, and make no income.

Once the satellites are in

place and the fiber-optic networks installed, there is only a
vast, complex and intersecting virtual machine which has the
capacity to invest any point of the social field at any time
and remains completely without "executive" supervision.

At

this point I turned the television off.

That all of this information regarding the rapid loss of
technological, privatized, and social territory was delivered
to me over the course of three one and a half minute soundbyte reports is not the concern.

Nor was the feeling of

nausea that overcame me spurred by some type of nostalgic
reverie which caused me to pine for days of old, when all
computers spoke Basic and going to the movies Was still a
profoundly exhilarating visual and aural experience.

No, the

real problem with Such a rapid deterritorialization of
commonly understood "spaces" (social spaces, private spaces,
academic and research spaces, economic spaces, political
spaces) is that theory cannot keep up.

We cannot think about

our world fast enough; it alters its agendas too quickly.
Just when an engaging theory is proposed concerning wildlife
habitat, or family values, or the positive and negative
effects of television viewing on children, or our political
policies regarding foreign nations, or salary caps for
professional athletes, or the ethical ramifications of
cloning, all of these practices are uprooted, presented to
the populous with thousands of different slants via
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newspapers and internet sites, network news programming and
satellite broadcasts.

We actually watched Operation Desert

Storm happen; it was a digital war, just as the Simpson
fiasco was a virtual trial; how could anything like the
"truth" of such events ever surface?

It cannot, and we don't want it.

What is needed is not the

truth, but fast-paced theory and even faster action.

All

things that were understood as organized and located, such as
the family, the penal institution, academia, people, places,
and ideas have become malleable, shifting, flowing and
intersecting.

This is not necessarily a negative event; most

of these institutions, as we shall see, are by their very
nature dictatorial and oppressive.

Yet while it is still to

be determined what positive or negative or benign effects
such shifts will generate, one thing is for sure:

Theory,

particularly political theory, must keep up, and to do so, it
must become flexible and experimental.

This essay will

examine one particular attempt to "experiment" with social
and political theory.

Deleuze speaks of "lines of flight" that lead outward, away,
to resistance and revolution.

He speaks of philosophy.

distinguishes between knowing and thinking.

He

Knowledge is

sedimented understanding; it is the standard discourse of the
history of ideas.

The history of philosophy is the curse and

the cure, for it situates the bounds of thinking just as it
provides the axis for all "lines of flight".

Thinking is the
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creation of new concepts, philosophy in its active form,
lines leading elsewhere.

This essay that I now write is

composed of many of these lines, lines which I have chosen to
lead "elsewhere".

But I have cheated, for I have selected an

"elsewhere" in advance, and this would be "rigging the game"
according to Deleuze.

None-the-less, I have chosen to follow

philosophical, historical, conceptual and political lines in
order to end up, of all places, at a book.

I have followed

at least five distinct lines (perhaps there are more) marked
by five distinct chapters (there is one more) that lead to a
text which offers nearly limitless alternative lines of
flight.

But I offer these lines, and an interpretation of

the book (the axis upon which they converge) as a
multiplicity of entrances, a set of distinct traces which
lead, directly or indirectly, to a powerfully rich text.
Five ways in, many ways out.

The first five chapters of this essay are roughly these five
lines.

Needless to say, they intersect, overlap, draw upon

and betray each other.

They elaborate very general

vicissitudes which point toward particular facets of AntiOedipus .

Whether these facets are simply concepts to be

defined, histories to be unthreaded, political agendas which
prefigure radical thinking, or analyses of the social /
cultural percepts which theory must grapple with, they are
discussed here only as points of entry, ways of approaching,
reading, and thinking, "lines" to be followed and pondered.
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Thus I offer up five ways to "enter" a text.

The text is

Anti-Oedipus , and in the final chapter of this essay I will
offer an account of this text, as a means of putting closure
on what might otherwise amount only to a conglomeration of
lines.

The leveling force which Anti-Oedipus

brings to bear upon

psychoanalysis, contemporary politics, subjectivity, indeed
everything and all that composes the "social" will certainly
be its most important contribution to philosophy.

The

"social", described only in terms of contemporary capitalism,
is dissected in Anti-Oedipus, and the dialectical tension
between desire and Fascism (or better production and
repression) is played out along the intersection of two
interrelated lines:

Capitalism and Schizophrenia.

The most immediate effect of the schizophrenic process,
posited as universal producer, is to separate, in the
authors' own words, desire from lack.

This amounts to an

attempt to scourge both philosophical theory and social and
political practice of all forms of domesticating and
repressive tendencies brought about and accelerated by
"state-happy" mentalities.

I will trace the origins and

developments of what Deleuze and Guattari call "state-happy"
thought, what Foucault calls domesticating thought, and what
Nietzsche refers to as the "moralization of existence"; these
concepts all have subtle, distinct connotations when examined
in the light and context of each author, but what will be
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discovered is that they are all symptoms 5f and reactions to
a certain conception of subjectivity.

This model of the

subject equates desire with lack and attributes
responsibility to the individual at the internal level; all
of these thinkers realize that whatever is wrong with
thinking originates with the binary model (interior/exterior)
of the individual.

The problem is that this "individual", what Foucault refers
to as "Man", cannot and indeed will not think itself through
to active, challenging, and liberating theoretical vantage
points; its lives its own history too well.

"Man" is pensive

and reflective, enamored by belief and systems; it is the
representation of institutional machinery at work at the
micro-social level.

Leaving "Man" behind is the first task

of schizo-analysis; for Deleuze and Guattari, Oedipus is the
social staying power of Man.

Oedipus is the figurehead which

causes us to desire our own repression.

And Oedipus is an

economy; it is a myth, it is a psychological concept, but it
is much more than this.

For the authors of Anti-Oedipus ,

the economy of Oedipus is a production of a
"deterritorializing" capitalism, a global machine which
always and everywhere outstrips the limits of individualism
while simultaneously re-orienting and re-channeling goals and
agendas elsewhere.

Oedipus is very real, just as all idols are.

Just as the

factory and its dialectic of production served as a model for
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the capitalism of the nineteenth century, Oedipus serves as
the model for twentieth century capitalism.

But Oedipus is

not a "site", like the factory; it is not localizable or
segmented, it is fluid and molecular.

One leaves the factory

and comes home to the family, or goes to the union club, or
attends classes at a local university, or goes ice fishing on
a lake.

According to Deleuze and Guattari, one never leaves

Oedipus.

The capitalism that these authors are elaborating

is no longer confined or restrained in any way to the
production of goods or merchandise; Oedipus is the mass
producer of all social bodies, and all social bodies are
themselves transient, interchangeable, and fragmented.
central themes of Anti-Oedipus

The

are discussed in my last

section, The Anti-Oedipal Machine , and I have designed that
chapter to be somewhat accessible on its own terms; thus it
can be read at the beginning, in the middle, or at the end of
the essay.

The site of the self is mapped, and this cartography is
central to the arrangement of social spaces, political
hierarchies, business ventures, etc.

ButA Deleuze and

Guattari understand this cartography in a very unique way; no
longer are there plateaus and valleys and forests and oceans
(the home, the factory, prison, family); rather all
"territories" are usurped and borrowed.

Instead of playing

chess, where each model or "gamepiece" can move but only
according to the strict rules of the striated space of the
game, we are now surfing, and the trajectories which inform

our movements are themselves as vast, turbulent, and
unpredictable as the ocean.

The final section of this essay will detail, as stated, some
of the central tenets of Anti-Oedipus .
reference guide of sorts.
a different nature.

It will serve as a

But the first five "lines" are of

Based upon the premise that theory must

be equally deterritorialized and as plural and fragmented as
contemporary culture, the authors of Anti-Oedipus

have

constructed a theoretical work which attempts such a project.
What is missing is the traditional respect and rigor that is
usually a prerequisite in informed, articulate philosophy.
My work here is not so much an attempt to "fill in the gaps"
that Anti-Oedipus leaves, but rather an experiment with modes
of reading the text.

Over the course of an interchange with

many different concepts and thinkers, I have attempted to
generate nothing more than ways of working with the grade of
theory given over to us in the book.

And although in the

title of this paper I make specific reference to reading
politically, this notion of politics is far too expansive to
be compared with the likes of Strauss, Rawls, Mill, etc.

For

with Deleuze and Guattari, politics is the entire mode of
existence and reading is always a political activity.

Nietzsche haunts the pages of Anti-Oedipus

like a specter.

As a critique of both Marx and Freud, the book serves as a
deliriously unstable attempt to bring to fruition a model of
critique fashioned by Nietzsche:

A thorough revaluation of
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our most deep-seated beliefs regarding ourselves and our
organized world.

What Nietzsche might term the

"reactive"

(and what Foucault might call "fascist") elements of both
Marx and Freud are exorcised in Anti-Oedipus

through a

lightning-fast and intoxicating tour of the socius mounted
and led by Nietzschean critique.

The first two lines that I

will follow in this essay originate from a Nietzschean axis.
Line One orients Nietzsche as the progenitor of the
psychoanalytic of guilty consciousness.

Line Two follows the

manifestations of this guilty interiority directly into the
heart of psychoanalysis.

Line One leads directly into Line

Two, and therefore they should be read consecutively.

Line Three is an attempt to piece together, from out of the
context of our immediate intellectual history, a very general
theory of the social order which animates Anti-Oedipus .

The

notion of a control society is unlike any other theory of
social organization ever advanced, and therefore it serves to
come to terms with this picture of the socius in order to
fully examine what the project of Anti-Oedipal thinking
denotes.

While most forms of alternative thinking which

label themselves revolutionary operate with a model of the
social field somewhat similar to what Foucault understands as
a disciplinary society, Deleuze and Guattari are theorizing
in another space, a space which is accelerated and malleable,
much like the dissociative characteristics of "virtual"
education or inanimate business.
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Line Four treats of the "political" in an extremely explicit
manner.

It will be contended that strains of Marxism had to

mutate into something rather close to traditional anarchy in
order to compete with the rapid acceleration of alienating
and decentralizing capitalist tendencies.

But if anarchy is

to be revolutionary, if it wants to have social import, it
must forego two of its central tenets: human essentialism and
its solely repressive view of power.

We can pick up on

something like an essence to the individual in a disciplinary
society, and therefore we can also understand along with Marx
the fundamentally repressive nature of such a social
configuration.

But control alters the schema and allows us

to see, along with Foucault, that individuals are produced by
social configurations as mechanisms of power; if individuals
are produced by power, then power is not only suppressive but
productive, and individuals are products, not essences.

Thus

anarchy must rethink its program if it wants to be active in
the New World Order, and Deleuze and Guattari give us a
version of anarchy which can do just this.

Within the context of a Nietzschean mode of critique, a
theory of subjectivity which references itself over and
against the conception of a society of control, and a working
understanding of "deterritorializing" capitalism (understood
as the entire productive surface of the social field) the
possibilities for political theory indeed look skewed.
Deleuze and Guattari draw upon the productive process of the
schizophrenic not only to understand the increasingly
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arbitrary technology of the modern socius, but also to stake
a ground for a revolutionary political theory that is
operable in light of the backdrop of a society of control.

I

will discuss the relevance of the schizophrenic process for
social theory in light of a discussion of social "spaces" in
the fifth section of this essay.

"Space" is an all-

encompassing locution; we use it to refer to outer space,
virtual space, the inside of a building or institution, the
locale that we presently inhabit, the measurable distance .
between two or more entities, etc.

Deleuze and Guattari

extol the heed for a radically new conception of space, the
space which both capitalism and schizophrenia create .

To

say that social space is inhabited is to conceive of the
socius as striated and organized, mapped out and segmented
off; effectively, it is to understand location in a way which
allows for "viewing from a distance", for desire to envision
that which it does not have, to crave alterity.

To say that

social space is created is to posit desire as productive and
to flush all repressive inferiorities out onto the smooth,
flowing space of the social field.

I will begin a discussion

of the schizophrenic process in Line Five and it will carry
over into the conclusion of this essay.

LINE

ONE:

NIETZSCHE

AND

INTERIORITY

In the Introduction to Jean-Francois Lyotard's Libidinal
Economy , translator Iain Hamilton Grant eloquently states
the most widely accepted and proto-reductionist response to a
handful of essays which compose "a series of responses to the
demise of Structuralism":

"[A] somewhat naive anti-

philosophical expressionism, an aestheticizing trend hung
over from a renewed interest in Nietzsche prevalent in the
late 1960s."

Continuing:

"It is further held to be the

philosophical expression of the political situationism
experienced throughout Europe during that same period, just
as short-lived, and just as much a 'dead end' "! .

These

statements express, in cozy fashion, the method behind much
of the contemporary philosophical madness:

Contemporary

continental philosophy is radical, anarchic, blindingly fast
and sometimes altogether unintelligible.

It says nothing, or

when it does, it appears to be saying nothing of any
interest.

And for many, it was

short-lived; even many of

the current heavies in Parisian universities are opting for a
sounder, liberalistic philosophical axiomatic.

Whether or not the relevance of the work begun by Derrida,
Foucault, Lyotard, Irigaray, and Deleuze can be or has been
properly assessed is not yet known; I will make a claim in
this essay that at least the political and cultural facets of
Deleuze's co-authored theoretical experiments with
1 Jean-Francois Lyotard, Libidinal Econom y, trans. lain Hamilton Grant (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1993 ) p, xvii.
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activist/anti-psychiatrist Felix Guattari cannot be ignored
by philosophy or any other discipline which seeks to make
sense of contemporary mass culture and political ideology.
What can be asserted with respect to Grant's assessment of
the developmental and current state of contemporary nonAnglo-American thought is that its homage to Nietzsche is
warranted.

We cannot imagine the direction thinking took in

the late 1960s and early 1970s in France without correctly
assigning to Nietzsche the role of instigator.

This presents an entire field of problems, however, for
literally everyone seems to have different Nietzsches.

Nine

out of ten books written on Nietzsche begin with the
obligatory disclaimer regarding the manner in which one is to
read Nietzsche, the ever-extending possibilities for new
interpretations of his thought, the assertions regarding
which schools of thought can claim him for their own (was he
a philosopher, a poet, an historian, a psychologist, an
exceptionally astute social critic, etc.?).

Nietzsches pop

up everywhere, and what is most intriguing about his
appearances is that they are united by a proper name and
little else.

The difference, for example, between Heidegger

and Foucault's Nietzsche is immense; as is that between the
interpretations of Nietzsche offered by Alasdair MacIntyre,
Walter Kaufmann, Karl Jaspers, Jacques Derrida, and Georges
Bataille.

A very specific Nietzsche, one which will be

discussed in this chapter, will belong to this text, and he
will be counted among the ranks of philosophy.
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Heidegger's work on Nietzsche inaugurated the conceptual
approaches to Nietzschean studies in the fields of
phenomenology, existentialism, and ontology.

In fact,

Heidegger's four volume lecture series/research project on
Nietzsche, which he introduced to the public nearly fifty
years after Thus Spake Zarathrustra

was written, arguably

marks the moment of Nietzsche's inception into philosophy;
Heidegger made sure that we took Nietzsche seriously.
France, however, Nietzsche remained an implicit

In

influence on

phenomenological existentialism and Structuralism; thinkers
like Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levi-Strauss all acknowledged
their debt to Nietzsche, but rarely took him to task, offered
interpretations of his work, or included him in their general
projects.

It was not until 1962, when Deleuze published his

slim volume Nietzsche et la Philosophie , that the members of
the French intellectual world began to acknowledge the far
reaching implications of Nietzsche's thought for their
respective enterprises.

The point is not that thinkers like Foucault and Derrida, who
were already publishing work at this time, did not recognize
their indebtedness to Nietzsche's thought; what

Deleuze

offered to French intellectuals was their first
comprehensive, systematic, and explicitly respectful
interpretation of the Nietzschean program.

Deleuze's book

has been widely overlooked by American scholars; even in
circles where Nietzsche is well-preserved, Deleuze's work is
attended to as a footnote to better known and more
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constrained interpretations of Nietzsche's work.
point must be made extremely clear:
Philosophie

But one

Nietzsche et la

is the work which made it possible for France to

take Nietzsche seriously as a philosopher, because it is, for
all of its ambiguity and extremely chewy discourse, the first
offering in France of a systematization of Nietzsche's
thought.

The system Deleuze presents is intentionally loose

and unstable, but Deleuze recognized that unless someone gave
to Nietzsche a relationship with philosophical systems, it
would be impossible for philosophers to look upon his work as
philosophically meritorious.

As it turns out, this effort by

Deleuze to bring Nietzsche into the fold of philosophy
spurred an aesthetic liberation from rigorous analysis and
philosophic transcendentalism (these methods of inquiry were
wrapped up in Structuralism at the time Deleuze's book came
out) on all fronts.

It should not be surprising then that exactly ten years after
his critical study on Nietzsche, Deleuze teamed up with Felix
Guattari to write Anti-Oedipus, a text which marks for
critics both the furthest extension of "radical post
structuralism" and one of the last great moments of an
anarchic, irrational aesthetic expressionism.

This book is

remarkable for many reasons, and one of the most outstanding
is that it offers to anyone interested in Nietzschean studies
the opportunity to experience the true radicality of
Nietzsche's thought as it can be played out among the orders
of contemporary politics, culture, and psychoanalysis.

Anti-
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Oedipus

is a Nietzschean undertaking; it owes more to

Nietzsche than even Foucault does.

But before discussing the

intricacies of Anti-Oedipus , we need to examine the
Nietzsche that it uses, manufactures, exploits; in short, the
Nietzsche that it offers us.

Oedipus Rex

is a Greek

tragedy.

Oedipus emerges on the

historical scene as one of the primary myths of the first
civilized society.

And Nietzsche, aside from a few short

essays, began his prolific writing career with a book on
Greek tragedy.2

we tend to historicize ancient Greek

culture as advanced both intellectually and socially, for out
of the well-spring of culture that gave us Plato, Sophocles,
Euripides and Aristotle also came an organized record of
distinct social classes, a proto-democratic governing body
and legislature, etc. (of course Egypt had developed, in a
much earlier era, similarly complex social configurations;
the point is not that Greece was primary but that it was of
fundamental significance to Western Philosophy).
elements of The Birth of Tragedy

Two

will be relevant to this

discussion:

1.

Nietzsche's psychological analysis of Greek gods and

their functional purposes in society.
2.

The figure of Dionysus as a necessary

manifestation of

delirium.

2 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of W agner , trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Random House, 1967).
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1.

In The Birth of Tragedy , Nietzsche describes the

instantiation of the gods of Mount Olympus:

"[T]here is

nothing here that suggests asceticism, spirituality, or duty.
We hear nothing but the accents of an exuberant, triumphant
life in which all things, whether good or evil, are deified.
And so the spectator may stand quite bewildered before this
fantastic excess of life, asking himself by virtue of what
magic potion these high-spirited men could have found life so
enjoyable that, wherever they turned, their eyes beheld the
smile of Helen, the ideal picture of their own existence,
'floating in sweet sensuality'".3

Superficially, it looks

as if Nietzsche is granting to the Greeks an ability to
appreciate all facets of life unconditionally; that they had
no need of responsibility while at the same time thrived on
disaster and fortune alike.

Nietzsche recognizes, however,

that something deeply integral to psychological well-being
formed the roots of the "Olympian magic mountain":

"It was

in order to be able to live that the Greeks had to create
these gods from a most profound need."4

It is here that

Nietzsche begins to formulate the grounds for what will
become his fundamental critique of guilty consciousness:
Nietzsche recognizes that the uncertainty of life is indeed
cause for celebration, but he also envisions the need to
explain the tragic and the capacity man has for imposing
blame upon himself.

3 Ibid., p. 41.
4 ibid., p. 42.
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Guilt manifests itself in the Western historico-cultural
domain in various forms: Adam is guilty of transgression in
the Garden of Eden, thus mankind is forever guilty in the
eyes of God; later, Paul and his cohorts place an
unconquerable guilt upon humankind for the murder of Christ,
the son of God; Nietzsche proposes that we as a people are
guilty of the death of God, and asks us to consider the
weight of our deed in light of our own potentiality to become
gods ourselves; we repress the innate desires of the id, for
they are shameful, unhealthy, animalistic, our whole
unconscious is unconscionable, and thereby we understand our
psychological malfunctions.

One might even surmise that much

of our recent intellectual effort (from Kierkegaard to
Nietzsche to Heidegger to Sartre) has been constructed in the
wake of "existential" guilt.

And there are ever new events

to hold oneself and one's race accountable for:

The Black

Death,"the Crusades, the Holocaust, Stalin's Soviet onslaught
in the Ukraine, urban poverty, the national debt.

As a

reflective people, we simply cannot avoid the capacity for
becoming-guilty that necessarily emerges when we seek to
locate the source of our ailments.

Nietzsche notes that the

Greeks used their gods in a peculiar fashion; they used them
to relieve guilt.

Nietzsche contends that the Greek Gods served at least two
interconnected purposes:

First, these gods lived out the

vibrant, adventurous lives that the Greek people could not.
Men invented the immortal gods who could bear and even enjoy
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the absurdity of their own existence.

Thus the drama serves

a cathartic purpose for the Greek citizen:

He is privy to

the irrational, intoxicated and fully liberated element of
life, while he remains shielded from its full effects through
the media of the structured lyrical or dramatic performance.
Of course, we still see this trend today; in the movie
houses, in novels, in the theatre, we lose ourselves in
worlds of significance wherein we experience high adventure,
tragic loss, perversions of all shapes and sizes without
having to bear out the consequences of involving ourselves in
destructive activities.

Second, the Greek Gods relieve a specific form of existential
guilt.

It is a fairly common anthropological assumption that

the religion of a people can reveal a tremendous amount of
information about their psychical well-being.

It does not

take a lot of mental footwork to recognize that using one's
gods to relieve guilt is a psychologically healthier practice
than using them to impose it.

Nietzsche takes careful note of the differences between the
gods of antiquity and the Christian God.

While many would

contend that the Greeks cannot be held responsible for their
paganistic tendencies and naive theology due to their
"infantile" situatedness in the saga of developing humanity,
Nietzsche wants something else from the Greeks than a
precursor or a prolegomena to a future mode of thinking on
the Divine.

Nietzsche is a psychologist; his philology
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reflects this tendency.

Let us take, by way of contrast, the

myth of Prometheus and the myth of Eden.

Prometheus, feeling pity for humanity, goes directly against
the explicit orders of Zeus and brings fire to the ancient
Greeks.

One can hypothesize what this metaphorical fire

really meant to the Greeks:

It was none other than the word,

knowledge of good and evil, life and death; at once it was
the power to communicate and to revel in shameless desire,
Prometheus brought them the Logos.

And we recognize that his

gift is empowering; this transgression of Prometheus gave
power to the Greeks, allowed them to organize, civilize, and
striate their territory.

Now in possession of that which

Zeus had strictly forbidden them, the Greek people are
likened unto gods.

And Prometheus is sentenced to live out

his days strapped to a rock whereupon an eagle appears once
daily to eat out his liver.
this deed.

He is to bear the iniquity of

The true price of knowledge is to be paid only by

him; Prometheus is guilty, not humanity.

The myth of Eden offers the psychological antithesis of the
myth of Prometheus.

Adam is seduced by Eve into eating of

the Tree of Knowledge, the only tree in the Garden from which
they are forbidden to taste fruit.
they fall.

The serpent tempts them;

Once they obtain the word of God, the knowledge

of good and evil, they are immediately embarrassed by their
immodesty.

They hide their nakedness from God, who seeks

them out and exiles them from the Garden.

Not only that, but
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their heirs are doomed to live forever under the weight of
inescapable guilt which such knowledge brings.

Here it is

all of humankind that bears the guilt which necessarily
accompanies the acquisition of knowledge.

So it runs that both myths relay how humanity acquires the
capacity to understand and contemplate its activities; the
Greek myth removes the anxiety inherent in such an awakening,
the Christian myth drills it into the very core of our
existential state; Nietzsche was attuned to such differences
and puzzled over a history which would not only accept but
internalize its guilt, the Christian lineage, in a later work
entitled On the Genealogy of Morals.

Nietzsche's Judeo-

Christian history of guilty consciousness marks, for all
intensive purposes, the beginning of the psycho-analysis of
repression, the birth of the realization that something is
fundamentally wrong with the way we have come to organize and
understand ourselves.

2.

The figure of Dionysus, although a terrifying and

menacing embodiment of the dark, delirious, and irrational in
man, was deified and in fact recognized by the Greeks as an
integral facet of the world that they inhabited.

In the

sublime, comic medium of Greek tragedy, the transgressions of
all boundaries of the ego and the ethical were played out.
Nietzsche recognizes the comfortable distance established
between total peril and the audience as made manifest by the
"Apollonian" format of the dramatic performance.

There is a
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need to explore, to recognize, to even enjoy the dark side of
our souls, but it must be kept in check by a certain "pathos
of distance".

The chorus "dreams" the tragedy, which is

presented on the stage as Dionysian reality.

The audience

dreams with the chorus; an insight is gained by experiencing
the breakdowns of tragic figures, but this chaotic,
excessive, even libidinal

will (see, for example, Antigone )

is still veiled by the distance of the dream and spectating.

When Freud uses dream life to uncover what will eventually be
in his mature work the entire field of the unconscious, we
are once again reminded that the dream provides a way in, a
milieu where it is possible to elaborate the trappings of
that which does not belong to either immediate experience or
conscious reflection, the irrational Dionysian pagan play or
the unconscious libido.

While Nietzsche later abandons this

viewpoint in favor of an aesthetic brought about by intensely
lived artistic experience, it is important to note that here
Nietzsche seems to be asserting that existence itself is
justified through the filter of an Apollonian drama, but is
in fact constructed by the schizophrenic paganism of the
artist, Dionysius.

Nietzsche saw the collective "dream of

death" of an entire culture expressed in its dramatic
sensibilities.

While Greek gods served to stave off the guilt imposed by the
dialectical tension between the rational and the irrational
(conscious life and uninhibited desire, Apollo and Dionysus),
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the divine figure of Christianity, as touched on briefly
above, intensifies this guilt and internalizes it.

Nietzsche

will later, in his work on morality, introduce the notions of
active and reactive to characterize activities or "codes" of
existence which exhibit psychologically healthy or
psychologically damaging tendencies respectfully.

When

George Morgan describes Nietzsche's meditation on the
"moralization of existence" ( "[M]en mistook the sequences of
guilt and punishment for those of cause and effect"5 ), we
sense he is very close to a central theme that will run
throughout the course of this essay: the "internalization" of
Man by man, the "individuation" and becoming-social that
Freud describes, Foucault's analysis of the concept of Man as
tool of power and axis of repression.

Essentially, Nietzsche

is asking Reich's elusive and infamous question:

"What could

cause the masses to desire their own repression?"

We recognize that Reich was speaking about Fascism, about a
state of civilization so deplorable that it would elect an
autocratic, genocidal, power-mongering institution such as
the Third Reich as its fundamental organizing and controlling
mechanism.

But Nietzsche saw the seeds of Fascism in the

"moralization of existence": Fascism as expressed and made
manifest in the figurehead of the god of Christianity.

Thus

the concept of Fascism has a much larger scope than the
governing form of the Fascist State: It will refer to all
practices and modes of experience where lack is replaced or
5 George Morgan, What Nietzsche M e a n s , (London: Oxford University Press, 1943) p. 147.
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exploited by one form of power or another, from the
internalization of the guilty consciousness and the birth of
"Man" to the radically unsound hyper-structures of
contemporary capitalism which create vicissitudes with the
media, mass culture, education, etc., and which force feed
the contemporary individual its desires.

The analytic of

internalized and inflicted psychological repression begins
with Nietzsche, with the analysis of a form of consciousness
that emerges as a result of a guilt-laden value system.
Nietzsche is the catalyst for thinking about what looks to be
an almost innate and certainly destructive tendency to
internalize domesticating forms of power.

In an early essay entitled On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral
Sense , Nietzsche begins to formulate his most devastating
question:

"What is the value of truth for life?"

This

question will come to inform all of his subsequent work on
morality.

Whatever truth is or may be, it should be noted

that up until this point in the history of philosophy the
value

of truth had never been called into question.

That

is, every thinker from Plato to Hegel offers a conception of
what truth is ; it is Nietzsche who tries to tell us what it
is worth.

Against Plato, who desires an "unchanging account of
unchanging being", and in a somewhat dizzying spiral out of
Kant, Nietzsche assures us that "[t]he 'thing in itself' (for
that is what pure truth, without consequences, would be) is
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quite incomprehensible to the creators of language and not at
all worth aiming for."6

The role language plays in

instituting the internal aspect of Man is another theme that
will traverse the Nietzschean landscape; indeed, it must be
noted that the entirety of the Genealogy
a critique of ethical language.

is little more than

Of course, Kant already had

told us that the "thing in itself" cannot be known, that the
"true" state of reality is hidden from us and that the
"phenomenal" world of experience is all we can hope for.

But

unlike Kant, Nietzsche will accede no possibility of
distinction between reason and its objects; he only describes
a reckless forgetfulness and a play of metaphor.

What he intends by this notion of forgetfulness is simply
that our language draws us into deception, or better, attunes
us to the deception that composes reality.

It is only by

forgetting that all frogs exist in different spaces and times
and are of different shapes and sizes and move differently
and so forth that we could ever Come to understand the
concept "frog".

Thus the "truth" is gained by forgetting

that we are false before ourselves.

This may

seem

inconsequential until we recognize that here we have a
definition of truth which stands in contradistinction to the
Platonic Ideal:

Rather than privileging the formal concept

of "frog" and understanding each manifestation of the concept
in reality (each actual frog) as an imperfect replica of such

6 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Portable N ietzsche , trans. Walter Kaufmann ( New York: Penguin Books,
1954) P. 45.
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a concept, Nietzsche confronts us with the painful
observation that concepts are nothing more than the implicit
agreement to lie to and among ourselves.

And this counters

even Kant, who developed his entire systematic around the
imposition of the faculties of reason upon reality, which for
him was the precondition for anything at all like experience
to take place.

Long before the Logical Positivists declared

that all deductive (i.e., a priori) truth is either
contradictory or tautological, Nietzsche informs us of man
that:

"If he does not wish to be satisfied with truth in the form of a
tautology - that is, with empty shells - then he will forever buy
illusions for truths. What is a word? The image of a nerve stimulus in
sounds.
But to infer from the nerve stimulus, a cause outside us, that
is already the result of a false and unjustified application of the
principle of reason..."7

Nietzsche asks why we act honestly and champion truth.

His

answer is simply that we have internalized the concept of
honesty as a highest goal; it has become a structural
component of the way we define ourselves, our legislature,
our social responsibilities.

But a concept internalized

becomes a concept immune to critique.
Morals

On the Genealogy of

is Nietzsche's most profound discussion of the

capacity for internalization.

We ask ourselves what internalization means.

How does man

gain the "capacity" to internalize morals, desires, an image
and a dogma of himself ?
7 Ibid,

p. 45.

He must first understand that he
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has an interior; a soul, perhaps, something extra-physical.
With this comes an odd sense of responsibility, of guilt, of
the capability to remember and regret.

Nietzsche begins his polemic with a claim regarding the
psychologists of his day:

"These English psychologists -

what do they really want?

One always discovers them

voluntarily or involuntarily at the same task, namely at
dragging the partie honteuse

[shame] of our inner world into

the foreground and seeking the truly effective and directing
agent, that which has been decisive in its evolution."®

The

question "What does it want?" is the force and flow of
Nietzschean critique.

Nietzsche examines every event

according to the intentions and wills involved; he is
determined to know what each participant (being an
individual, a locale, a political organization, a religious
history, a text, etc.) wants ; this is the crux of genealogy,
and is the approach that, for Nietzsche, allows the surest
access to underlying or implicit values.
many ways the first structuralist.

Nietzsche is in

But his jibe at

psychology rings through with truth; he saw that much of what
he knew as modernity had adopted a certain crude model of the
individual and that many of our practices (psychology,
religion, legislature, discipline) presupposed an interiority
of man, one which informs and causes

his actions.

The

psychologist does not evaluate an action; he judges the

8 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce H o m o , trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J.
Hollingdale ( New York: Random House, In c.) p. 24.
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distraught or disturbed individual who intentionally caused
this action to occur.

Nietzsche thinks that we are too

comfortable with this model, the inner or animated element of
man (his "true" self) as the purveyor and instigator of all
activities.

He therefore inquires into how it came to be the

case that this "inner" depth was acquired.

Nietzsche again looks to the civilizations of antiquity, but
this time he has a different agenda.

The dichotomy of "good"

and "bad", as manifest in Ancient Greece, is a distinction
which, if eyed carefully, looks very foreign to modern man.
In such a civilization, the power to judge was acquired by
those who could physically claim it; that is, the concept of
"good" and everything which came to be understood as such,
was determined out of the distance between the aristocratic
warrior class and the plebeian peasantry.

The aristocrats

had dominant political power, thus they had the correct
values; this was not a correlation, simply a self-evident
mode of life.

The values of the warrior class were the

"good" values; since these folks were jubilant, vain, and
decadent, jubilance, vanity, and decadence came to be "high"
values; whatever enhanced the sensation of life was "good".
The concept of "goodness" owed its value to a class
distinction; the values of the warrior aristocracy (luck,
risk, danger, power, cunning, art, war) were all high values;
those of the plebeians (humility, patience, meekness, piety)
were, only by way of contradistinction, "bad" values, lowminded values.
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Nietzsche contrasts this value system with one which develops
as the result of an instantiation of the ascetic mentality,
made manifest in the priestly class, whereby reaction and
revenge work in tandem to subvert the dichotomy of "good" and
"bad".

Nietzsche does not intend for us to think that one

develops as a result of the other, nor that there is some
form of causal linkage which constitutes both as value
systems; he intends only to point out the radically different
origins which seem to surface when we approach various
dominating mentalities.

In all fairness, it should be

pointed out that Nietzsche appears, throughout the text, to
favor what he refers to as the "life-affirming" values of
antiquity over the "slave morality" of the priestly class.
Nietzsche does recognize, however, along with Kierkegaard,
that once we have gained the capacity for moral depth, there
is no going back; to attempt to do so would be beastly.

And

thus we are to read his interpretation of the evolution of
the guilty consciousness as merely a stifling movement in the
lineage of value systems.

Nietzsche attributes to the priestly class a certain
cleverness which is actually closer to cunning (he admires
Paul for being one of the shrewdest psychologists of all
time).

So the priestly mentality is clever; it forces regret

and reflection upon the high-minded.

A new model of life and

existential purpose arises; no longer is the human cause one
of life-affirmation and acquiring wealth, power, and
prestige.

Now the very values which once allowed one to rule
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and live vigorously have become shameful and base, in fact
"evil".

"Good" itself has become "evil".

A "doctrine of

love" (behind which stands the figurehead of a judgmental God
who favors patience, humility, piety, meekness, passivity,
and peace) inverts the rules; man is given a soul which is
accountable to a God who admonishes love and sanctity and
humility.

One may speculate that the Jews defeated the

Romans by making them reflectively attentive to a moral
"inner" sense.

Once man is convinced that he has a soul, he

can also become convinced that there is a judgable facet
behind his every act and deed.

While the lower classes are

exploited or even abused, they acquire a smug sense of
superiority from this doctrine of the soul.

What emerges is a reversal of values (the "high-minded"
aristocratic values are now acts of evil by which all
oppressors will be judged) and, more importantly,

a depth

to mankind:

"For the priests everything becomes dangerous, not only cures and
remedies, but also arrogance, revenge, acuteness, profligacy, love, lust
to rule, virtue, disease - but it is only fair to add that it was on the
soil of this essentially dangerous form of human existence, the priestly
form, that man first became an interesting animal, that only here did he
acquire depth and become evil...One will have divined how easily the
priestly mode of valuation can branch off from the knightly-aristocratic
and then develop into its opposite; this is particularly likely when the
priestly caste and the warrior caste are in jealous opposition to one
another and are unwilling to come to terms.
The knightly-aristocratic
value judgements presupposed a powerful physicality, a flourishing,
abundant, even overflowing health, together with that which serves to
preserve it:
war, adventure, hunting, dancing, war games, and in
general all that involves vigorous, free, joyful activity...The truly
great haters in world history have always been priests; likewise the
most ingenuous haters: other kinds of spirit hardly come into
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consideration when compared with the spirit of priestly vengefulness."9

So we are brought to bear with a politically charged reversal
of values, and indeed it works:

we note that by the middle

ages, the Roman Catholic Church had replaced the Holy Roman
Empire as the world's most powerful institution.

A priestly

aristocracy had emerged to replace the warrior aristocracy;
and it prevailed due to cunning.

To borrow Nietzsche's

metaphor, the bird of prey was made to feel bad

for

slaughtering the innocent lamb.

An important side note:

Nietzsche feels that this reversion

was a calculated manifestation of the will turning against
life .

The knightly-aristocratic values affirmed the

physicality, the struggle, of existence.

The new order of

values, where human dignity, peace, passivity, dominate as
proper values, represents a turning of the will against the
physical towards the "spiritual", the "moral".

Certainly,

man becomes interesting, but he is irreparably altered to the
point where reflection and repentance, benevolence and
generosity can not now be scrutinized as dangerous or anti
human.

These priestly values have actually become man; the

inner sense, the capacity to do evil and to feel bad about
it, slowly becomes inseparable from our political and social
modes of existence.

Nietzsche intimates that the aforementioned reversal of
values, born of ressentiment
9 Ibid,p. 32-33.

(the low-minded will turning
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against life), grants to man the possibility for
internalizing guilt.

The soul is judged by God according to

its purity, its goodness and its justness.

Nietzsche notes

that purity originated as a ritualistic, body oriented
practice akin to that of physical cleanliness; with the sense
of a spiritual interiority also comes an internalization of
purity; man is now accountable for being spiritually pure.
Once internal and external purity are equated, so also do we
equate unjust acts and sexual frivolity with rotten meat and
physical uncleanliness; as one is bad for the body, so the
other is decadent for the soul.

This God which serves as a monitoring device for the moral
sphere in man is the hyperbolic example of guilt-ridden
consciousness.

God is all-powerful, the word of law and the

force of justice; when Jesus, the son of God, died for our
sins, we were not saved by divine providence; we were
infected with the most pervasive and unconquerable guilt that
mankind has ever known.

The son of God has to die to save us

from our deplorable state of sinfulness, and we are suddenly
aware that we are morally regrettable.

Humanity is weak,

unable to overcome its basest desires, and thus we require,
for spiritual healing, the death of the highest power
hitherto.

This is the mark of repentance; we are invested

with a sense of guilt upon which we can never make good, a
permanent, unconquerable moral lack.

The only thing that can

fill our spiritual lacunae is the death of the holiest being
conceivable.

The ascetic mentality feels spiritually vacuous
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and permanently guilty.

Obviously, as we saw above with the

Greeks, gods do not have to be the constant reminders of
existential guilt; they do not need to serve only a profound
neurosis.

Nietzsche, in his most telling and acute

recognition of cultural anxiety, notes that the priestly
mentality and the moral sphere as monitored by the Christian
God are symptoms of mental sickness in the Western mind.

The

social unconscious is neurotic.

In the final section of On the Genealogy of Morals ,
Nietzsche touches upon the Protestant work ethic.

He

analyzes the industrious attitudes that emerged from dwelling
in the shadow of a condition of guilt.

We begin to believe

that hard work and prosperity are in fact God's plan, ann
Nietzsche notes that work in fact takes the mind far from its
meditation upon life's seeming lack of purpose.

He notes

that like sheep, mindless ascetics gather into a herd and
thereby acquire a diluted sense of strength.

It sounds as

though the stage is set for mercantilism and, eventually,
capitalism.

But to link the encroachment of capitalism to a

very general discussion of a value-laden social framework is
without question to underestimate the pervasiveness of the
contemporary world order.

I will touch upon the forces and

connections that lend to the social sector the possibility
for a worker based economic and political system in Line
Three.

As a parting shot, it should be noted that until the time of
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Constantine (roughly 300 A.D.), Christianity had no real
purchase among the powerful.

Between the time of Paul (who

effectually paved the way for an intellectual revolt in
morality) and Freud, the self
interiority.

became a privatized

We know that Socrates talked of knowledge of

the self as a virtuous and important acquisition; but he
understood the self as inextricably linked to the activities
and habits that it took up with.

Although we rarely speak of

God as judge anymore, we have little trouble making the
analogical jump from the exterior legislation imposed by the
figurehead of God to the internalization of the legislative
machines monitored by the figurehead Man; our courtrooms
fester with remnants of the priestly mentality ("Who is
responsible for this illicit act?") and the legal system
teams up with the psychologists in order to determine,
according to "mental state", where and how guilt is to be
ascertained ("Can she be held legally responsible for her
actions?

Is she sane or not?").

So it remains that while we do not pander to God any longer
for forgiveness, nor pay indulgences to the church for sins
committed, we still operate according to a certain
hierarchical and bipolar model of the individual left over
from the sickly mentality of the priestly class.

We have not

abandoned the notion that man's actions are the physical
manifestations of his inner desire to act a certain way, his
lack of self-restraint, etc.
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It would be premature, however, to assume that we can mount a
critique of capitalist culture and psycho-speak ideology from
a few assumptions about shifting historical values.

In

section three of this essay, I will take up with Foucault and
his analysis of modern institutions as a way of coming to
terms with value-patterns in a social rubric inundated with
accelerated technological advancements and barren of the
assuredness provided by a super-terrestrial, authoritarian
Deity.

Both Foucault and Deleuze argue that certain

scientific, legislative, and psychological patterns have
allowed for a renunciation of the guilty consciousness
attributable to an inner moral sphere but have simultaneously
allowed it to be replaced by an infinitely more complicated
and pervasive figurehead of Man; thus the plague of humanism
(the belief that man holds in himself and his own innate
goodness) will be addressed below in Lines Three and Four.
But first, I should like to approach this "myth of the
interior" from a more contemporary perspective, that of
Freudian Psychoanalysis.

Line Two outlines the connections

between Nietzschean suggestions regarding the role of
psychology in cultural repression and the explicit attack on
psychoanalysis as a domesticating avatar of Fascism brought
out in Anti-Oedipus.

LINE

TWO:

CULTURAL OEDIPALIZATION

"I continue to hear messages in the environment... I'm angry over the
fact that these messages seem to occur everywhere...I can only hope to
respond imaginatively and appropriately to the significance contained
herein...In the daytime I become someone else...Only as I wait for sleep
do I perceive reality as a tangible presence.
There is no substance in
my waking life, no truth...I have been having thoughts I can't
decipher...Does this make my perception of reality more thorough? is it
significant that I wish to retain my private conception of reality?..."1
Edward, a schizophrenic

Anti-Oedipal thought is a thinking outside, a thinking
outside of belonging.

Why must we think the subject?

Why

are we indebted to the history which presents, in direct and
precedented mannerisms, our most intricate and inescapable
distractions and problematics?

It is not the over-coming of

the Platonic Ideal which will a t last grant philosophy its
true place.

For we have, always and everywhere, misplaced,

displaced, and overturned the Platonic.

We have no enemy in

the history of thought; nor do we have a friend.

It is

thinking itself which has become null, domesticated.
knows this more than Deleuze.

No one

We are in a position, at the

end of the twentieth century, to once again begin again.

We

have never had an Objective; thought was never dialectical or
progressive.

The acceleration towards truth is a fantastical

nightmare, a life-negating manifestation of the repression of
desire*

A culture of religious, political, and theoretical

neuroses; thus we staple our blood-mark onto the organism of
history.

All possible avenues of acceleration, of speed and

depth and cunning have been marked off and delineated; civil

1 Michael Robbins, Experiences of Schizophrenia ( New York: The Guilford Press, 1993) p.86.
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thinking is stagnant.
psychologist.

Nietzsche gives us away, the ultimate

A snide and sophisticated bastard he is,

revealing the sated truth of modernity.

We strive forward in

our wretched and docile bliss, appeasing ourselves and our
neurotic ends with over-production and easily inhabitable
psycho-speak.

The new god is upon us; let us pray that we

not suffocate under the weight of his mediocrity.

That is what lies before us; wasteland, the visibility of the
truant, the absent, the loss of possibility for thought.

But

escape is a myth; culture represses, owns, controls,
formulates the there, the how, the when.

We eat and breathe

our own waste, only to expel and regurgitate the bile of
humanity in a new and interesting form.
feast again.

We then proceed to

Time has called us here, and we must pay heed;

a new order is upon us, the call of thinking beckons; rancid
passivity and appeals to authority be gone; the time of
thinking is at hand.

Stop. Listen.

It can be heard and

realized.

The attitude of the penitent:

Who cares?

is all that will penetrate the fog*
of the multiple.

A sour disposition

We see the intoxication

Not the Last Man; not even the Ubermensch .

We seek to lose our foundation, thereby we are saved.

The

history of philosophy has been an engagement with the history
of philosophy.

Thought comes neatly packaged and

diametrically opposed to life; we suck our own blood, eat our
own fat, and drink from the stagnant pool of our own
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recesses.

Thinking knows its bounds; how did this ever come

to be the case?

It plays out as such:

Nietzsche has done a fine thing in

attempting to loose us from our repressed, prudish, eclectic
cultural stigmas, and much of modern thought is gravely
indebted to him for this.

In Anti-Oedipus , Deleuze and

Guattari ride Nietzsche through the bowels of psychoanalysis
in order to exceed forms of domesticating fascism, to expose
ours as a culture of repression and neurosis. They attribute
much of our complex social dysfunction to the repression of
elements of desire found in contemporary psychoanalytic
thought; residuals of certain conceptions of the self which
suppress and direct our thinking about ourselves are nothing
more than stains on the psychoanalyst's couch.

One wants to extol the impact of the death of God upon modern
man; what new existential roles are we to adopt in light of
the absence of a foundation?

In the process of becoming-

Gods, are we in fact limited by residuals of moral and
metaphysical values, what Deleuze, in Nietzsche and
Philosophy,

has christened "avatars of the dialectic"?

The

project of Anti-Oedipus , in fact the entirety of the work
set forth by Deleuze and Guattari,

might be assessed simply

as an attempt to uncover any and all remaining embodiments of
repressive, limiting thought in order to give them a proper
burial.
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What begins in Nietzsche and is to some extent realized with
Deleuze is a new and unconventional means of construing the
"self";

if the self is understood as multiplicities which

participate always and everywhere in desiring-production, as
Deleuze and Guattari assert, then we are at a point in
history where it becomes possible to inaugurate, map and
explore a selfless self .

Not even; we are purely selfless;

the site of the self is vacant,

with the absence of any

autonomous core, the self can only be employed through a
radical phenomenology of desire, a very physical and
liberated philosophy of will; this was Nietzsche's ephemeral
dream.

But most importantly, we are now confronted with a new way of
thinking desire: without the subject, it is not possible to
situate desire as a lack.

Desire can only be seen as a lack

when it is repressed under totalizing categories such as
"self", "sanity", "whole", "normal" and "ego"; it can only be
seen as a lack once it has been molded into that which it is
not.

"I am me and not you, I am I and want you".

the crux of the matter.

This is

Nietzsche's relentless attempts to

free thinking from crushing guilt complexes and definitive
individual categorizations are the footholds of Anti-Oedipal
schizo-analysis; it is only through the rigorous
deconstruction of all totalities (God, state, mommy, daddy,
me) that desire can be seen for what it truly is:
and art, overflow and energy.

Expression

This leads to a stark

confrontation between psychoanalysis and schizoanalysis.

The
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Deleuzian/Guattarian conception of desire

mimics and

modulates Nietzsche's will ; this will be the starting point,
our plane of departure into the nebulous of anti-oedipal
desire, an anti-metaphysic

of will.

As the will is tamed

and forced to reflectively understand itself in constant
reference to a "moral sphere" by an historically impotent
priestly mentality, so desire is domesticated and instilled
as a lack

by the contemporary psychoanalytic church.

We

cannot imagine desire as productive, as anything but divested
from its object.

In the Genealogy , Nietzsche plays shrink.

The curtain

rises, and the stage reveals a consciousness in chains,
thought in bondage.

We are guiltyI

There is no need to

recite our crimes, but we shall, because it makes us feel
better: we have executed the son of God, and we have done so
because we ourselves are not worthy of his goodness.

We had

need of redemption, and this we achieved, though only at a
price higher than any of us can afford.

I do not want this

guilt; thus speaks the agnostic (more on this point below).
But there is good news:

As a means of covering up this

heinous crime, some of the more ingenious among us set out to
murder Dad; thus we killed the son and the father.

This last

deed was a whopper; we have not yet begun to come to terms
with it.

The death of God reveals the absence of all sense

of security; the "bare manifold" has never looked more bare.
But the murder of God frees us from all forms of existential
guilt...there is now no hierarchy, no stipulative rule for
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the correct procession of human affairs:

We are free. Let us

set to paint the canvas in all the fantastical colors of
springtime, let us ride our ideas into the sun, let us "give
birth to a dancing star"...

Unfortunately, as we all-too-clearly realize, the impact of
this superb, indeed superior, deed has not and perhaps will
not be fully assessed.

For Dad is not really dead;

vanquished, perhaps, from the realm of intellectual theology,
and even from a majority of our metaphysical models; but Dad
is tricky, shifty, and he crops up again and again in forms
that are hard to recognize, even harder to pinpoint for
extermination; He forms the backbone of psychoanalysis, the
crux of deontological ethics; he appears, strangely enough,
as us, as what we think we are, as the "self"; he infiltrates
the life-force and modifies thinking, he tames us,
domesticates us, and makes us afraid of our own desires; as
if our desires could belong to us in the first place.

He is

God, Dad, Oedipus, Me, State, Other, (your name here).
Deleuze, speaking of the Dialectic and the insidious manner
by which it creeps into twentieth century humanist thought,
notes the "incapacity of this philosophy to end in anything
but the ego, man, or phantasms of the h u m a n " . 2

"What a mistake it was to have ever said the id.
it is machines..

Everywhere

History of Moralization and

2 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy , trans. Hugh Tomlinson ( New York: Columbia University
Press, 1983) p. 162.
3 A nti-O ed ip u s , p. 1.
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Dismoralizatiom

Evolution of the antithesis ego/non-ego:

"It seems evident that the value of the single ego could lie
only in relating itself to the tremendous "non-ego", being
subject to it and existing for its sake".

Proceeding on:

"[I]n what actions does man affirm himself most strongly?
Around these (sexuality, avarice, lust to rule, cruelty,
etc.) prohibition, hatred, and contempt were heaped: one
believed there were unselfish drives, one condemned all the
selfish ones, one demanded the u n s e l f i s h ".4

Both Nietzsche

and Deleuze acknowledge that the starting point of repression
is the subject.

Without it, responsibility cannot be affixed

to action, "moral choice" cannot be a structure of
consciousness/unconsciousness, and there can quite literally
be no such thing as "repressed", "unhealthy", or otherwise
immoral desires, i.e. manifestations of the will.

Thinking

stops abruptly at the inauguration of the subject; it breaks
down right at the border of the self .

We ask how this could

be the case; the traditional paradox, roughly stated, is as
follows: The self (subject, individual) is the origin,
protector, and expressive vessel for thought; there is no
thought without the thinking self.

Thus it is not possible,

probable, nor even theoretically practical to attempt to
"think" the subject away, to eliminate its dictatorial
status.

But in order to answer this tricky construction of the
"subject-as-thinker", we must do some backtracking.

In

On

4 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to P o w er , trans. Waiter Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale ( New York:
Random House, Inc. 1967) p. 414.
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The Genealogy of Morals , Nietzsche comments upon the abusive
structure of the "moral self".

Nietzsche notes how

interesting man became once a soul was attributed to him;
suddenly a man of depth, of great spiritual complexity; a man
with the capacity to do evil ,
capacity to feel bad about it.5

and a consciousness with the
The metaphysical tendency

to deny the physical or phenomenal in lieu of a "higher"
abstract Purity had struck at the core of our existence; the
body, the physical, the will, was subjugated to the soul,
thereby erecting a dialectical antithesis at the level of the
individual from which we are still wont to escape.

Here the

reactive forces triumph, for the framework of reality
experiences an inversion.

Indeed the whole grid of knowledge

shifts: "What do I need and how will I get it?" becomes "Are
my actions in accordance with the Rule of Law?" and "What can
I know absolutely?"

The unchanging, absolute world of which

we only experience "decadent" parts can be known by the
eternal soul, for which our physical bodies are only fleshy
containers.

Our bodies will pass, our souls will move on;

death is not for us.

But it remains that we are indeed

physical (therefore imperfect, decadent, weak, inferior).
What saving grace is there for us, a civilization of
failures; how are we to be redeemed when we fall victim to
the temptations of the flesh, the beckonings of the earth?

The death of the most high, the eternally righteous; sent to
lead us down the path to salvation, we murder him.
5 On the Genealogy of M orals , p.33.

His blood
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is substituted for our sins.

We are indeed responsible at

the moral level for all the sins we commit; our
transgressions so evil that the holiest of holies,
righteousness par excellence,

must be slain by our own

hands; and now out with the metaphors:

We are washed in the

blood (ughi), redeemed by the lamb, saved by amazing grace
and divine providence.

We are so bad

that we cannot be

reconciled even to ourselves without sacrificing the epitome
of goodness.

Thus we are indebted, from the beginning.

Existential guilt has never been more concrete: "The son of
God was crucified so that your puny pathetic life could have
some stitch of meaning".

The cries of the blasphemous: "I do

not want the burden of the death of God on my souli"

It is

an all-encompassing, permanent, unconquerable guilt, a debt
of guilt which one can never make good on.

For the goodness

and purity of God is now evident, evident only in contrast to
the weakness, banality, and degradation of humanity.
Remember, Nietzsche notes that while Greek cultures used
their Gods to relieve them of guilt (Homeric heroes blamed
the gods for misfortune and gave themselves credit for all of
their accomplishments, i.e. Odysseus), we have used ours to
shower us with guilt; we are subject to the inferiority of
the physical and the immorality of unhealthy desires, and the
absolute goodness of our progenitor constantly reminds us of
this, our heavy human penance (our penance for being human).
As stated in Line One, using gods to relieve guilt rather
than using them to instill guilt is psychologically a
healthier practice.
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But the interiority attributed to the human self soon begins
to crumble, and not long after the death of God.

The creator

and protector of the soul is absent; the "moral interior" of
the self comes under fire.

Yet while the notion of an

eternal spiritual self loses its luster, the foundations of
consciousness are strengthened.
the theological, for example.

The psychological replaces
And it is no surprise that

after existing for centuries in a state of constant
existential neurosis, we might look for something to
supplement or replace the confines of a guilty conscious, now
without focus.

As Foucault notably realizes, there is a

little bit of fascism in all of us; the desire to be
dominated, mandated, repressed.
the guilt still remains.

The cause of guilt removed,

The question then becomes;

"To

what level of organization can I now commit my 'existence' in
order to understand myself in a comfortable hierarchy?"
answer:

The

Daddy, mommy, me; the triangle of repressed desire.6

Oedipus, the new God, awakens everywhere.

And the level of

the nuclear family is not the beginning or the end of
oedipalization:

it occurs everywhere, in all activity, the

manifestations of unconscious desire here repressed, there
contextualized, here expressed, there forbidden.

"It is

obvious that when traditional psychoanalysis explains that
the instructor is the father, and that the colonel too is the
father, and that the mother is nonetheless the father too, it
reduces all of desire to a familial determination that no
longer has anything to do with the social field actually
6Anti-Oedipus, pp. 1-50.

47
invested by the libido."7

it is the lust for the mother,

the hatred of the father which first informs structures of
desire; everything becoming threat, everything becoming
other, everything becoming father, becoming Oedipal...Deleuze
and Guattari make no mistake: Desire does not first find its
object in the form of the separate-mother, nor does it stake
its opposition in the guise of the father; rather the figure
of the always-already Oedipalized paranoiac father, the
dictatorial oppressor, establishes the rules of play for
desire: guilt is re-routed, re-organized; it shifts from a
guilt of transcendental proportions to a guilt of
unconscious/libidinal proportions, but the devastating
effects remain.

Thus the morally accountable subject is theologically
reproached for its spiritual inferiority, and the
psychological atomistic subject is analytically reproached
for harboring unmentionable and unacceptable desires.

Once

again the ascetic reactivist triumphs; our condition remains
one of unconquerable guilt.

What this really amounts to is a

harnessing of the will, in Nietzsche's terms, or an
Oedipalizing of desire, within the framework of Anti-Oedipus.
We attribute the will to the subject, in order to encapsulate
it, to give it visible and relatively static bounds, and
evaluate the condition
this subject.

of "want" from the vantage point of

When Nietzsche claims that there is no such

thing as a "will", we take him to mean that there is no will
7 Ibid.,

p. 62.
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for the illusory a-historical subject, there is no will which
serves repression.

The subject, as useful illusion, is

convenient; it serves to locate and define us within a nexus
of activities.

But it has a dangerous capacity to overtake

these subtle contextual bounds and stand forth as the final
triumph of Absolutism.

If we think of will as a particular

element of the self, as that which originates and takes form
within the self, then we are not thinking about will.
really the case that "I" control "my" will?

Is it

Not at all; one

will overtakes and dominates another; "I" am nothing but a
convenient and locutionary residue of a conflict of wills.

will is a transitional process, a life-dynamic, not a
"within", not a manifestation of the "interior", of
consciousness.

Will is expressive, not repressive; it

reaches out and promotes change; Nietzsche loves change.
Change for change's sake, never for the utilitarian good and
never for the betterment of the socius, simply for the sake
of differentiation.

There is never a thesis, an antithesis,

or a synthesis, for each of these is many, multiple, a
complexity of values, conditions, stimuli, etc.
evolve, we are always becoming.
exceeds.

We never

Will never wants, it always

Will is the force of flux which abets becoming; and

becoming is a chaotic tendency towards difference.
is without end, without object.

Becoming

We don't "become older" or

"become author" in the sense of a teleological fixed end;
becoming is process, not product,

what we were before is

still ahead of us and what we will be is already gone; change
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for change's sake.

Our highest values are simply

manifestations of will. Truth is "the will to be master over
the multiplicity of sensations."8

Desire has traditional value as a lack; it seeks what it is
not or does not have.

Thus the first realization by the

child that the mother is separate, detached, other, is
accompanied by the desire to re-possess the mbther/other, to
once again be unified with her.

Of course the father steps

in here and re-affirms the element of difference, smashing
the crux of identity into the subject-box.

"I am I and not

my mother"; only here, after this fundamental degree of
separation, is desire given any credence; subject desires
object.

Desire can therefore only come after the fact, only

come too late, and it is always perverse.

Anti-Oedipus

seeks a new formulation of desire, one which is not dependent
upon the subject for context.

"Desire does not lack

anything; it does not lack its object.

It is, rather, the

subject that is missing in desire, or desire that lacks a
fixed subject; there is no fixed subject unless there is
repression".9

That the unconscious is not productive but

expressive; that it only dabbles in representation, in
expressing its own repressed tendencies; this is the meager
and impotent picture of the unconscious given to us by the
psychoanalyst.

What would it mean to say that desire is

productive, that it is a creative force?

8 The Will to Power, Section 517.
9 Anti-Oedipus, p.26.

If desire first
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establishes its object as other, and then determines that
there is a capacity for union or rejoinder therewith, then
desire is reactive .

It reacts to oppositional stimuli.

This is not the picture of desire we obtain when we vanquish
the subject.

Desire now becomes active, productive? it

"plugs-in" everywhere, forming and breaking apart machines of
desire-production.

Let us think about this another way.
should not make too much of this.

Nietzsche went mad; we

Nietzsche does not care

for truth; Is there an "I"? Lets say no; what new thoughts
can we think, what can we now do?

Encapsulating structures

limit the flight of thinking, do not allow thinking to play,
to progress, to create.

Rather, boundaries for thought are

erected at the site of the subject, of truth, of God, of
history.

Thinking occurs within the confines of such

limiting structures, and yet we persuade ourselves that
thinking is free, that it knows no bounds; we say things
like:

"Anything is logically possible, just not empirically

provable".

This is a gross subordination of thinking to its

own creations; thought is confined to think the subject, to
think in hierarchies and orders, to establish categories for
understanding and divisions between objects.

The self is

related in such and such a way to the state, the apple is
related in such and such a way to the tree, etc.
only

We think

in terms of identity and difference, of unity of Being

and separation of beings.

We never have thought and now

cannot think in multiplicities.

Thought cannot be creative
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because it knows its bounds, it cannot be artistic because it
knows only the ancient medium of metaphysics.

But what does a psychological ordering give us?
Yet another standard for evaluation.

A standard.

What some might call a

healthy mentality can now be witnessed as a severe criterion
for normalcy.

The neurotic is so because of an early absence

of affection; the neurotic is a lack.

The obsessive is so

because she has never compensated for her lack of a penis;
the obsessive is a lack.
because,..ah, wait.

The schizophrenic is so

The schizophrenic is an enigma; there is

no cause for such a severe dysfunction.

Schizophrenia has

not yet fully become an object of knowledge.

It is a call

for thinking which cannot yet be answered.

Yet we have already answered it; the answer is to Oedipalize.
We know what "normal" is; we know that the schizo is not.
Through the use of drugs and within the context of
psychoanalysis we can attempt to "cure" him/her.

Again the

fixed subject rears its ugly head; there is a definitive mark
( the mentally stable self, the "I" which understands itself
as such ) for which to aim.

The human condition is one of

certain forms of understanding and not of other forms.

The

schizophrenic is not merely different; we construe the schizo
as sick

at the basest level.

There is no "I" for many

schizophrenics; there are pluralities and variable "Is",
shifting and slipping "Is" which transgress the boundaries of
any limiting sphere.

Thus the first task of the analyst is
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to instill the "I", to fix identity.

It is not the schizo

who admits to a condition of abnormality (which hints at a
condition of inferiority).

Or rather, it may be the schizo

who admits this condition, but only when the construction of
identity fails, only after the shrink has confronted the
schizo as other, as incapable of handling "reality".

This

brings up two points.

First, that this shrink no longer need be a licensed
practitioner of psychology; the shrink-image is now
internalized ; we have little or no need of psychologists to
confirm our idiosyncracies.

We have internalized the

formula, and are now perfectly capable of mentally policing
ourselves.

Thus we all know the basic problem of

schizophrenia; there is no fixed "I" there.

What we fail to

account for is that there is no fixed "I" anywhere; we easily
mask our own schizophrenia with tightly spun pronouns and
traditional locutions.

Non-schizophrenics create the only

possible means of diagnosing schizophrenia.

Second, if a schizophrenic is incapable of handling reality,
it is only a reality that he or she cannot work within.
Nietzsche is the first to recognize that reality itself is a
useful illusion, born of our deepest values and acquisitions
of forms of knowledge.

Contemporary schizophrenics cannot

assimilate with contemporary reality; that is all.
Schizophrenics cannot succeed at higher education because
educational boundaries are determined within the horizon of
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values which they do not possess.

Schizophrenics cannot be

integral members of the state because the state begins with
the presupposition of

the individual; it builds its order

around the rights or duties or activities of the "subject";
the schizo has abandoned the subject, and with it the State.

Deleuze and Guattari advocate schizo-analysis; what is
interesting about such an attempt to think outside is that
the schizophrenic is granted a privileged position; the
schizophrenic survives as hero.

This point deserves to be

considered. (For a detailed account of the importance of
schizophrenia for Anti-Oedipal political theory, see Line
Five.

For an explication of the methodology of Anti-Oedipal

thought, refer to the conclusion).

It is a madman who brings us the news of the death of God.i°
It is the schizophrenic who brings us the news of the death
of Oedipus.

In both cases the voice of iconoclasm comes from

without, has always already exceeded the perimeter.
stands outside always gains the best perspective.

He who
The camel,

lion and child overflow from the excesses of madness; not as
separate entities, not as a succession of evolutionary
metamorphoses, but all at once, as one, together.
is the core activity of unrepressed desire.
the schizophrenic will wants?

What is it that

What it is free for?

what Anti-Oedipus is about, bottom line.

Production

This is

Schizoanalysis

would be a revolution of the psyche, a revolution which makes
10 The Portable N ietzsche , pp. 95-6.
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possible entirely new spheres of thought and thoughtproduction.

For thought is a very material, realistic

production process.

Always extending its field, always

flittering about construing and re-construing the world.
Thinking does more than this; it invents

the world, changes

the world, makes worldliness possible.

So we accost psychoanalysis:

"Your frantic Oedipalization of

the whole psychical field has deftly bound the imagination;
thinking can not create or employ or produce, it can only
think the structure:

again, thinking knows its bounds".

What schizoanalysis seeks is to cast off the self; there is
no self, no moral agent, no neurotic son or daughter, no
illegitimate sexual tendencies, no Father.

To lose the

Father is to lose the self; to be free for production, for
plugging-in .

In Thus Spake Zarathrustra, Nietzsche recounts the Three
Metamorphoses of the spirit.n

Becoming is a lived

condition; it is the process of always and everywhere
overcoming, never being sated, ever intoxicated and never
patient.

It is in fact the life condition of the overman.

But becoming should never be confused with a teleological
process, for it is precisely in this construction of the
becoming process that Nietzsche falls prey to the reformist.
Becoming is not a striving-for, but a revolutionary activity
which despises any culmination.
11 Ibid., pp. 137-140.

A flux.

The camel is the
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burdened spirit; this stage is nothing new to any thinking
person, indeed, it is the birthplace of philosophy.

This

stage is thoughtful and ruminative; it takes into account the
existential situation from which it arises.
manifestation of dissatisfied oedipalization;

The camel is the
its trudge

into the dessert is heavily burdened by State-God-MommyDaddy-Me.

It knows this burden all-too-well; for all of its

friends are camels.

And revolution is only successful when

one knows one's enemies.

The lion wants to be a nomad but is not.

A reckless

revolutionary, he steps into the manifold with fire-red eyes
and intent to do harm.
overturned by "I will".

The dragon cowers; "thou shalt" is
The lion speaks the sacred No; an

entire history is shedded, renounced, discarded at the
instant of this utterance.

The lion says No to Oedipus, who

shudders in disbelief; No to himself, to the abysmal membrane
of consciousness shrouded in the iron bars of normalization;
and No to the Father, who has inserted his erect monument
into the state, into the church, into the family, into Mommy,
into the very tenets of desire; all desire is beaten back by
the Father's erection.

To this acrid old fool the lion says

No, and thereby sparks the revolution.

Thereby he becomes

free.

But this freedom is wildly incompetent; it does not know
itself, it does not know its artifice.

This freedom must be

channeled into productiive/creative energies; it is not enough
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to be free-from; Nietzsche requires us to justify this
freedom by taking advantage of all that it affords.
and Guattari would have us do the same.

Deleuze

Are we free from

Oedipus, free to adopt an even more sinister model of
restraint, of repression?
it has lost itself?

What will the self now become that

The death of God brought an onslaught of

chaos, which was resolved by the instantiation of newer, more
subtle, but equally benign deities.
most of us knew that God had died.

And it happened before
We can pray the same does

not happen with the collapse of Oedipus.

The child steps up

to the plate.

The child represents the creative Yes-saying, the limitless
loss of stale tradition and festering values coupled with the
loss of the self; an expressive force, free from all, free
for all.

The child can construct and work, can plug in

everywhere and explore vast terrains.

The child is naive; it

lacks the necessity of constraint and is puzzled by the
furious exaltations of all fellows.

The child is the very

possibility for revolution at the deepest level; the child is
the paradigm for the loss of the individual, the loss of
control and restraint; the child feeds on autonomy and shits
personae; it turns us back upon ourselves in an arbitrary
assault on the senses; the child must needs be
institutionalized.

The child is a madman.

For only the

madman and the child have been loosed from the history of
repression so completely that a re-pression is not possible;
only the schizophrenic and the naive child stand beyond
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Oedipus, shirk Oedipus in all his insidious forms.
Consequently it happens that children and lunatics are
subjected to intentional Oedipalization; we force the stout
Oedipus down the throat of the hapless schizo, frantically
trying to re-associate identity, to organize all spheres of
consciousness around the centralizing Oedipal shaft.

Edward only feels Oedipalized at night; "In the daytime I
become someone else...Only as I wait for sleep do I perceive
reality as a tangible presence.
waking life, no truth...".

There is no substance in my

Edward does not want to "perceive

reality as a tangible presence", or if he does it is only
because he has been told for so long that he should.

The

schizophrenic sees no substance, no truth to waking life;
waking life is a myriad of rich deceptions.

Edward simply

wants to play; he receives messages from outer space and from
nature, from trees and rocks and birds and fish; always from
the exterior, always from outside, never from within.

Edward

becomes someone else during the day; he walks into and out of
personae, experiencing shifting reality in a very material,
very real

way.

reality; why?

Yet he retains his own private conception of
Out of convenience, nothing more.

"Also

because its nice to talk like everybody else, to say the sun
rises, when everybody knows its only a manner of speaking.
To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the
point where it is no longer of any importance whether one
says I ".12
12 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari Capitalism and Schizophrenia: A Thousand Plateaus , vol. 2, trans.
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) p. 3.
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Nietzsche pleads with us to listen to the madman, to hear his
words and reflect upon their importance.

There is prophecy

in madness, there is freedom in madness.

Deleuze and

Guattari are after this freedom, this child who playfully
lurks behind the guise of insanity.

Our society Oedipalizes

the child and incarcerates the schizophrenic, for in the
matrix where permission still matters, it cannot be permitted
to step so far away from the center, or to go further and
disregard the center altogether.

Oedipalization is

normalization, structured obedience to the state, fascism at
the conscious level; thus the madman is a heretic, the child
simple and useless.

And there is little doubt that if the

death of Oedipus is in any way as magnificent as the death of
God, it will not be long before the footfalls of a new idol
are heard just beyond the vale, the shadows of another
immanent figure-head darkening the horizon.

The lesson is

there, and begging to be learned; let us be lunatics and
children, let us not go gently under; let us go kicking and
screaming and crying and laughing into the great beyond;
beyond the Savior, beyond the Father, beyond state philosophy
and metaphysical orders.

Let us madly go where no man can

go...beyond Man...beyond Oedipus.

LINE THREE:

DISCIPLINE

AND

CONTROL

It is imperative to note that the discussion of Nietzsche
offered up should serve only as a way of historically
orienting and elaborating the capacity for locating ourselves
morally and socially., this depth, our interiority.

What

slips in and how it influences the whole of the socius will
be the vector of this line; Nietzsche is useful only as a
powerful way to open a discussion of the interiority of the
self.

We should also note that this interiority, for all

thinkers involved, is nothing more than a tool of power .

In

the end, the major theoretical task will be to force this
interiority out, to extinguish lack altogether, and to make
everything productive.

The "structure" of the interior is in a state of flux; this
is because it has no claim to ontological grounding and
exists solely as convention; it remains a convenient and
productive means of organizing people.

I have suggested that

one cannot become guilty unless one takes some stock in the
gravity of the interior; the interior has to matter at the
social level in order for it to serve its organizational
function.

With Nietzsche, the "capacity" for internalization

is wrought out; this capacity is man's interiority.

Man was

somehow made to internalize guilt, and this guilty
consciousness enabled a revolution in morality, historically
speaking.

We recognize the vacant site that the Divine once

occupied and note that we still feel guilty; the judge is
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gone, but the sentence remains.

It will be suggested in this

chapter, and throughout the rest of the essay, that the judge
is certainly not gone, that whatever stands as the impetus
for guilt continuously metamorphosizes into new, insidious,
and interesting forms.

And it is for this reason that simply

uncovering the idol of the day and recognizing it as such
will never be enough; the true militant recognizes that he
cannot sit still, ever.

Before the topic of anarchy can be broached, we must assess
why it is necessary in the first place.

Anarchy is the

absence of State; no rule, no law, no subservient subjects.
The first anarchists saw in the State the same totalitarian
and repressive tendencies that were represented in the
figurehead of God; thus Bakunin asserts that "[i]f God really
existed it would be necessary to abolish him."

The State

really does exist; and we shall see that it cannot help but
be repressive.

But under State regimes, especially modern or

capitalist state regimes, the enemy is decentralized and
cannot be assessed as merely the "oppressor"; one of the
fatal flaws of Marxism is that it organizes itself against an
enemy that is all too easily delineated; it thinks it is
fighting an organization, when it is really taking on the
entire productive surface of the social field,

in order to

assess the differences, then, between the instantiations of
God and government, we need an intermediary.

The theories of

political power elaborated by Deleuze and Foucault are of
central interest to us here; they both understand power to be
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utterly deterritorialized, and adopt a Nietzschean
methodology to uncover its traces in all realms of the
socius.

Negotiations, a series of articles and interviews by and with
Deleuze, marks the most straightforward account of his
political critique of repression.

The book is framed by

discussions of schizophrenia and politics; the first three
pieces directly treat both volumes of Capitalism and
Schizophrenia; the last two are the most concise statements
Deleuze has given us regarding a political theory.

Deleuze's

thought is inextricably linked to an awareness of Foucault's
work; it is for this reason that elements of both thinkers
can and should be discussed simultaneously.

In his Letter to a Harsh Critic i , Deleuze explains his
relationship with the history of philosophy:

"I belong to a generation, one of the last generations, that was more or
less bludgeoned to death with the history of philosophy. The history of
philosophy plays a patently repressive role in philosophy,
it's
philosophy's own version of the Oedipus complex:
'You can't seriously
consider saying what you yourself think until you've read this and that,
and that on this, and this on that.'
Many members of my generation
never broke free of this; others did, by inventing their own particular
methods and new rules, a new approach."2

He continues on to describe this new approach, his own
engagement with his immediate intellectual history, as a type
of sodomizing creativity:
1 Letter to a Harsh Critic in Gilles Deleuze Negotiations: 1 9 7 2 -1 9 9 0 , trans. Martin Joughin ( New York:
Columbia University P ress 1994) pps. 3-12.
2 Ibid., pps. 5-6.
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"I suppose the main way I coped with it at the time was to see the
history of philosophy as asort of buggery or ( it comes to the same
thing ) immaculate conception.
I saw myself as taking an author from
behind and giving him a child that would be his own offspring, yet
monstrous.
It was really important for it to be his child, because the
author had to actually say all I had him
saying. But the child was
bound to be monstrous, too, because it resulted from all sorts of
shifting, slipping, dislocations, and hidden emissions that I really
enjoyed."3

What Deleuze appreciates about Nietzsche, the grand
inquisitor of the moral sphere, is that he has a strange
capacity to bugger his own readership:

"It was Nietzsche, who I read only later, who extricated me from all
this. Because you can't just deal with him in the same sort of way. He
gets up to all sorts of things behind your
back.
He gives you a
perverse taste - certainly something Marx or Freud never gave anyone for saying simple things in your own way, in affects, intensities,
experiences, experiments.
It's a strange business, speaking for
yourself, in your own name, because it doesn't at all come with seeing
yourself as an ego or a person or a subject.
Individuals find a real
name for themselves, rather, only through the harshest exercise in
depersonalization, by opening themselves up to the multiplicities
everywhere within them, to the intensities running through them, A name
as the direct awareness of such intensive multiplicity is the opposite
of the depersonalization effected by the history of philosophy..."^

Deleuze means that the history of philosophy, as it
represents and articulates a certain intellectual history of
western culture, always already presents its own problems:
It gives us both preconceived problems and the conceptual
apparatus to work them through.

Logic is highly idealistic;

it organizes the field of philosophy systematically according
to variant causes and effects, problems and solutions, etc.
What needs to be addressed is the assertion that the history

3 Ibid., p. 6.
4 Ibid., pps. 6-7.
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of philosophy is philosophy's own Oedipus complex.

How does

a structural framework which serves to striate and organize
social or theoretical space come to be understood as the
operative force which produces that space?

That is, how does

the history of philosophy come to be the re-generative power
for contemporary thinking, how does it come to be the case
that the "structure" of Oedipus is mistakenly taken to be the
progenitor of the social field of desire?

"We're not saying psychoanalysis invented the Oedipus complex. It gives
people what they want, they bring their Oedipus complex along with them.
Psychoanalysis simply turns the complex back on itself, oedipalizes
transference, oedipalizes the complex itself on the couch, its mucky
little kingdom.
But whether in its domestic or analytic form, the
Oedipus complex is basically an apparatus for repressing desiring
machines, and in no sense a formation of the unconscious itself."5

Continuing:

"Foucault said psychoanalysis remains deaf to the voice of unreason.
Indeed, it neuroticizes everything, and through this neuroticization
contributes not only to producing neurotics whose treatment never ends
but also psychotics in the form of anyone resisting oedipalization."5

Deleuze and Guattari assert that "a schizophrenic is someone
who's been decoded, deterritorialized."7

They then shun all

responsibility for their work or its implications:

"As for

being responsible or irresponsible, we don't recognize these
notions, they're for policemen and courtroom psychiatrists."8

5
5
7
8

Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations , p. 17.

Ibid., p. 18.
Ibid., p. 23.
Ibid., p. 24.
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What is a "decoded" or "deterritorialized" individual?

How

does Oedipus become the model for the entirety of social
orders, i.e., desire?

How does thinking internalize its own

linear rational history, how does the socius internalize
Oedipus, and how does one discuss theory free from all
responsibility?

(That is, how can we say that the very

notion of responsibility is limiting, controlling,
repressive, in short the manifestation of "policemen and
courtroom psychiatrists ?")

These questions will be worked out throughout the course of
the rest of this essay.

We have seen that man has the

capacity to internalize conceptual orders and moral or
ethical imperatives,

we have further seen that this process

of internalization writes the very code of what is
internalized into the corpus of mankind; man understands
himself according to what has become his "inner sphere".
This sphere is protected in many ways from the realm of
criticism; philosophy can work with it, but cannot
systematically unravel it.

What we are after is a way to

understand internalization politically; how is it that
Oedipus, that the history of philosophy, that social
institutions and judiciary operations come to light as
fundamentally repressive ?

In Discipline and Punish , Foucault elaborates the history of
punitive measures.

His attention is captured not by the

causal or linear links between forms of punishment over the
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course of the last few centuries, but rather with the
differences that emerge when history is cast in a
genealogical light;

What he uncovers are various orders of

legislature and punishment, judicial tactics and prosecution
techniques, which both shape and organize what will come to
be known as "Man".

This concept of Man is fading from the

modern social order, according to both Foucault and Deleuze,
and I will deal with that issue later.

I want to elaborate

only some of the central themes of Discipline and Punish ;
this text offers a developmental picture of individual
political subjects internalizing social norms and codes.

It

will be shown that we already police ourselves and divine our
own limitations and possibilities from the investment of
politically charged disciplinary tactics and psychologically
heirarchized orders which delineate the criteria for the
contemporary individual.

Foucault analyzes an arbitrary assimilation of societal
structures (including politico-punitive measures,
psychological evaluations, and a host of other "normalizing"
and categorizing methodologies), each driven by an underlying
weave of power threads, that have infiltrated every micro
area of our existence, establishing the criteria by which we
discern the contemporary "individual".

The initial stages of

this radical shift were characterized by the birth of
ideological punitive measures and a categorical localizing of
individuals within society.
of the classical age.

These changes marked the onset

Foucault sees this development as one
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particularly dangerous stage in the historical movements of
power.

Foucault's book begins with a nightmarish depiction of a
public execution.

A regicide, after confessing to his crime

and publicly asking both God and man for forgiveness, is
literally torn to pieces upon a scaffold in front of an
assembled audience.

We cannot help but realize that what was

commonplace practice three hundred years ago now manifests
itself as an abomination of justice.

At the order of the

judge, the thief's hand was cut off, or the blasphemer
executed.

Power has shifted; we are subject to very

different tactical disciplinary procedures now than we ever
have been.

Legislation is now not only less visible and

sectionalized, it also appears in micro areas of our
existence, as the way we govern and organize ourselves.

The punishment dealt out upon the scaffold was a politics of
fear-tactics.

Its effects were by no means far reaching, and

it left many crimes unpunished.

But its object was the

crime; the judge measured and assessed the crime committed
and extolled what he determined to be proper punishment upon
the body of the condemned.

Foucault claims that in such a

setting, where the crime is looked upon as a direct offense
upon the body of the sovereign, power is isolated,
constricted; it is played out in one discourse and one alone.
Power for Foucault is manifested in whatever social systems
or institutions are dominant at any given time; it functions
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under the guise of governmental order.

But we recognize that in a such a system where the sovereign
occupies the physical and metaphorical site of the rule of
law, the socius cannot achieve a complex order (for example,
a bureaucracy).

In order to ensure a further reaching

control, power had to be dispersed; divisions had to be made.
At this juncture, Foucault describes a web of power
discourses which permeated society, all distinct but
intertwining, within which the individual came to light as an
ethical, responsible subject capable of judging himself or
being judged by others over and against certain established
normative criteria.

Foucault contends that the age of enlightenment brought about
fundamental changes in the power relations which constituted
the governing aspects of society.

For instance, the

incorporation of medical analyses of the criminal into
judicial systems (i.e., a psychological profile) enabled the
judge to judge the criminal rather than the crime itself, and
punishment moved from a public exhibition of physical torture
to an economic suspension of the rights of the prisoner via
the prison sentence.

Time tables were inaugurated to ensure

strict adherence to rules in institutions such as the
military and the educational system, while obedience and
active allegiance to standards were rewarded with medals,
privileged status in the class, etc.

The insane, who had

freely walked the streets in medieval society, were shipped
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off to asylums, while the sick were removed from their
families and treated in clinics.

All of these instances

represent for Foucault the dispersion of power into microareas of our lives.

This type of dialectical ordering

(sick/well, right/wrong, authority/individual,
brave/cowardly) fosters a self-regulating imperative in the
individual.

It "makes each individual a case...(t)he case is

no longer...a set of circumstances defining an act and
capable of modifying the application of a rule; it is the
individual as he may be described, judged, measured, compared
with others, in his very individuality." 9 .

This is what

Foucault understands as a "disciplinary" society; a social
Configuration in which the onset of particular political
power-wielding machines, dispersed throughout societal
institutions, creates the capacity for judgment of the
individual using the criteria of a normative valuation.

The shift of emphasis upon the crime to emphasis upon the
individual was an economic movement; if a judge assesses the
character of the criminal and not merely his or her crime,
this trend festers outside of the judicial establishment, or
rather the judicial establishment extends outward into
society, causing a regulative effect.

Everyone now has the

capacity to act as judges for themselves and others.

The

application of disciplinary measures within secured prisons,
such as regulated time tables and a strict work regime,
provided a means for the first time by which the criminal
9 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish , trans. Alan Sheridan ( New York: Random House, Inc. 1977)
p. 191.
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could be reformed as opposed to merely punished.

This

represents for Foucault a critical moment in the development
of repressive measures; "the moment where it became
understood that it was more efficient and profitable in terms
of the economy of power to place people under surveillance
than to subject them to some exemplary penalty." i° .

Foucault is of the opinion that society utilizes a popular
scapegoat which allows for a retrospective reinstantiation of
certain functional ideals when the ostracized are juxtaposed
to the normative.

For example, in Madness and Civilization

he addresses the fact that after the downsurge in occurrences
of leprosy on the medieval Continent, there was a calculated
grouping of the foolish, the criminally inclined, the
hysterical, etc.; they were labeled and separated off from
the boundaries of social order via institutions such as the
asylum, the prison, the hospital; boundaries were drawn
between the normal and the abnormal which established a kind
of normative criteria.

The disciplinary tactics of the

modern prison represent a tighter grip in the development of
the scapegoat politics.

Not only do contemporary penal

institutions confine the "criminally inclined" to
institutions which safeguard society from them, they also
create what are known as delinquents, thereby perpetuating
the scapegoat class under the adopted label of reformation.

Foucault discusses

the panoptic model of the prison as the

10 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk in Power / Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 19721 9 7 7 , ed. Colin Gordon ( New York: Pantheon Books 1980) p. 38
.
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apex of the disciplinary institution.

The division of the

cells is such that each captive is simultaneously isolated
and perpetually watched, giving them time to think out their
predicament under the always and constant watchful eye of the
unnamed superior.
of society.

This model extends outward into all realms

For example, hospitals develop methods by which

patients can be isolated in their own beds while constantly
being looked after by nurse and doctors; roll call

becomes

commonplace to ensure that schoolchildren are present in the
classroom.

And such practices have a way of ensuring their own
continuation, for these structures follow the criminal out
into the work force long after he is released in various
ways.

He has only associated with criminals while

incarcerated, hence his only friends are of a delinquent
mindset.

Upon being arrested, a black mark goes on his

permanent record, allowing for public access to knowledge of
his criminal past and ensuring that he will not be elevated
to the upper tiers of society.

This type of forced

categorization is a breeding ground for recidivism.

It is in

this way that our system perpetuates itself; it labels
delinquents and keeps them organized and categorized as such.

We should be careful about ascribing a certain lineage to the
development of punitive and disciplinary measures; Foucault
wants to trace power, not historicize an economy of
legislation.

But at the same time, we recognize that the
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shifts in the way society slates its internments occupy a
unique and somewhat consequential dispersion of power
throughout the entire social field.

Initially, we have a

system of judicial order where a large group of citizens are
ruled by a single monarch, who embodies the function of
government.

Under this design, the means of judicial

sovereignty meet at the scaffold;

judges are appointed to

assess criminal actions and to punish with due vengeance
those accused of perpetrating said law in a public spectacle.
This tyrannical form of rule cannot efficiently govern the
entirety of the masses, however, and by pitting the governed
populace directly against the sovereign, it provides the
basis for revolutionary ideas and uprisings.

"In these

ceremonies...one sees the intersection of the excess of armed
justice and the anger of the threatened people."ii .

This

ultimately ineffective system hence gave way to subtler
tactics, which amounted to an ideological model of
surveillance.

This model was the first to utilize
Line One,

the idea, discussed in

that there was indeed an individual lurking behind

criminal actions, and the need for punishment without torture
or public display arose.

The ideological method brought

about such novelties as roughly assembled policing units, and
civilians began to discern a general over-arching
surveillance which monitored them instead of their actions.
This played itself out into a neurotic culture where the

11 Discipline and Punish, p. 73.
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masses adopted the ideals of the rulers and slowly pinpointed
methods by which they could utilize surveillance methods in a
local fashion; the family and similar social structures began
to govern themselves.

As repression became organized, institutions formed.

The

school, the hospital, the asylum, and the factory all
benefited from these newly domesticated subjects.

Within

such institutions it was possible to extend the means of
control present in the ideological method into micro-facets
of the individual’s life;

by incorporating rigorous time

tables, work ethics, and the strategic organization of
utilized space into the common agenda, schools, hospitals,
prisons, and factories realized a true upgrade in the economy
of control.

Each subject, operating under a learned

disciplinary mentally, could be positioned in each of these
institutions to attain his highest possibility for output and
production, thereby rapidly enhancing technology, politics,
and education.

It is here that power is recognized as having

its firmest hold upon the individual.

But this disciplinary

system could also be applied by the individual herself, not
merely by the unseen eye of the supervisor, and power had to
insure its investment.

This came about through the evolution

of normalizing criteria and the formation of groups of
societal illegalities.

Standardized examinations are manifestations of the way in
which cultural values codify certain norms.

"Norms" should
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be understood as criteria by which abilities and individual
achievements can by measured.

The appropriation of rank or

status to those who perform exceptionally well in any given
discipline, modeled after the military, ensures a
"performance and reward" type mentality.

In this way every

individual has determinate criteria for establishing his or
her own status in relation to the norm.

At the same time,

labels are affixed to those who perform in a non-satisfactory
fashion with regards to the criteria, labels such as
"delinquent", or in the school setting, "failure".

This

makes it possible for individuals to distinguish their own
position in society.

In this way, type-casts of certain

people "prone" to illegal behavior are played out by those
who do not fit the mold, and society finds use for the neat
categorization of hooligans just as it had done with the more
domesticated subjects.

It is important to note that the major element in all of the
aforementioned models is primarily political.

Foucault's

objective is to expose the historical weave of power as a
fundamental element of truth; better to expose this weave as
our grounds for truth. "Power manifests itself in a discourse
through which it arbitrarily and for its own purposes engages
in the invention of truth."12

Since power is manifested

strictly in the political (that is, in institutions and
legislation, academies and courtrooms), Foucault's discussion
of power technologies grants immediate and absolute primacy

12 Alan Megill, Prophets of Extrem ity, (Berkeley: University of California P ress 1985) p. 192.
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to the role of politics and political theory within society;
everything, truth not excluded, becomes part ahd parcel of a
political machine.

Since government in general has its locus around control, in
areas such as judicial practice, economical monitoring, and
education and its offspring, it is not surprising that the
vehicle of power is politics.

If we concede with Foucault

that political structures themselves are in the business of
manufacturing efficient and domesticated individuals, then we
forego any possibility of grounding ourselves with respect to
absolute truth or structured existence.

A shift in the

domain of power will sufficiently re-route the social order
along varying lines of judgment and responsibility.

Indeed,

what we consider in the present age to be the status of an
individual (his academic aptitude, her ability to succeed at
sporting events, etc.) represents for Foucault only an
adherence to the rules of certain arbitrary discourses, which
are at once molding and controlling subjectivities.
Furthermore, the general validity of any such discourse
remains unintelligible, for an adherence to the established
rules of tantamount discourses (semantics, economy, science,
etc.) will always manifest itself in the utilization of any
criteria.

It would seem, then, that we are subjugated

victims to the rules of science and politics, language and
economics> medicine and education.

And all of these facets

would represent the calculated assimilation of individuals
into the service of power.
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What we have come to terms with here is a model of a
disciplinary society.

This model is what much of political

theory, particularly revolutionary political theory, takes as
its conception of the social field.

It is assumed that,

regardless of how and when they are constituted, there are
individual subjects in society, that they demand certain
things (rights-speak), and that government is in place to
ensure that order is preserved (that the political subjects
are satisfied with the current state of affairs, and that no
individuals or groups are infringing upon the rights of
others in an unjustified fashion).

Note also that

revolutionary thinking appears only when a certain group of
individuals envision their rights to be severely overlooked
or trampled underfoot by the governing order, the State.
This, of course, is where Marx set up his camp.

But with

Foucault's analytic of the history of certain institutions,
something is happening in a different sphere; "individuals"
are not merely repressed by singular oppressive discourses or
power substantiated institutions.
becomes a product of control.

Rather, the individual

The subject who can police

himself, who understands himself as a micro version of macro
state mentality has internalized the entire apparatus of the
State.

Thus power is not only a repressive force but a productive
force.

While it can be asserted that power is oppressive,

and numerous examples of abusive usury of power are
available, we note that power is also artistic, creative, and

76
in every way productive .

Power is the ultimate investor of the social field (the
manipulating and organizing postulate which appropriates
social apparatuses for its use:

The factory, the school, the

hospital, the prison are all sites of confinement within
which power operates).

Yet it is the force and flow of the

socius as well, not only appropriating these institutions and
modulating their capacities for repression but also acting as
the productive pseudo-metaphysical underlying mechanism which
constructs not only the political subject but also writes the
discourses of sites of confinement.

Is Foucault asserting

that power constructs its own social models and malleable
subjects so- that it can turn around and repress whatever non
power-serving desires emanate from the social field?

That

is, does power create and

There

repress its own subjects?

is a sense in Foucault's work that he thinks this might be
the case. In describing the organization of power in penal
system in the nineteenth century, Foucault states that
"procedures were being elaborated for distributing
individuals, fixing them in space, classifying them,
extracting from them the maximum in time and forces, training
their bodies, coding their continuous behavior, maintaining
them in perfect visibility, forming around them an apparatus
of observation, registration and recording, constituting on
them a body of knowledge that is accumulated and
centralized. "I3

13Disciplineand Punish,p.231.

From such talk we certainly get the sense
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that power constructs both repressed subject and oppressive
social institutions.

In his afterword to Michel Foucault:

Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics by Hubert Dreyfuss and
Paul Rabinow, Foucault describes his entire project:

"My

objective...has been to create a history of the different
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made
subjects...[t]hus it is not power, but the subject, which is
the general theme of my research."i*

The obvious paradox, one that cannot be avoided, is that any
survey of power's movements, any analysis of power at all,
must necessarily take shape within the field of play
elaborated by power itself.

If power inscribes the

organization of the social field, and if then in turn the
model of such an apparatus is internalized, becomes man's
interiority, and thus allows for anything at all like a
contemporary subject to emerge, how are we to know that all
this clap-trap regarding repressive tendencies and sites of
confinement isn't simply another product of power?

Deleuze and Foucault both answer this seeming contradiction
by distinguishing between knowledge (which amounts to the
matrix of discursive social practices that indoctrinate the
social field with habitual locutions like law, school, self,
parents, God, history, communication) and thought (which, in
contradistinction to knowledge, is a "line of flight" that
announces alternatives for action and existence that are
14 Hubert Dreyfuss and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics,
(Chicago: University of Chicago P re ss 1983) pps. 208-9.

78
unattainable under a disciplinary model of society).

"The

difference between thought and knowledge is that knowledge is
a set of sedimented practices that devolve upon relations of
force, while thought is the subversion of that sedimentation
through the process of articulating the relations of force
that constitute it."is

This does not mean that thought is an

entirely liberating or fundamentally noble activity which
always stands over and against sedimentary knowledge.
Indeed, thought is simply the vehicle to "new set[s] of
beliefs that in turn will become sedimented and in need of
new thought."is

Take, for example, a project like Marx's, which established
itself upon the sedimented capitalistic practices of exchange
and usury but attempted to think its way through to a new
form of social and political activity free from the
repressive aspects of a dichotomizing, rigid economic
repressive structure.

Variations on Communism and Socialism,

once incorporated into the organism of the social field,
become newly sedimentary practices which thought once again
strives to outstrip.

Marx organized his revolutionary

philosophy around a reductionist economic theory
(emancipation can only be thought in relation to a revolt
against the existing structures of economic exchange in
capitalist society).

See Line Four for a discussion of

strategic Marxist thought; here let me simply say that most
15 Todd May, The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism , (University Park: The
Pennsylvania State University P ress 1994) p. 69.
16 Ibid.
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forms of Marxism, from Lenin to Althusser, operate by
positing as a specific oppressive enemy the regime of
capitalism.

The body of Capital as it is dispersed unevenly

throughout the realm of the socius serves as the locus of
power and the fueling apparatus of repression.

But this apparatus cannot be strategically opposed, for it
is, as we shall see, "deterritorialized",

institutions of

power are no longer merely separate, analyzable, structured
organizations, as Marx thought (all oppression for Marx
arises out of the economic tension between base and
superstructure).

They are transient, changing, indeed

interconnecting.

It cannot be feasible, using a realistic

picture of the modern capitalist order, to imagine an "us
against them" scenario.

The organized and striated field of

the whole social body, which is invested and fueled by wide
market economies, institutional hierarchies and the like, is
simply dissected semantically, and thereby the modern subject
is constituted.

We come to understand who we are, what

sociological spaces we as individuals occupy, where and how
we should act; in other words, we envision the whole social
field as a massive, dilated body, a "body without organs"17 .
It is anorganic because it is wholly smooth and without
depth; the social field is the flat surface of desire.

Certain intensities (institutions, individuals, theories,
etc.) appear in a sort of moldable plasticity upon this flat
17 For a treatm ent of the "body without organs”, which is a concept of central importance in Anti-O edipus,
s e e my conclusion to this essay.
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surface.

Of course, the body of the socius allows for long

transversal movements in multiple directions (as witnessed by
the movement of another flat body, for example the bodies of
capital or of religious faith, intersecting on the surface of
the socius).

We can envision, by employing such a model, a

new form of social repression, inextricably linked to the
movement of the body of capital and extremely more insidious
in nature than that employed by a disciplinary society:

We

here begin to come to terms with the hyper-real authority of
a Baudrillardesque "Disneyland" mentality, what Deleuze
refers to as a control society .

In his Postscript on Control Societies 18' Deleuze offers a
reading of Foucault which also lends insight into his own
political theory.

He distinguishes between three different

organizations of the social field:

the sovereign society,

the disciplinary society, and the control society.

In

Discipline and Punish, Foucault charted the movements which
disassembled sovereign society and recontextualized the
social order according to "sites of confinement", the model
of organization for a disciplinary society.

Both thinkers set as a historical marker for the onset of the
society of discipline the end of the classical age; the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries are the representative
time periods for such a social schemata.
disciplinary societies as such:
18 Postscript on Control Societies in Negotiations, pps. 177-182.

Deleuze describes
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"They operate by organizing major sites of confinement. Individuals are
always going from one closed site to another, each with its own laws:
first of all the family, then the school ('you're not
at home, you
know'), then the barracks ('you're not at school, you know'), then the
factory, the hospital from time to time, maybe prison, the model site of
confinement...Foucault has thoroughly analyzed the ideal behind sites of
confinement, clearly seen in the factory: bringing everything together,
giving each thing its place, organizing time, setting up in this space
time a force of production greater than the sum of component forces."19

What Deleuze is describing here is the model of the socius
that we have traced in this chapter.

But both Deleuze and

Foucault contend that this disciplinary society, against
which revolutionary thinking has mounted its attack for at
least the past hundred years, has

begun to give way. It is

being effaced and supplanted by a

new form of social

organization.

new form of capitalism

"control".

Deleuze calls this

He claims that "[w]e're in the

midst of a general

breakdown of all sites of confinement - prisons, hospitals,
factories, schools, the family.

The family is an interior

that's breaking down like all other interiors - educational,
professional, and so on."2o
myth, an antique.

interiority is fast becoming a

Everything is exterior, pushed outside,

evident, transversal and productive.

But if it is in fact

the case that sites of confinement and discursive
institutions are breaking down, logically political theory
must alter its approach:

Contemporary ideology can serve no

function if it takes for its conception of the social field
an outdated model.

19 Ibid., p. 177.
20 Ibid., p. 178.
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Deleuze writes that "confinements are molds...while controls
are a modulation. "21

What he means by this is that a site

such as a factory, where production occurs, has its own
territory or geography.

It is physically situated in a

certain state or province, acquires its revenue .from other
localizable institutions (wholesalers and retailers) and
generates specific product to which a certain value is
affixed.

These social territories which the factory and its

products and revenues (as well as other territories such as
family, nursery school, hospice shelters, department stores)
occupy are the "sites" through which the disciplined citizen
moves.

"Factories formed individuals into a body of men for the joint
convenience of a management that could monitor each component in this
mass, and trade unions that could mobilize mass resistance; but
businesses are constantly introducing an inexorable rivalry presented as
healthy competition, a wonderful motivation that sets individuals
against one another and sets itself up in each of them, dividing each
within himself."22

Businesses are replacing factories as workplaces.

We can go

to school at home or in cyberspace; home health care,
improved pharmaceuticals, and "community psychiatry" are ever
extending the boundaries of hospitals and institutions.

With

ankle-bracelets, work release, suspended sentences and parole
officers the panoptic model of reform and discipline is past
history.

And as these interiors, these closed sites, become

ever extended across the surface of the social field, they
intersect with one another at certain points, creating newly
21 Ibid.
22 ibid., p. 179.
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emerging control mechanisms.

When Foucault describes the

intersection of psychology and the judicial system in order
to elaborate how a psychological profile ever became relevant
to punitive institutions, we sense he is glimpsing ahead
towards the emergence of control.

Production - the creation of a product by a mechanism
(automaton, individual, assembly line) intended for that
purpose - is now a Third World activity.
sites of production; they buy production.

Businesses are not
As Deleuze puts

it, they are "directed towards metaproduction."

What we see

is endless administration, a bureaucratic world-wide market.
All the "closed sites" of disciplinary societies (factory,
family, armed forces, school, church, asylum, prison) are
split wide open and available for use via networking,
technological advancements, media interventions, information
technology, cybernetics, continuing education, training and
advancement incentives, etc.

we literally watch all sites of

confinement opened up, laid bare, dissected and reconstructed
in new and interesting forms on television every night at
six.

"Sites" are in motion; as Deleuze says, they modulate.

They have no territory, they are floating, ungrounded,
malleable,and subject to drift.

They are deterritorialized.

As modes of exchange shift toward a state of perpetual
continuation

(virtual spending), capital modifies itself.

"Money, perhaps, best expresses the difference between the two kinds of
society, since discipline was always related to molded currencies
containing gold as a numerical standard, whereas control is based on
floating exchange rates, modulations depending on a code setting sample
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percentages for various currencies...Disciplinary man produced energy in
discrete amounts, while control man undulates, moving among a continuous
range of different orbits.
Surfing
has taken over from all the old
sports ."23

Capitalism, which has previously been understood as an
economic ordering of the means of production, has mutated:

"Markets are won by taking control rather than by establishing a
discipline, by fixing rates rather than reducing costs, by transforming
products rather than by specializing production.
Corruption here takes
on a new power....Marketing is now the instrument of social control and
produces the arrogant breed who are our masters.
Control is short-term
and rapidly shifting, but at the same time continuous and unbounded,
whereas discipline was long-term, infinite, and discontinuous. A man is
no longer a man confined but a man in debt."24

If marketing (via telecommunications, complex networking
systems, demographic advertising which exploits every aspect
of our lifeworld from sexual drives to penchants for gameshow mentality trivia) is indeed the instrument for social
control, then business has, in a very literal sense, the
world at its fingertips.

"The key thing is that we're at the beginning of something new.
In the
prison system : the attempt to find 'alternatives' to custody, at least
for minor offenses, and the use of electronic tagging to force offenders
to stay at home between certain hours. In the school system : forms of
continuous assessment, the impact of continuing education on schools,
and the related move away from any research in universities, 'business'
being brought into education at every level.
In the hospital system:
the new medicine 'without doctors or patients' that identifies potential
cases and subjects at risk and is nothing to do with any progress
towards individualizing treatment, which is how its presented, but is
the substitution for individual or numbered bodies of coded 'dividual'
matter to be controlled.
In the business system:
new ways of
manipulating money, products, and men, no longer channeled through the
old factory system.
This is a fairly limited range of examples, but
enough to convey what it means to talk of institutions breaking down:
the widespread progressive introduction of a new system of
23 ibid., p. 180.
24 ibid., p. 181.
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domination."25

Some of the most striking examples that I can think of
concerning the onset
university campuses.

ofcontrol strategies occur on
Iwas a student at a small college in

Ohio where a series of rapes had occurred.

Those students

who lived on campus were given a general dormitory key and a
key to their respective rooms.

When this was deemed

unsuitable for security purposes, an electronic system was
installed.

Students were issued bar coded cards which

slid

through a processing unit at the entrance to each dorm.
Those students who lived in a certain dorm had cards that
would open the doors

at all times. Those who lived in other

dorms had cards thatwould allow them to

enter different

dormitories until eleven o'clock at night, and then their
access was restricted.

Those who lived off campus had cards

that would work for food in the mess hall if one purchased a
meal plan package, but would allow no access to dormitories.
All cards were meal plan cards, but it was possible to not
pay for campus meals, in which case access to the cafeteria
was restricted when the user swiped his card.

There were

various meal plans as well, such as the "week-day only" plan,
which afforded a student access to the cafeteria Monday
through Friday but not on Saturday and Sunday, or the "lunch
and dinner plan", which restricted the card holder from
eating breakfast. Thus a digital configuration, read by a
computer, served to regulate our eating habits and ensure
that we stayed out of restricted areas.
25 ibid., p. 182.
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If we take this conception of a control society as the
starting point for thinking about politics, old methodology
and traditional logic are rendered impotent.

I will explore

throughout the rest of this essay some various suggestions
regarding why revolutionary thinking is so difficult in
relation to what Felix Guattari calls "Integrated Global
Capitalism", and I will attempt to delineate some possible
ways of thinking politically in such an accelerated
environment.

± will examine, in Line Five, the idea that the

deterritorializing fluid movements of contemporary capitalism
resemble in many ways the disjointed anti-logic of the
schizophrenic process, and the specific relation between
schizophrenia and capitalism that serves as the basis for a
Deleuzoguattarian (to borrow from Ronald Bogue) politics.

If we maintain that specific territories of the state such as
the university, the factory, the prison, etc. have in fact
broken down or become mobilized and have mutated, we are not
in any way viewing this as a shift toward an open, more
liberated social sphere.

If the subject has internalized and

in fact become a micro-instantiation of the mechanisms of
order and discipline, and if those mechanisms have gone
south, then the interiority of the subject, which had for so
long served as a tool of power, is now fractured,
externalized and spread across the field of the socius as
well.

In fact all interiors (the interior of the factory,

the closed space of academia, the autonomy of the self) are
now being ripped out and laid bare upon the shifting surface
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of the social field.

But this is not to say that repression

has ceased to occur at many levels, not the least of which is
thinking.

As suggested in Line Two, thinking knows its

bounds, struggles under its own organization.

When Deleuze

christens the history of philosophy "philosophy's own Oedipus
complex", he means that the history of philosophy operates as
a neuroticizing and repressive force upon thinking.

We need

only look at Plato, Kant, Nietzsche to realize that
philosophy wasn't always a pure research project.

There are

more footnotes in any ten page article in Philosophy Today
than there are in the entirety of The Critique of Pure
Reason.

But note that, even with a rapidly accelerated and
deterritorialized social framework, capital still, perhaps
more than ever, is the force and flow of market economy.

We

will see that in much the same way, Oedipus is the force and
flow of libidinal (or "subjective") economy.

Schizophrenia

vanquishes Oedipus, and mimics and apes capitalism.

And

therefore it will be integral to the re-thinking of political
philosophy that fuels Anti-Oedipus.

LINE FOUR:

MARXISM AND ANARCHY

Anarchism is a mixed bag.

In the terminology of the

layperson, it acquires an affectation of disorderliness at
best and complete and total lawless debauchery at worst.
Modern anarchism has origins in political theory; it began
with the likes of Bakunin and Proudhon for whom Marxism
simply wasn't a viable political solution to the social
problems inaugurated by an encroaching Capitalist framework
in Europe in the mid 1800's.

Originally a radical branch of

socialist thought, anarchy gained its autonomy when Bakunin
was ousted from what was later to be known as the First
International by Marx and his followers in 1872.

I will examine some key tenets of anarchist thought via the
proliferation and eventual downslide of Marxist thought.

I

will briefly touch upon some pivotal moments in the history
of Marxist ideology in order to trace the changes which
bespoke revolutionary theory from Marx to the fall of the
Berlin Wall.

I will discuss anarchy and elaborate at least

two central problems of anarchist thought that hinder its
political potency in light of the encroachment of societies
of control: the anarchist view that power is always
suppressive, never productive, and the presupposition that
human beings have an innate and benign essence which is
corrupted by centralized power.

And, finally, I will return

to Foucault and Deleuze, because these thinkers offer a new
vision for anarchist thinking which forgoes these two
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problems.

Before I begin, however, I wish to make a few clarifying
statements.

Over the course of this essay I have begun to

use the terms "capitalism" and the "socius" almost
interchangeably.

It should become apparent in this chapter

why capitalism now no longer refers to a specifically
economic state of affairs, but rather to the whole social
field.

One of the reasons that such terms have become

interchangeable was discussed in the last chapter, and is
directly caught up in the notion of a society of control.
When all localizable social, economic, political, religious,
disciplinary sites begin to break down and infinitely mutate
and combine with each other, the geography of social life
becomes virtual and malleable.

Capitalism no longer refers

simply to the economic conditions of a country just as the
"social" no longer refers simply to the public sector of
life.

The divisions between public and private, just as the

divisions between the social, the political, and the economic
have broken down.

As Deleuze states in his introduction to

Jacques Donzelot's brilliant work The Policing of Families,
"it is along the same line that the points of
authoritarianism, the points of reform, the points of
resistance and revolution come face to face around this new
stake, 'the social'...in several, sometimes opposing, ways
that invest and reorganize the family, "i

Thus all points

of resistance and of authority meet to invest what will be
1 Gilles Deleuze, The Rise o f the S o cial, Forward in Jacq u es Donzelot, The Policing of Fam ilies, trans.
Robert Hurley ( New York: Pantheon Books 1979).
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referred to as the social.

The role that the familial model

plays in this equation will be discussed below.

This concept of the social field is global.

It refers not

only to first world economies, but also to the goods and
services which these economies appropriate and which make up
the economies of third world orders.

Thus the "social" and

the locution which describes it , "capitalism", are global
effects of the deterritorialization which reconfigures all
lived space in a Society of control.

Marxism understands itself to have an organized and easily
delineated enemy:

the economic substructure and the

capitalists who appropriate it to repress the workers.

But

as we have seen, contemporary society is not so easily
mapped.

If we examine the history of Marxism, we find that

it constantly and consistently re-mobilizes itself; this is
due to the fact that it has never appropriately estimated the
ever-extending nature of deterritorializing capitalism.

Todd May, in his work on post-structuralist anarchism,
outlines what he calls the "failure of Marxism"2 .

I will

examine a few of his key points here because such an event as
the end of "Marxist Ideology" puts closure on nearly two
centuries of revolutionary thought.
kept in mind.

A few things should be

First, this discussion is not centered around

Marx, but Marxism, and it proceeds in a way which certainly
2 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism, pps. 17-44.
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does no service to the tremendously rich political and
intellectual history that Marx's works have fostered.

This

is because what is at issue here is not the failure of a
specific program, but some general presuppositions about the
nature of capital and the social that much of revolutionary
thinking takes as its foothold.

Second, one does not have to

look far to notice that aspects of Marxist ideology, from the
dialectical conception of history to the economic analysis of
labor, still persist not only in academia, but in grass roots
politics, third-world revolutions, etc.

Thus what is

referred to as the failure of Marxism should be taken to mean
the end of a legacy of political practice with global import.
Communist parties are mostly gone, socialist organizations
occupy only the margins of the political sphere, and with the
demise of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, Marxist politics appear to be
in their death throes.

May asks why this is the case.

Versions or mutations of

Marxism were implemented in many countries; why did none take
permanent hold?

The common answer, of course, is that

Marxism has a global agenda in mind, and that it will always
fail at the national level because of pressures from other
non-sympathetic or Democratic economies.
different answer.

But May is after a

He argues that Marxism, through all of its

mutations, "kept reformulating itself in ways that edged ever
closer to - but never entirely coincided with - the
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perspective embraced by anarchism."3

in order to accurately

assess the import of the work of Deleuze and Foucault, it
will be necessary to explore first how Marxism began to model
itself after anarchism, and second what facets of anarchist
thought are viable and which are outmoded or impotent.

May reminds us that when Lenin set up the three defining
truths of Marxist politics, he set the stage for all of
twentieth century Marxism.
follows:

These three truths are as

"[t]here can be only one struggle, there can be

only one theory; there can be only one leadership."4

The

singular struggle between the working class and capitalist
oppression leads to a categorical analysis of theory:
"either it helps the class struggle progress toward
revolution or it helps the bourgeoisie forestall the
possibility of revolution and thus maintain its domination."5
The singular leadership (a vanguard communist party) is the
third component of Leninist strategy and assumes that the
party is the one which both knows the "true interests" of the
proletariat and is forwarded by advanced theory.

According to Lenin, the workers must be taught their true
interests.

He does not mean that they do not know what is

good for them; he means that the pervasive and dominant
repressive structure of the capitalist/worker dialectic has
sufficiently shielded the working class from understanding
3 Ibid., p. 18.
4 ibid., p. 20.
5 Ibid.
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the thorough-going nature of their alienation and has kept
them from knowing how to revolt.

This they must be taught.

Based upon such a dialectic, power is seen as repressive and
lies solely with the bourgeoisie, while the capacity for
revolution is understood as active and lies solely with the
proletariat.

This capacity simply needs to be channeled,

organized, and awakened by a vanguard party which recognizes
one struggle, one theory, and which sees itself as the only
true administration of economic justice.

Throughout the courses of Soviet Marxism, Western Marxism,
Existentialist and Structuralist Marxism this dichotomy was
not only accepted but pre-supposed.

Indeed, the major

project of the Critical Theorists was to assess why the
working class had not recognized its revolutionary
capabilities.

According to May, the Critical Theorists

identified a "cultural capitalism" as the major repressive
force, thus they differ from Lenin in their assessment of the
limits and pervasiveness of capitalist repression.

However,

"[f]or both, there is a single enemy:

While

capitalism.

Lenin saw capitalism primarily in economic terms, the turn to
'cultural capitalism' by the Critical Theorists does not
change the analysis of capitalism; it merely spreads it
across the entire social space."6

The line from Lenin to

Habermas is infested with subtle shifts and differing
agendas, but what is important is that the central tenets of
6 Ibid., p. 26.
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the Leninist Dialectic (Capitalism is the enemy and utilizes
repressive power; the working class is revolutionary and
fundamentally alienated) remain.

Indeed, what we see is a

movement toward a conception of the social field which
envisions it as thoroughly invested by repressive mechanisms,
a conception that is shared by the anarchists.

But May traces another line of Marxist thought, one that can
be seen somewhat nascently in the work of the Leninist
thinker Louis Althusser, which appears in virgin form with
Antonio Negri and the Italian autonomia

movement, and which

is most fully manifest in the political philosophy of
Cornelius Castoriadis.

What Althusser offered was a looser Marxism which viewed
theory as a "practice in a contingent histbrical context."?
This is important because it allows for multiple "true"
theories regarding the social field, not simply one.

while

such a strategy of course associates its own theoretical hold
with whichever struggle it wishes to support, it opens the
door for what Guattari will later call "micropolitics".

If

several different accounts of the procession or evolution of
repression are possible, then revolt can take place on
several different fronts.

It no longer remains the case

that only "one struggle" can bring about true social change;
multiple struggles are now sanctioned, and the social field

7 Ibid., p. 35.
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comes to be understood as multiple and fragmentary. s

While remaining under a a general Marxist framework
("Capitalism develops as the separation and mutual antagonism
of the two classes? as the development proceeds, the
antagonism deepens"9), thinkers like Negri offer a theory of
the "social factory", which insinuates that in a capitalist
society, all social life "tends toward becoming a factory in
which the capitalist requirement - the exploitation of
surplus value - is most perfectly met."10

What is perhaps

most important about a movement like autonomia

is that it

strove to break up the intense homogenation that capitalism
generates.

It did this not by way of a singular attack or

total worker uprising, rather it attempted to recognize the
diverse needs of all people, the multiplicity of interests
which subsist in housewives, firemen, factory workers, etc.
And the revolt was not intended to come from a vanguard
party:

"It must arise at the level of people's daily lives.

What autonomia proposed was a refusal of all attempts to
extract surplus value, whether that refusal involved work
slowdowns, demands for wages by students and housewives, or
8 As sites of confinement begin to break down, causing the whole social field to appear a s a melting pot of
control, notions of the multiple and the fragm entary will play a pronounced role in political thinking. This
seem ing contradiction ( the notion that all previously autonom ous sites are now freely intersecting in an
alm ost hom ogeneous sp a ce referred to a s the socius contrasted with the assertion that political theory
and practice can no longer be, a s Lenin would have it, singular but m ust be multiple and diversified)
vanishes when the distinction betw een the linguistic determination “capitalism” and its actual activities
becom e apparent. True, the term capitalism, when linked to with the conception for a control society,
appears to describe something global and perhaps even universal. We will see, in Line Five and in the
conclusion b elo w , that this is certainly not the case, and that deterritorializing capitalism c a u se s the social
field to not only consistently m utate but also to consistently fragment.
9 The Political Philosophy of Post-structuralist Anarchism , p. 36.
10 ibid.
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noncooperation with the rituals of capitalism.

Capitalism

would be subverted 'from below' or not at all."ii

The general idea then is that the notion of representation at
some type of governmental level is vanquished.

There is no

need for democracy, or vanguard communism, for each
individual is understood as having the autonomy to assert his
or her subjective interests directly.
complicit with perhaps the

This notion is

central theme of anarchy.

For

his part, Castoriadis offered perhaps the closest variation
of Marxism to anarchy:

He replaced the definitively economic

dichotomy of oppressed worker/oppressive capitalist with the
infinitely more inclusive categorizations of
director/executant 12 .

For Castoriadis, then, alienation is

not the result of economic exploitation of the working class
by capitalists, but rather the loss of self-management (selfgovernment) at all levels of social interaction.

Capitalism,

while still the enemy, has with this newest strain of Marxism
become so loose and shifting a term that it almost ceases to
function, and the possibilities for revolution against both
repression and political representation crop up everywhere
across the social spectrum. 13

Of course, while this

theoretical move borders on anarchy, one would hesitate to
continue to refer to it as Marxism.

11 Ibid., p. 37.
12 ibid., p. 43.
13 In Anti-O edipus , it is suggested that we are now facing perhaps the m ost insidious form of
representation, political or otherwise, in the figure of Oedipus. This notion w as touched upon in Line Two
and will com e up again in the conclusion.
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Thus while manifestations of Marxism in both theory and
practice began to crumble, certain Marxist theoreticians
began to approach some central anarchist themes.

What is

significant about this fact is that revolutionary theory (for
which Marxism must be taken as the milestone) either
collapses due to the infringing and tantalizing auspices of
bureaucracy and democratic capitalism, or it retreats to a
full scale theoretical annihilation of all governmental
structures in order to keep its head above water.

But

perhaps the goals of anarchy (a totally liberated social
sphere with no governmental intervention) were always nascent
in the programs of Marxism.

The ideals are sympatico to an

extent; the difference lies in the strategic methodology
employed to bring an end to State rule.

Keep in mind that

both Marxism and traditional anarchism are reactions to
disciplinary societies.

I will suggest that anarchy offers a

better tactical approach but that it must alter its course in
order to remain relevant in an era pre-configured by control.

Anarchy is actually considered a form of socialism.

It

differs from what has come to be known as "authoritarian
socialism" on several key points.

While Lenin and his

successors saw power as emanating from one source (a
monopolizing capitalist economic superstructure), the
original anarchists (Bakunin and Proudhon, and later
Kropotkin) extended power to all aspects of the social field.
Government in all its insidious forms, no matter how
minuscule, is responsible for not only all repression within

98
the social sector but also for contaminating and severely
limiting individual possibilities.

For the anarchists, the

State is the source of power, power is everywhere and always
suppressive, and both are the incubus for corrupting human
essence and shackling subjective human liberty.

"Bakunin

sees the State as an 'abstraction devouring the life of the
people', an 'immense cemetery where all the real aspirations
and living forces of a country generously and blissfully
allow themselves to be buried in the name of that
abstraction.'" 14

The State is the figurehead of what the anarchists call
"centralization":

a top-down procedure which both organizes

and strengthens controlling hierarchies while repressing the
generally benign will ("I want only to be left alone") of
individuals within the populace.

Thus the anarchist refuses

all sorts of State fostered intervention, including, and
perhaps especially, a "representative" vanguard party which
teaches to the working class their interests.

All forms of

representation (of exchanging the will of one person or group
for the multiple wills, interests, and desires of counties,
towns, states) are reproached by the anarchist.

We see the

connections between anarchy and the Italian autonomia
movement:

All individuals are capable of directly asserting

their subjective interests against State orders.

"What

motivates the critique of political representation is the
idea that in giving people images of who they are and what
14 Daniel Guerin Anarchism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) p. 16.
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they desire, one wrests from them the ability to decide those
matters for themselvesis

Revolt happens within tactical,

intensely charged micropolitical resistances, not in
widesweeping, singular struggles or by figurehead political
parties claiming to represent the interests of all repressed
parties within the social network^ .

What is lacking in anarchism is a cold, calculated logic, a
"strategy".

In Arthur Koestler's novel Darkness at Noon , we

find the main character, Rubashov, struggling with the only
important question for all communists:

"How can my actions,

even in the face of death , further the interests of the
party?"

Rubashov is slated to die for crimes against the

party, and his single consideration is how to make his death
an occasion which strengthens party interests.

Revolution is

simply not logical or programmatic for the anarchist.

While

Marx strategically operated within the orders of the First
International, seeking a position of political superiority
with which he could oversee the organization of the
revolution, "Bakunin used his charismatic personality in
traveling around to different groups in different counties,
15 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism , p. 48.
16 It should be noted here that thinkers such a s Haberm as have suggested resistance strategies that
might be confused with this position. H aberm as se ek s “points of resistance” which for him are
synonym ous with social milieus that have not yet been contam inated by the scourge of ever-extending
capitalism. T hese sp a ce s are supposed to be buttresses where resistance can stave off the
encroachm ent of capitalist tendencies. But H a b e rm a s, in looking for th ese sp aces, appears as a tired
soldier, simply looking for a place to hide from the overpowering advances of the enemy. An anarchism
like the one Deleuze forwards s e e s no such spaces, for the “social” is synonym ous with contem porary
capitalism. There are no s p a c e s or “points of resistance” left “uncontam inated”. Also, an understanding
of power a s productive a s well a s repressive allows the militant active choices for reform, resistance, even
revolt everywhere across the surfaoe of the social sphere, and not just, a s Haberm as would have it, safe
places to hide.
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more interested in roiling them to action than in determining
the proper vehicle for that action.

Bakunin felt that action

would create its own proper vehicles."17

Anarchists are humanists.

As Daniel Guerin points out,

"[t]he anarchist sets two sources of revolutionary energy
against the constraints and hierarchies of authoritarian
socialisms

the individual and the spontaneity of the masses.

Some anarchists are more individualistic than social, some
more social than individualistic.

However, one cannot

conceive of a libertarian who is not an individualist."is
Deleuze, Guattari, and Foucault do in fact conceive an
anarchism that is not individualistic.
later.

We will come to this

In order to more clearly elaborate what the anarchist

wants, we must take up with at least two angles of anarchist
thinking: this notion of humanism at the core of anarchist
theory and the anarchist conception of power.

First, anarchists understand human beings as essential, evenkeeled organisms capable of structuring their own existence.
Transgressions against oneself and others are thought to be
the obvious reactions to dilemmas like poverty, overabundance
of legislation (which leads to individual political
impotence), etc.

These problems stem directly from the

aforementioned "centralization" of state power.

With

Leninists, we witness a "top-down" political theory, where

17 The PoliticalPhilosophyofPost-StructuralistAnarchism,p.46
18Anarchism,p.27.
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control of the state is to be seized by a vanguard
representative party in order to eventually demolish state
oppression.

Anarchy, from the beginning, advocates a

"bottom-up" political philosophy:

rights begin and end with

the self-decided interests of the individual.

Anarchy seeks

only to incite the masses to action: they already know what
to do.

But because of this belief inherent in anarchism that the
individual has a natural essence which is corrupted and then
repressed by the state, the conception of power forwarded by
traditional anarchy is thwarted.

While the anarchists

believe that power is indeed dispersed across the whole
social field and that it emerges as "intersecting networks...
rather than a hierarchy"is , power is still seen to be solely
repressive, a function of the centralization of the State.
They thus elaborate a conception of social space very similar
to Foucault's analysis of disciplinary societies in
Discipline and Punish.

While no single source can be said to

animate power (remember that for Bakunin the State is only an
"abstraction"), all of the sites where power emerges are
sites that serve repression.

Power, for the anarchist, is

always suppressive, never productive.

This contradicts

Foucault's contention that power produces

individuals.

And

this notion provides an argument against the possibility of
human beings ever having anything remotely resembling an
"essence", benign or otherwise.

If, as Foucault hints and

19 The Political Philosophy of Post-Structuralist Anarchism , p. 51.
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Deleuze asserts, in disciplinary societies individuals are
the composite sites which reflect small-scale representations
of the domesticating organization of sites of confinement,
then these thinkers directly contest two central themes of
anarchy:

First, power is not merely repressive, it is also

productive.

Second, there is no such thing as a localizable

individual outside of the sets of practices and social
organizations that produce that individual.

It is true that contemporary anarchists such as Murray
Bookchin and Colin Ward recognize that power and its
oppressive tendencies are decentralized, but the notion that
power serves only repression and can only be resisted through
a humanist theoretical reduction to the ontological level of
the individual remains.

What Foucault and Deleuze offer, and

what composes the crux of Anti-Oedipus , is a model of power
that is productive and a conception of the individual that is
loose and unstable, "deterritorialized".

"Just as power and

oppression are decentralized, so must resistance be . "20

This brings our discussion to the notion of social space.
According to Foucault, in a disciplinary society there are in
fact "territories", sites of confinement, divisions within
the sphere of the social that are separated and marked off.
If we take this model as a starting point, power is
understood as a flux of forces which "invests" preestablished social spaces.
20 Ibid., p. 54.

Lines of power converge at a
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"site" which is one territory in the broader social field.
But when these territories (factory, bank, individual,
school, family, hospital, college), which together compose
what we understand as the social field, begin to break down
and an unstable and modulating code of control infinitely
divides and reconfigures social spaces, the entire geography
of the social field is uprooted.

Capitalism consistently

deterritorializes localized sites and re-territorializes them
in such a fashion that the concept of "space" becomes
outmoded; there is no longer any social space to be invested
by power; rather, the socius is the overflowing product of
vicissitudes of modulating functions of control.

I will

directly address this absence of space, particularly with
respect to the space of the individual, in Line Five.
Deleuze and Guattari envision the schizophrenic process as
"universal producer".

They also attribute to schizophrenia

the same deterritorializing capacities that capitalism
utilizes.

It is therefore no surprise that they use the

schizophrenic process as a model for active political
engagement of the social field.

LINE

FIVE:

SCHIZOPHRENIC

"SPACES"

What will be my concern here is the space
schizophrenic inhabits.

which the

It is the space of hallucination, of

dream, of psychic production; but it is of course much more
than this.

That the space of the schizo supplants,

overthrows, replaces the space of lived bodily perception
indicates a certain decentering, an entire calculus of the
production of the real .

To be more specific: it is in fact

the case that the real is always

produced, always

instituted, by media machines and capitalist fragmentation;
it is not far off to admit that desire, the very heart of
subjectivity, is mass-produced within the contemporary order
and installed sporadically, actually invested, within and as
society.

Under this rubric, the schizophrenic process is an

investment of produced desire

which complies entirely with

the capitalist model while simultaneously and on all fronts
operating outside the limits of capital.

"The schizophrenic

is more capitalist than the capitalist".

Schizophrenia is

capitalism without the body of capital, without a marker, and
therefore it is the antithesis of capitalism.

We are getting

far ahead of ourselves; for now we must at least consent that
the schizophrenic experience is in fact a production, for we
are not willing to admit that hallucinations, phantasms,
paranoias approach the schizophrenic from without; they are
produced, artificially constructed, by the unconscious
machine.

A break has occurred, and necessarily so.

For the

break between sanity and insanity is the break between
104
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perception and hallucination, the break between reality
(whatever assignment such a word implies) and fantasy.

It is

the break, to speak the discourse of nostalgia, between
language and silence, between truth and folly, between
science and absurdity.

Schizophrenic space is always

regarded from the frontier of more static, operable, fixed
spaces.

It will be our business herein to disengage this

constricting paradigm; to do so we will locate schiz-flows
within all spaces, we will conceive of schizophrenia not as
(dis) order, but as a typal energy, erratically material and
very much a part of the constitution of the "real".

The precise regional or psychoanalytic position that
schizophrenic space occupies is of no concern to us here; we
are interested, along with Merleau-Ponty, in the significance
of such a lived space.

In the Phenomenology of Perception ,

we are brought to bear with the lived phenomenal body.
Indeed, we uncover a philosophy of the flesh which subtends
all empirical and intellectualist accounts of the subject.
We are introduced to the subjectless subject, the subject
which cannot be a dissociate of its world, the subject for
whom natural, cultural, indeed all physical or psychical
objects are grafted onto and into the core of his very being.
This lived phenomenal body invests the world with temporality
and is in a magnetic flux with all of its perceptions.

The

body's gaze communes with the world, is developed in a nexus
of call-and-response activity which Merleau-Ponty understands
as perception .

Indeed, his is a metaphysics of perception;
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we are lived fleshy bodies, interrogated by and interrogating
the world.

We inhabit habitual space in which our activities

make sense to us; I know what it is to be in the store, my
wife sent me here, I came from our home, I am caught up in
the act of shopping, and though my ankle is sprained and my
great uncle is on trial for fraud, right now the green pepper
is the object of my quest, for the chef's salad at home on my
table will not be complete without it.

Thus it runs that perception looks upon the world not as an
assortment of distributed objects, but as an assemblage
meaning.

of

All "objects" exist only in contextual realities,

and these contexts underlie the very possibility of
perception, i.e., of seeing, understanding, living .
Perception is the medium by which the subject and its world
are unified, and reflexively how they are constituted.

We

are reminded that reflection takes place only after
perception; that the body already has its bearings, is
already geared into the world through its activities before
any objective distinction can be made between who sees and
what is seen.

Now, of course, this lived phenomenal body which belongs to
perception is not distinct from the withdrawn, autonomous
consciousness of intellectualist reflection.

Merleau-Ponty

goes to great lengths to show us that the process of
perception reveals not only a correlation between motor
response and intellectual assessment; it reveals the
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indivisibility of the two.

As we said above, this lived

phenomenal body cannot be extracted from its experience of
the world; such a removal establishes degrees of separation
between consciousness, body, and world.
with no remainder.

The body belongs ,

We are confronted only with an

inexhaustible multiplicity of phenomena, layers of
transcendental significance.

Without belaboring the point,

suffice it to say that perception is the crux of MerleauPonty' s philosophical vantage point.

It is indeed curious,

then, that he should oppose perception to hallucination in
his discussion of Space.

Space is a pre-perceptive awareness; it is, according to
Merleau-Ponty, a precondition for perception.

It establishes

the realm within which significance is invested.

We

understand that there must be a "here" to constitute any type
of space; Nietzsche recognized early on that a nonperspectival vantage point is a "view from nowhere"; God's
view in fact.

It is a useless perspective, an hypothetical

abstract which serves no purpose other than to entertain the
metaphysicians.

This "here", which is always the root of the

subject, is not only a physical location; it belongs to the
order of the bodily historical, to the order of meaning, and
to the order of the temporal ek-stacy which perception always
already is.

"Here" refers not to geographical/scientific

position but to existential space, to the lived significance
and the ongoing activities in which we are subsumed and
contextualized.

Thus we

rethink proximity and distance in
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relation to existential space; I am physically very near to
my philosophy professor at the U of M, relating to me the
significance of classical paradoxes, and very far from my
dear mother in Pennsylvania who is suffering a bout with
dysentery.

Existentially, my mother is right with me, for

nary can I entertain the notion of Meno's paradox when I am
worried sick over mum.

And it is the case that I don't need

to have my attention drawn to this fact; I am already
thinking on my sick mother, whether I am explicitly conscious
of thinking about it or not. While physical distance and
existential space both have an immediate bearing upon my
horizon of being, I am always caught up within existential
spaces and rarely have occasion to ponder objective
measurements or geographical proximities.

I understand myself as a mobile, situated, embodied self who
entertains a primordial grasp on reality.

While the retro

spection involved in positing an objective world within which
I dwell and which conditions my experience is distasteful to
all but the stout absolutist, there must be something
tangible, something true, about reality which is given over
to me in perception and which allows for a certain contiguity
of experience.

A shared pre-articulate world , one which is

not judged by its correlation with propositional truth values
and which is inexhaustibly, wonderfully ambiguous, is given
to us in perception, beckons us and commands our gaze.

It is

this horizonal space, this largely abstract but fundamental
communion with the natural world, which grounds perception
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and which illuminates all of our related existential spaces.
Space is, according to Merleau-Ponty, "neither an object, nor
an act of unification on the subject's part; it can neither
be observed, since it is pre-supposed in every observation,
nor seen to emerge from a constituting operation, since it is
of its essence that it be already constituted."!

Space is

the "positing of a level", and by this we mean a level of
illumination; it grants a possibility for perceiving and
understanding.

Underlying all conscious perceptions is a

"system of anonymous 'functions' which draw every particular
focus into a general project"; this "system" is none other
than the lived, phenomenal, temporal, spatial

body.

This

body is aware of itself; it possesses an image of itself,
thus it stands in harmonious relation to its world, for it
understands its own operations and simultaneously relates
them causally to the functioning of the natural and cultural
world.

Space is always already there, always already

saturated with significance.

The body is the gathering of

lived spaces, the guardian of significance. This significance
is a tacit understanding, transcendental in the sense that it
impregnates our activities with meaning; it is a recollection
of our past aimed at our future; significance synthesizes and
unifies thetic experience. We might call this fluid condition
"sanity".

It is the case that if one is blindfolded and set adrift in a
pool of water at 98.6 degrees Fahrenheit, the body image
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Phenomenology of Perception ( New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul
Ltd. 1962 ) p. 254,
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disintegrates.

Such complete sensory depravation induces, in

the average subject, a sensation that his organs are leaking
out into the water, that the barriers of the flesh are no
longer holding.

This condition leads to a loss of sanity;

everyone requires a body image.

The body image is our style,

our succinct awareness of the way the body is already in
spaces.

its

Our body image is a prerequisite to our sharing in

the world competently.

We experience the world as if our

body image has already been there in advance.

The loss of

this facticity does not affect psychical breakdown; it alters
the psychical schemata.

That is, what I refer to as my

conscious history (the history that I know as my own past
experiences, recollected in the present), is subtended by a
bodily pre-history, which amounts to the understanding the
body enjoys with the natural world.

When this understanding

is frustrated, my conscious history, i.e., my lived reality,
is upended.

Space is the pre-condition for perception.

It safeguards

difference and distance, for these are the constituents of
meaning.

We have said that the lived, phenomenal body is

essentially spatial; it is corporeal within physical space,
it catches up with itself within temporal space, it acts
within praxis space, it smolders within its moods.

These

spaces are never radically other than each other; what is
given to us in our experience of the physical world tends to
comply with our temporal,cultural, and activity spaces; for
even the experience of what we consider objective space
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relations is always already pregnant with existential
meaning.

Not only this, but they all maintain significance

for us; they form the content of our experience by co
existing; it is not contradictory to say that I find myself
within several spaces at once:

I am a student on the campus,

with my good friend, talking about something we did last
Saturday, walking to a shop to buy supper.

All of these

things represent certain temporal, physical, or praxis
spaces, all are significant to me and my current experience
of the "present", and none are isolated or withdrawn from
each other or from me.

At the same time, none of them impose

such a tremendous tenor of significance upon me that I am
unable to alter my course of action or think of something
else; they all "keep their distance".

Thus these spaces form

a comfortable arena, and I am a tacit inhabitor of
spatiality.

Perception is the dynamic which momentarily

crystallizes experience into its relations of significance.
We have elaborated an account of reality which is fluid,
intersubjective, and inexhaustible.

We can now turn to

Merleau-Ponty's account of schizophrenic space and hope to
understand what exactly is revealed in this, the most
fundamental of all breakdowns.

We have briefly examined the lived phenomenal body, the
necessity of a spatial body image, the co-existence and
blending of all lived spaces.

And through this, the

phenomenological subject of perception has emerged, stepping
out of the spiraling fogs of textbook objectivity and
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revealing to us his own primordial link with his world.

But

as phenomenology is a science of breakdowns, or rather since
breakdown is t h e birthplace of phenomenological inquiry, it
is only proper to approach spaces which do not quite fit the
tidy package heretofore elaborated.

Merleau-Ponty, after

discussing spatial depth, spatial movement, and spatial
orientation, approaches the complicated realms of dream
space, mythic space, and schizophrenic space.

Merleau-Ponty contends that different spaces call up
different subjects capable of living in them .2

The subject

and the environment adapt to each other in order to
facilitate peaceable dwelling.

Dream space is a significant

space? it really "contains its meaning".

It is of course

obvious that so-called "objective space", in the dream state,
"settle[s] in a different theatre"3? but this space, while
carrying its own significance along with it, poses no real
difficulty to the understanding.

In the same way that I am

with my mother in Pennsylvania and not present in the
classroom, I am not lying in my bed, fast asleep, dreaming; I
am immersed in a dream space, a space which maintains the
same transcendental understanding and lived significance as
any other.

We encounter "a space peopled with phantasms,

just as, in waking life, our dealings with the world which is
offered to us condition a space peopled with realities."4
Both spaces precede, condition, and give meaning to
2 Ibid., p. 250.
3 Ibid., p. 284.
4 Ibid., p. 285.
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perception; their objective reality status is no concern of
ours.

All dream spaces resemble real spaces, and have a

horizonal quality for experience just as real spaces; we are
immersed within them, and they are endowed with significance
for us.

Dream space is

existential space.

Similarly, the

space of myth poses no real detours; primitive peoples simply
"do not overstep this existential space".

They dwell in a

world where objective calculations do not impose upon an
existential understanding; whether we reside in the favor of
the rain god or receive the precipitation from over-burdened
cloud cover makes no difference; nor whether we go the way of
the wind or turn right on Fairmont Avenue.

The spaces are

different, but each belongs to a mode of dwelling within
which inter-subjective significance abounds.

But let us discuss psychotics.

For it is in fact

schizophrenic space which gives us pause.

Schizophrenic

space and the space of hallucination, according to MerleauPonty, are of a slightly different order.

In "normal" or

"average" experience,
[b]esides the physical and geometrical distance which stands between
myself and all things, a 'lived' distance binds me to things which count
and exist for me, and links them to each other.
This distance measures
the 'scope' of my life at every moment.
Sometimes between myself and
the events there is a certain amount of play...which insures that my
freedom is preserved while the events do not cease to concern me.5

This is to say that the elements of my spaces do not bear
upon me in such a way that I am surrounded, trapped, or

5 Ibid., p. 186.
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imprisoned by them.

We retain a certain amount of "breathing

room" between ourselves and our involvements which ensures a
compatible relationship.

To take a few examples, when I find

myself examining a photographer's portfolio, I have an
implicit understanding that I am looking at photographs; I
understand that a photograph is a representation of a past
event, that the portfolio is a composite of the work of a
certain photographer, who maintains a certain relationship
with myself.

I recognize people or places in the photos and

can read the contexts well enough to imagine what was not
captured in the picture, what never came under the scrutiny
of the lens.

All this while turning pages, drinking coffee,

and complimenting the photographer upon a job well done.

I

am involved in all of these activities, but they do not
impose upon me in such a way that one of them overpowers the
others; I am easily able to accommodate all such phenomena.
Such is not the case with the schizophrenic.

Everyone has had the experience of being preoccupied.

There

are certain events or tasks or conditions which at certain
times seem so overpowering and immense that one can think of
little else.

When these concerns start to get the best of

us, we are labeled neurotic.

When these concerns are not

real but imagined, that is, when they are not simply
overblown perceptions but imagined violations and
hallucinations, or when significance is not singularly
overbearing but infinitely and incoherently multiple, we are
labeled psychotic.

Here we enter the realm of schizophrenia.
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Merleau-Ponty describes the space of schizophrenia as an
imposition, the elimination of the comfortable distance
between myself and my objects and activities.

It is the

"shrinkage of lived space" which crashes in upon the
individual, an unbearable imposition of significance upon the
subject.

He calls this existential space of the

schizophrenic "landscape space", referring to a certain case
study in which the schizophrenic, out for a walk, is
confronted by a landscape, interrogated unrelentingly by each
object of perception.

An ominous sky replaces the evening

sky, perhaps bleeding trees and blissful rocks frolic about
on the vibrating landscape.

This space in which there is no

comfortable separation between subject and involvements,
which is the schizophrenic's "way of perceiving the world",
invades physical space to such a degree that the real
landscape is subverted and removed; the schizo is dissociated
from the "objective world as the latter is presented to
perception", and immersed in this private space.

Here the

schizophrenic dwells; we cannot wake him up, as we could the
dreamer, in order to give him new perspective, a new space
from which to reconsider the old.

The schizophrenic is not

drawn towards the world of objects; his gaze is not commanded
by elements which have significance for him; the "impulse of
existence towards things has lost its energy, because it
appears to itself in all its contingency and because the
-

^

world can no longer be taken for granted."6

The landscape

before which he stands is incidental; schizophrenic space
6 Ibid., p. 287.
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overtakes and negates comfortable lived space.

The schisophrenic is trapped in an "illusory world" from
which he cannot escape.

His "play-room" has collapsed in

upon itself, and he cannot enjoy a "virtual space", a
comfortable space in relation to his body image.

All of

space becomes pregnant with meaning, all spaces are
essentially filled .

His own private, existential space

intrudes upon him, and he can no longer inhabit the shared
world.

In a condition of sanity, one's existential spaces

open out onto the shared world of experience, are in
communion with it, and enjoy a relative harmony with "clear
space".

For Merleau-Ponty, the structure of space determines

the limits of sanity and insanity; things retain their
distance in reality.

When we feel threatened, we can

reconcile our unease with the shared world, which all of our
spaces open onto.

The schizophrenic does not have this

luxury; he is not ekstatic out onto the world, he is imposed
upon by the very structures of nature.

While Merleau-Ponty takes up the antipode of objective
analysis, he admits of a certain "clear space" to which
schizophrenic space occupies a relation.

This is not the

objective world which forms a foundation for the subject;
this is the incarnate experience of spatiality which everyone
necessarily

experiences.

This is the pre-reflective spatial

and temporal ekstatic condition; Merleau-Ponty wants t o gain
this as a guasi-universal, applicable to all lived bodies.
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He verifies this by examining case studies; schizophrenics
are aware

that what haunts them is not real, and can easily

distinguish between an actual object and a hallucination.
The fact that this is of no consequence to them is an
important point, one which will be discussed below.
suffice it sum up:

For now,

Hallucinatory conditions, like dreams and

myths, take their bearing from real spaces, just as all
spaces do.

The notion of nearness to a sick family member

iniles away is not of a totally different order than the
distance which separates two stone walls of a canyon, or the
proximal vicinity which relates the subject-while-flyfishing
to the same subject-while-jogging.

Space is universal

experience for Merleau-Ponty, and all experiences of space
are fundamentally related to our existential, non-thetic,
pre-objective and pre-articulate spatiality; we are spatial.
Thus we are assured that while there is no proscription which
will return to schizo his "comfortable space", at least the
schizophrenic, as an incarnate lived body, resides in the
spatial order.

Neither will Merleau-Ponty concede that hallucinations are
indistinguishable from reality; those who hallucinate know
that they are hallucinating.

While the hallucination may

possess tremendous weight for the afflicted individual, it
remains of the order of a sensory or psychical disturbance
and can always be distinguished from real, lived experience.7
The experiences of the schizophrenic are recognized as unreal
7 Ibid., pps. 334-345.
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even by him; "there is no definite path leading from it to
all the remaining experiences of the deluded subject, or the
experiences of the sane."0

The hallucination is not a member

of the "geographical world", where we find the stuff of
knowledge or establish laws.

It is, and remains, an

"individual landscape", in which the victim is confronted and
violated by the world; the communion is forced, unwarranted,
and intrusive.

If it sounds strange that Merleau-Ponty must find recourse to
the "geographical" world in order to understand the
"individual landscape"*

of the schizophrenic, or that the

space of dream, activity, hallucination or culture must
necessarily be rooted, so to speak, in a pre-thetic,
ambiguous, intersubjective clear space, it should.

Although

Merleau-Ponty does his best to avoid any type of
totalizations, hierarchies, or other definitive statements
about physical or metaphysical objectivity, he cannot grant
that the space of the schizophrenic is as viable and allencompassing a lived space as any other, nor can he simply
chalk it up to relative differences; schizophrenic space must
be of a certain order; it must be related, in a crucial and
derivative way, to all discussions of space, or else the
nasty business of relativism will taint the pages of the
Phenomenology, re-writing arguments and frightening off the
tepid reader of philosophy; logical inconsistency cannot be

8 ibid., p. 339.
9 Ibid., p. 341.
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permitted, even when one is attempting to articulate the prelogical.

If one cannot find some shared spatiality, to which

all are accommodated, then the analyticians are given
recourse to fall back upon the age old objection of
relativism.

Be that as it may, Merleau-Ponty evades wholly

all objective positing, at least in-so-far as it is possible.
This speaks in his favor; he paves the way for many modern
studies of "abnormal" conditions by avoiding the
objectifications so callously attributed to the afflicted
(insane, pathological, the patient) and takes up with
evaluations of relationships ; not the doctor examining the
schizo in the hospital, but a nexus of involvements from
which many possible outcomes emerge.

Briefly, a recap:
1.

The existential condition is a harmonious communion with

the world; the subject is a composite of all of its spatial
horizons, never an autonomous entity.
2.

Perception is not the medium which relates subject to

object, but rather the mystical link which insures all mutual
interest and intersubjectivity.

Phenomenologically speaking,

the subject lives his world; he does not examine or analyze
it.
3.

Underlying perception is an implicit and necessary

awareness of one's body image and the way it opens onto the
perceptual horizon; we call this space and realize that it
allows for all significant experience.

Space is not a
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measurable distance; it is the transcendental awareness of
distance, motion, perspective, social complexes, etc.
4.

We dwell spatially; in so doing, we find that our spaces

are interconnected and inseparable; they are the latent forms
of significance by way of which perception is open to the
world.

And although spaces form an interconnectedness and

enable meaning, they retain their distance from us so that we
are free to move among spaces, to shift spatialities, and to
fluidly relate spaces within a "comfortable distance".
5.

'The schizophrenic process, according to Merleau-Ponty, is

the collapse of this comfortable distance by intrusive space;
schizophrenia is the annihilation of a "clear" or shared
spatiality by an oppressive, internal, and subjective
reconstruction of reality.

The schizophrenic is therefore

spatially understood, but this deficiency in the area of
spatial structure inhibits the process of the habitual body
towards its world.

The world of common property is usurped

by an imposing, private, hallucinatory world.

There is more, I believe, to the schizophrenic dynamic than
has been hitherto elaborated in this discussion.

It is the

case, therefore, that we should examine this issue more
closely, in order to understand what is meant when we refer
to "schizophrenic space".

Let us take up with this issue,

and hopefully we will not lose sight of the scope and tenor
of Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology while doing so.

Schizophrenia is the tragic condition par excellence ; the
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afflicted is antisocial, incoherent, at times irrationally
violent or eerily catatonic, paranoid, confused.

We do not

desire this condition, and most look upon it as an ailment,
an illness which needs be cured or at least contained.
Although it has no clear boundaries and can go by many other
names, few would regard schizophrenia as anything but a
disorder; as we have seen above, Merleau-Ponty does just
this.

The schizophrenic's experience of space is mutated and

ominous; he cannot come to terms with his spatiality, cannot
dwell in the shared spatial world where others have their
activities; his space is that of the introverted illusion,
not of the real.

But I think the question should be posed in

a different light, in another space:

Rather than seek out

the probable causes for dysfunctional behavior, we should
understand better why this behavior is dysfunctional at all.

Schizophrenia is a modern affliction; while madmen have
populated every ville and castle, every country and fairie
tale in history, there is little resemblance between the
madmen of the past and the contemporary schizophrenic.

In

fact, as has been effectively argued by Foucault (see Madness
and Civilization ), madness, like most of our other socially
constituted labels and objectifications, shows up in
different spaces, for different reasons, under different
guises in every discourse, in every age.

As elaborated in

Line Three, Foucault further argues that madness,
criminality, foolishness, and all other forms of illness or
affliction are merely empty signifiers; they are invested
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with meanings historically and as it suits the matrix of
power structures.

Whether we agree with this last point is

unimportant, it is enough to say that in an age of
psychoanalysis, rapidly advancing technology, complex
scientific procedures, and accelerated capitalist
deterritorialization, madness, like all other socially
established frontiers, cannot possibly retain a constant
meaning, one that would suit all the cases in history.

To

some extent, Merleau-Ponty recognizes this; he only discusses
very recent experiments on schizophrenics, for schizophrenia
belongs to

the realm of modern psychology, is given voice

only as an object of interest and inquiry.

Only once

consciousness has emerged as an object for scientific inquiry
can anything remotely resembling contemporary schizophrenia
come into being.

Now, before moving on, an important distinction must be made.
The schizophrenic condition, as witnessed by the
psychoanalyst (and everyone else, for we have all
internalized the shrink's gaze), is of a different order than
the schizophrenic process.

The captured schizophrenic is not

a representative of the schizophrenic process; by nailing
Oedipus to the psychotic, we create an artificial
schizophrenia.
not the process.

Merleau-Ponty examines only the condition,
What this amounts to is the difference

between a free man and a man in chains, for the incarcerated
schizophrenic that we find behind the walls of the
institution is a harnessed, constructed entity.

The thrust
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of psychology is the fervent and frantic Oedipalization of
all men; the subject emerges from a context in which the
father and the mother form the other points of a composite
triangle.

The unconscious is formed through the process of

"coming into the social" that the child undergoes when he/she
realizes that he or she is other than mommy/daddy.

The child

sees the penis and realizes that she lacks it, or he is
afraid that his will be severed.

He wants to fuck mom and

kill dad, or she want to fuck dad and murder mom,

but

gradually each accepts the repression of these natural but
antisocial desires.

The subject is born.

And it is the

case, as pointed out by Lacan and his contemporaries, that
the child does not have to see the actual penis but only
needs to "come into language" in order to be Oedipalized; for
language is the use of symbolism, and the central symbol is
the penis; it is the stout metaphor for all signification and
all order.

The real is the symbolic, or rather, there is no

intimation of the real which is not symbolic.

Thus language, while separating the child from its nascent
state of union with mom, grants to the subject's world the
enigma of symbolism, which is the birthplace of desire.

The

Other comes radically into view as other, as the necessary
distance which is the basis for communication; communication
is lack.

This desiring-subject is of course the foundation

for psychology, so it should not surprise us that when
confronted by schizophrenia, the psychoanalyst would
immediately look for a disruptive phase in the maturation of
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the psychological subject (for Lacan, the psychotic never
comes to grips with phallic symbolism, what he calls
"foreclosure", what amounts to the phallic never becoming
symbolic, never finding its place in the symbolism of the
real; the phallic then resides in hallucination or other
infringements upon the real).
break down?

Where did the Oedipal process

What can we now do to re-invest subjectivity

into this thwarted schema?

Of all the ambiguities

surrounding schizophrenia, we can be sure of one constant;
the schizophrenic condition is the absence of the ego.

Thus

the schizo is forced to comply to an order which is foreign
to him, the already established, pre-given and necessary
subject.

This is the condition of schizophrenia that we read

about in psychology texts; this is not the schizophrenic
process.

But of course, it will be objected, schizophrenia in not born
in the institution; schizophrenics are brought to
psychoanalysts because they are

schizophrenic, because they

cannot function in their jobs, or in their family life.
this we should reply:

To

The schizophrenic is easily

recognizable precisely because

he does not fit the mold.

Psychoanalysis is not the abstract art of head-shrinking; it
is a lived condition, it is

the contemporary subject.

We

are all born of psychology to the extent that we are immersed
in our own subjectivity; the contemporary subject is the
Oedipalized subject, the consciousness aware of its own
activity and capable of questioning its own motives; we are
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able to pinpoint and isolate neurotic or psychotic behavior
immediately; we readily accept our own individuality, models
for our development, and proper social conduct.
one of us shrinks.

We are each

And this is not the least bit surprising;

society itself is neurotic, capitalism itself schizophrenic.
The police state of the mind, awakened at the level of
individual consciousness; we are ourselves trained
psychological policemen.

It is for these reasons that we can make the distinction
between the schizophrenic, who comes into being as the target
of Oedipalization, and the schizophrenic process, which would
represent a loss of all location and space, of all judgment
and subjectivity.

These are two very different orders; one

is brought into being by nature of a forced impotence; the
other represents foreign and dissociated thinking, a thinking
which remains outside, a hyper-productivity.

It should be

asked what this thinking can do.

Capitalism is the art of production, the establishment of
rules of exchange; not only exchange values of goods and
products, but the exchange values of desires and territories,
of sexual oddities and virtual spaces.

And it is our

capitalism, what some have termed "Late Capitalism", which we
must relate to the schizophrenic condition.

Postraodernity witnesses the
structures.

reckless decentering of all

Our cultural objects are simulacra; our desires
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are

written for us by advertisements, magazines, internets,

televisions.

While the products of capitalism used to be

tangible goods, we now witness the reproduction of all things
illusory, everything from company stocks to video tapes (the
former represents imaginary money, the latter is the
production and sale of an image).

All areas of society are

fragmented and dissociated; even the subject is fragmentary
(we are not aware of our own desires until they are
"revealed" to us by the media, psychology, culture, etc.; we
become different selves in various situations; we cannot
reconcile our conscious needs with our unconscious desires
and with the social order).

Advertisements make random

associations which do not equate (drink Mountain Dew and
experience treacherous free-falls off of mountain cliffs).
Many post-modern authors (Jameson, Baudrillard, etc.) have
equated Late Capitalism with a psychotic or schizophrenic
state.

I do not think this comparison is unwarranted,

for

nowhere is there a tangible or transcendental subject,
nowhere do we find grounded reality, and nowhere is anything
autonomous; all discourses flow together in a disjointed
association of arbitrary assessments.

This "society of the spectacle" (to borrow from DuBord) might
be seen as the realm where illusory subjectivity is produced;
the irony being that the process of production, which Marx
understood to be synonymous with human nature, is now
producing

human nature, producing the subject who desires,

producing desire itself, and establishing the hyper-arenar in
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which

these events are played out.

This all looks,

hauntingly enough, like most descriptions of schizophrenic
thought processes.

For the real is synonymous with the

symbol and the illusion, which are the hyperbolical
composites of the desiring-subject.

Our society is

constantly re-writing subjects through the production of
desires.

The real is imagery, illusion, hallucination.

And

it does not maintain a comfortable distance; our own
production always and everywhere reproduces us; it fragments
subjectivities; there can be no "clear" space to which all of
our fragmented capitalist spaces refer or relate.

Capitalism

produces the real, produces the desiring subject, and
produces itself and all of its territories.
legendary.

Its immanence is

Capitalism does not care for the real any more

than the schizo; the schizo knows that his productions are
not real, but their significance is all-encompassing; the
modern subject, who is the waste product of capitalist
production, may know that his desires are not his own, that
his objects and spaces are always and everywhere fabricated;
this has no bearing on his life, however, for the experience
of the simulation is the ground floor of meaning; produced
simulacra are

significant reality.

The post-modern individual is the excess of so many
decentered discourses; we can rest assured that the subject
is missing.

Capitalism and schizophrenia are inherently

linked, but how so?
not likely.

Is one the origin of the other?

It is as much a mistake to assume that

This is
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capitalism causes schizophrenia as to assume that
schizophrenia is an Oedipal failure; schizophrenia surfaces
as a contemporary affliction because it is so compatible with
the capitalist mode of production.

Just as material

production was once the essence of capitalism, so the subject
was once the essence of social life.

It has become the case

that capitalism frees production from material exchange, from
concrete values.

Now production assumes control of the

organization of the socius, the complete construction and
organization of the real.

And the schizophrenic process

removes the bodily/conscious/subjective restrictions which
once structured the social self.

Modern capitalism is a

deterritorialization geared towards pure production in the
form of reterritorialization, nothing else.
examples offered in the Introduction:

Remember the

Academia, the

teacher/student relationship, information technologies,
individuals, wildlife refuges, etc. are all uprooted and
reconfigured constantly with the onset of new connections of
control like the virtual diploma or the "high-definition"
television.

And schizophrenia deterritorializes as well;

there are no boundaries and no symbols; nothing means
anything else (the cigar is never a penis); there is free
play and multiplicity, infinite layers of chaotic
significance.

But schizophrenia is not exactly akin to

capitalism; capitalism is self-serving and remains regional.
This is to say, capitalism is concerned with a recording and
re-ordering proces which operates according to the logic of
expansion and gain:
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"Yet it would be a serious error to consider the capitalist flows and
the schizophrenic flows as identical, under the general theme of a
decoding of the flows of desire. Their affinity is great...We have seen
that the relationship of schizophrenia to capitalism...should be
examined at the deepest level of one and the same economy, one and the
same production process."10

The economical process is the same; the motivating orders are
not.

Here we see the nature of the difference between the
f

capitalist and schizophrenic processes.
"The language of a banker, a general, an industrialist, a middle or high
level manager, or a government minister is a perfectly schizophrenic
language, but that functions only statistically within the flattening
axiomatic of connections that puts it in the service of the capitalist
order."11

Capitalism employs the language and the structure of
schizophrenia (it authorizes what Deleuze and Guattari call
schiz-flows) in order to invest the whole of the social field
with "limitless" pure production.

Yet it is only a regional

deterritorialization, for it re-establishes its own limits
with respect to investment; it establishes entirely new
boundaries with one hand where it deterritorializes with the
other.

Schizophrenia represents chaos with no remainder; not

the limitless extension of boundaries, but the annihilation
of boundaries.

Schizophrenic thinking

is full-scale

theoretical anarchy.

Through the retardation process of the contemporary
intelligentsia (psychoanalytic micro-state), schizophrenia is
boxed, labeled and shipped.
10 A n ti-O ed ip u s, p. 245.
11 Ibid., p. 246.

All of its productions become
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reactive, never active.

Its activities are constructed as

expressions of anxiety and illusion.

All of its behaviors

stem from repression and are not expressive of excess; and,
fundamentally, the core of desire, the Oedipal subject, is
always a lack .

Desire always lacks its object.

schizophrenic always lacks reality.

The

Capitalism is

schizophrenic, but only to the extent that schizophrenic
flows (language, thought processes, technologies) multiply,
divide and accelerate a certain metaphysical capital, the God
of exchange and value.

Schizophrenia threatens this regime,

for it pushes capitalism too far.

Capitalism puts schizo-

processes in the service of capital; no, the worker no longer
produces his own alienation (he no longer has that luxury);
now there is only pure production,
the socius.

a constant re-writing of

There is no possibility of alienation; there is

no comfortable space.

The schizophrenic process everywhere

exceeds the capitalist order, thus it threatens social order
from within and without.

Schizophrenia is the limit of

revolution; it is revolution not "for the sake of" (equal
rights, governmental representation, etc.)
qua

but revolution

revolution, chaos for the sake of chaos.

This

revolutionary aspect of schizophrenia has also been harnessed
by capitalism; skinheads selling skateboards, gansta rap
promoting Osh-Kosh jeans, hippies for Christ, whatever.

Merleau-Ponty approaches the issue of schizophrenia with the
intention of granting it a certain space.

This he does.

this space is simply a re-working of his theory of lived

But
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phenomenal space; schizophrenic space has an imposing
tendency; it suffocates the schizo with meaning but remains
spatial.
space.

It simply supplants a more comfortable, clear
It seems to be the case, however, that the problem is

not so simple.

For schizophrenic space is not the stuff of

ill-formed Oedipal processes; it is not an isolated,
individual, impositional micro-space.

Neither is it the

dilemma of the afflicted schizophrenic, who is in fact merely
the deposit of so much schizophrenic energy.

It is not the

case that the schizophrenic simply cannot open onto a shared
world, a world in which things "keep their distance".

For

this world is vacuous, is indeed, at the very core,
hallucination itself.

The clear world, the spatial realm

which grants activities their significance, is the doctored
illusion which is ritualistically invested with schizophrenic
movements under the rubric of distribution of capital.
"shared world" is the world of Oedipus, where

The

grafted

subjectivities are force-fed marketable desires.

We are all

"aware" of our body image because control is only possible
when limits are established; the subject is constructed as
desiring-subject because subjectivity is the capacity to
absorb desire, make it mean something else, and re-invest it
with interest

back into the body of capitalism.

Schizophrenia is not a regional space where intrusive
illusions overstep the bounds of shared, pre-thetic
experience.

The schizophrenic patient is simply the

subjectivization of the capitalist schema; instead of
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passively receiving his illusions, he actively originates
them; he is more efficient than the sane subject, but he is
also infinitely more threatening.
of every society, is reality.

Capitalism, as the limit

We witness nothing that is

untouched and unchanged by its operations.
are the modus operandi

Schiz-processes

of capitalism, the connective

electrico-social generators of reality.

The real is

synonymous with the illusory, perception with hallucination.
The lived phenomenal body is the constant restructuring of
desires, and nothing more.

Significance is not born of a

pre-thetic synthesis, an orienting awareness of body/world.
Significance is the product of illusion, the simulacra of the
ideal subject, and variations thereof are the experimental
adopted samples, the desiring-subjects.

But the myth of the real still dominates, for it is the
perfect alibi for pure productive processes.
producing what you want!

"We are

Technology affords us the luxury of

being able to expand our world, broaden our horizons, give us
larger scope and more fundamental access to all areas of
reality1"

We can fly across the Atlantic and marvel at the

mystery of Stonehenge in just under three hours on the
Concord.

Unfortunately, we bring our history with us; we are

witness only to what we want to witness; rather, to what we
are informed that we want to witness.

I can read in explicit

detail the news coverage of Bosnia and be up to date on the
death tolls, but no one is dying.

We believe in the "real"

just as, for so long, we believed in objective reality, and
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before that God.

Without substantial reference, we are

absent, and no one but the schizophrenic can accept this
fact.

So we comfort ourselves with stories of people and

places, of presidents and leaders, of conflict and slaughter
and welfare and academics.

We all know

we share the same

world, deep down, for how else could it be?

Merleau-Ponty's description of schizophrenic space sounds
alot like contemporary capitalist space; a "landscape space"
of illusion, pregnant with meaning and bearing its own
significance within itself bears upon the "real" to such an
extent that the "real" is insignificant, unrecognizable,
usurped and discarded.

Thd difference is that the

schizophrenic knows his hallucinations are not real and also
knows that this makes no difference.

Meaning is bound up in

existential illusion, not in any type of shared,
intersubjective framework.

Gunnar, an incarcerated

schizophrenic, relays his struggle with reality:
"I attempt to structure the world all the time, simplify, generalize,
find universal symbols, everything to keep a chaotic reign of terror at
bay; but instead the chaotic pressure and tangled undergrowth of new
interpretive possibilities increases.
Fragmentation finally becomes so
complete that any meaningful contact with the world outside becomes
impossible."12

This quote accentuates a dilemma.

The schizophrenic is bound

and gagged by the totalitarianism of the real; the space of
hallucination, of infinitely multiple meanings, of layers of
arbitrary significance is relegated in society to occupy the
12 Barbo Sandin Schizophrenic Strategies of Survival in Psychiatry: Interpersonal and Biological
Process August 1993 v56 n3 p. 295.
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realm of literature and film, of the joke world and the world
of the mystical and magical; but one must

draw the line

between "reality" and these fictional or theoretical

spaces.

Gunnar is constructed to believe that the world is
structured, that there are universal symbols, and since he
recognizes none, his hyper-ekstatic condition of free-play
and association becomes his own personal hell.

He has been

convinced that fragmentation is not 'real', is not of the
social order.

Thus he struggles to attach himself to the

static world to which everyone else belongs.

He is not

compatible with the myth, and is therefore the object of
investigation, a curious oddity, a modern Galileo.

Henri Michaux describes a schizophrenic table:
"[I]t was neither simple nor really complex, initially or intentionally
complex, or constructed according to a complicated plan.
Instead, it
had been desimplified in the course of its carpentering...As it stood,
it was a table of additions, much like certain schizophrenics' drawings,
described as "overstuffed", and if finished it was only so in so far as
there was no way of adding anything more to it, the table having become
more and more an accumulation, less and less a table... It was not
intended for any specific purpose, for anything one expects of a table.
Heavy, cumbersome, it was virtually immovable.
One didn't know how to
handle it [mentally or physically]. Its top surface, the useful part of
the table, having been gradually reduced, was disappearing, with so
little relation to the clumsy framework that the thing did not strike
one as a table, but as some freak piece of furniture, an unfamiliar
instrument... for which there was no purpose.
A dehumanized table,
nothing cozy about it...A table which lent itself to no function, selfprotective, denying itself to service and communication alike.
There
was something stunned about it, something petrified.
Perhaps it
suggested a stalled engine."13

This fantastic table, viewed as an abomination of carpentry,
is revelatory in certain definitive ways.
13 A n ti-O edipu s , pps. 6-7.

It reveals
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something first about the production process of
schizophrenia.

There is no "space" in which such a table

could function as table.

It is nonsensical to the extent

that it does not relate to a schema or framework where
"table" has a certain significance or shared structure.

Its

"tableness" is removed; the significance attributable to the
"tables" of experience gone with it.

But this is not to say

that it is lacking significance; for this table carries its
own meaning within itself; it is its own meaning.

There is

no separation here between production and what is produced. 14
While we think of tables as produced for a reason and having
a certain significant function, this table is its own reason
and its own significant function.

It is a capitalist table;

its surface has no relation to its framework, its function
has no relation to general tableness; it is pure production.
And it does not represent the chaotic state of the artist,
nor his inability to understand the meaning of objects; it is
not the unconscious expression of a repressed desire, and it
is not a useless dead end; it is product and producer and
production, indistinguishable.
production.

It is consumption as

The schizophrenic table works; just like a

bubble gum dispenser that looks like a Maytag; the difference
is that "schizos are not saleable"is

In conclusion, there is no such thing as schizophrenic space.
To make the connection between schizo-flows and the

14 ibid., p. 7.
15 ibid., p. 245.
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fragmented contemporary social being, one has to look no
further than the modern social order.

Merleau-Ponty's

analysis of schizophrenic space is insightful and lucid, but
it reveals much more than the latency of the schizophrenic.
Illusions are very much the status guo; it is not the case
that the schizophrenic harbors any
"landscape space".

subjective or isolated

The functional reality in which we dwell

is a matrix of production/consumption simulations.

If one

wants to establish barriers between the sane and the
schizophrenic, it might be possible to regard sanity as the
condition which is wholly constituted from without.

For the

norm is the passive trade-off of a barrage of imagery for
reality; schizophrenia is the active internalization of the
contemporary process of production.

The schizo cannot accept

simulated reality as "shared space", for he knows the
production process too well.

He understands multiplicity and

fragmentation, and becomes confused wheh language makes
reference to the "geographical world"; for the schizophrenic,
significance is not impositional, nor does it overtake the
"real", it is simply divisible and tangential.

Sanity is the nascent state of insanity; it is the realm
where desire is invested as subjectivity and then re-invested
into the illusory realm of the socius as lack, the hollow
subject who always wants more.

The schizophrenic is the

producer, production, and product of desire; he has no need
for capitalism, for he has no territory and no objects, no
location, biography, or geography; he will not be convinced
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that he ever lacks.

CONCLUSION:

Anti-Oedipus

THE

ANTI-OEDIPAL

MACHINE

is a great book of fictions.

It lies to its

reader innocently enough; it captures its audience like a
master storyteller.

It "gets up to things behind your back."

Anti-Oedipus makes use of "bodies without organs", desiringmachines, schiz-flows, intensities, deterritorializations and
reterritorializations, Oedipalization, production, recording
and immanence.

It sees the paranoiac father everywhere,

confuses words and things, and tries to inscribe, a la
Kafka's In the Penal Colony, its codes on lived, fleshy
bodies.

It proposes a materialist psychiatry and offers the

schizophrenic process as the universal producer / producing /
product.

Many thinkers are content to dismiss the project of AntiOedipus outright in a simple paragraphi .

Others consider it

a little gem of postmodernism, but quickly add that Guattari
was the worst thing to happen to a lucid, sobering, and
clear-headed thinker like Deleuze.

The book is, in many

1 “As for the psychic subject and its theories, this is the area colonized by the Deleuze-Guattari notion of
the ideal schizophrenic - that psychic subject who ‘perceives’ by way of difference and differentiation
alone, if that is conceivable; of course, the conceiving of it is the construction of an ideal which is, so to
speak, the ethical - not to say the political - task proposed by their Anti-Oedipus This is Fredric
Ja m e so n ’s sole treatm ent of the Anti-Oedipal project in a 438 page discourse on the nature of PostModernity ( Fredric Jam eson, Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism , Durham: Duke
University P ress 1991 p. 345). Many have mimicked Jam eson in their analyses of this book. Usually, the
objections are either of an aesthetic nature ( the book is simply intellectual masturbation or a strangely
incoherent form of expressionism ) or a retreat to the charge of idealism ( the bane of all post-modernists )
a s dem onstrated by Jam eson. We shall s e e below that in no way is the schizophrenic process as
articulated by Deleuze and Guattari a new ideal, a purely differential unity or som e other such farce. As for
the account of Anti-Oedipus which looks upon it a s intellectual masturbation, we can only respond that at
least som ething is produced, something is impregnated with m eaning by this text, and so we recognized
that so m eo n e’s getting fucked.
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places, needlessly complex.

It uses and abuses far too much

theory and far too many texts.

What I propose to do here is

to simply offer an interpretation of Anti-Oedipus
clarify some of its central themes.

that will

In keeping with the

general theme of this essay, I will attend specifically to
the facets of the book which pertain immediately to political
thinking.

Deleuze and Guattari begin with a "theory of connections".
They are informed by a very queer notion of production:
production is a process which produces itself.

Philip

Goodchild distinguishes between autoproduction and
antiproduction,2

and I think this is a good manner in which

to understand the process of production being advanced in
Anti-Oedipus.3

Everything is subject to and informed by some mode of
relation (the daughter is related in a familial way to the
grandmother, and mom is positioned in between; a car is
2 Philip Goodchild Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire ( London: Sage
Publications Ltd. 1996 ) pps. 73-105.
3 “Autoproduction” is the process of pure production exhibited in schizophrenia. “Anti-production” is the
moment that this production “breaks down” ; production c e a s e s its infernal dynamic and becom es static.
The authors of Anti-Oedipus catch glimpses of autoproduction in the artwork of inmates at an asylum. A
schizophrenic builds a “table” which he continually nails more wood onto. All the sipaces becom e filled,
becom e spaceless. “A s it stood, it w as a table of additions, much like schizophrenics’ drawings,
described a s overstuffed, and if finished it w as only so far a s there w as no way of adding anything more to
it...It w as not intended for any specific purpose...'” ( Anti-Oedipus , p. 6 .). It is not finished, or rather is
finished only b e c au se no more connections could be m ade, and when the schizophrenic leaves this
project he tak es up with som ething else entirely. This process of pure production which is at once
product, production, and producer is autoproduction, the self-perpetuating production process. Desire
here produces itself. Something tangible like a factory, or Ideal like Oedipus, is born of this process, but it
becom es “fixed” and forces desire ( that which produced i t ) back upon itself. This is “anti-production”, the
“stalled engine”, the sedim ented social structure which immediately checks desire, channeling and re
routing the productive tendencies of desire into a sole purpose or se t of purposes.
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related to the driver, gasoline, and the road; shit is
related to the anus, the digestive system, its odor, the food
it once was, etc.).

But relation is understood by way of

connections, and these connections are micro-divisible.

For

example, I am related to my stereo and the sound it
generates, just as the component parts of the stereo (wiring,
tubes, speakers, flows of electricity) are related to me and
to each other.

Ordinarily, we establish "levels" of relation

which facilitate understanding (the table and the computer
and the couch are distinct objects which co-exist in the
living room; the living room, dining room, and bathroom are
rooms which co-exist in the house; the house has very little
to do with the atoms that compose the particles of fabric
which form the black stitch that traverses the body of the
couch, etc.).

My organs are connected in a fundamental way

which authorizes the delimitation of my physical body and
(

allows me to fall under the category heading "human being".

These levels of relation and connection are symptoms, for the
authors of Anti-Oedipus, of a secondary understanding of
reality, of a sedimentary and rigid "Oedipalized" social
order.

The first thing that they do is to eliminate these

levels at which connections and relations "make sense".

Thus

instead of an understanding of the body in which eating
causes growth, the organs function together to animate
corporeal being, the hand picks the nose, etc., they adopt a
model of the whole sphere of social life which is immanent
and within which any thing at any "level" can "plug-in"
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(connect) to any other thing at any other level.

For example, my belly-button extends over a whole city street
and animates the sound waves which re-route the revolution of
Pluto around the Sun.

In establishing this connection, I

have taken note of a "desiring-machine", which is always
already there yet is produced, on the spot, by itself and its
connections.

The capitalist says "What good is this machine;

it can't be operated, contained, produced, sold, or even
literally conceived of?".

The psychoanalyst says "The belly

button represents the severed connection with your mother at
the hollow site of the umbilical cord; the revolution of
Pluto is a huge, universal circle which represents the small
circle which is your belly button which represents the
severed connection with your mother."

The schizophrenic just

giggles, or weeps, or ignores the desiring-machine
altogether.

She is not obligated to "take notice".

For Deleuze and Guattari, desire is immanent within the
social and constantly produces itself and its machines.
above example sounds silly, and of course it is.
that Anti-Oedipus

The

But all

is doing here is exposing a very pragmatic

attention that we pay to our world.

The belly button-Pluto

machine exists in a very real way, but it doesn't work; the
listening-machine which is comprised of my ears, a compact
disc, a stereo, and speakers exists in a very real way as
well, and according to a contemporary code of social
existence it works very well.

Deleuze and Guattari want only
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to draw our attention to the fact that somewhere, somehow it
becomes possible to establish which desiring-machines (sets
of connections) work and which do not.

However this comes

about (most are convinced that it has to do with scientific
advancements, the laws of physics, practical governing codes
which inform the way we dwell together socially), it is
apparent that the process of establishing these levels of
organization immediately striates and configures the sphere
of desiring-production.

An economy of desire is instituted

which pre-configures social space and limits the ways human
beings dwell.

In Line Three it was elaborated how just such

an economy actually writes the codes for what will be known
as the individual.

Of course, limitations are necessary, for

we are pretty sure that thinking cannot think its way into
infinite couplings, connections, and programmatics.

Authors

like Deleuze and Guattari are aware that thinking cannot be
truly unbounded; but they are also aware that it must open up
upon itself if it wants to operate in the pacings and
trappings set up by control.

The contemporary order is the

only one which will concern them, specifically the ordering
process which is the integrated capitalistic social sector.
What troubles Deleuze and Guattari is not the fact that
limits exist but rather that the limits imposed by control
society rewrite the desiring process:

deterritorialization

turns desire back upon itself and causes desire to desire its
own repression, the continuance and acceleration of
repression.
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This establishing of levels which only permit certain
connections, certain "assemblages" (body, mountain, telephone
wire) to make sense is precisely the organic ordering which
Deleuze and Guattari refer to.

The infinite connections that

are possible in the process of desiring-production compose
the anorganic, the schizophrenic, universally productive
motor.

In a disciplinary society, institutions such as the

individual, the family, and territorialized sites of
confinement such as the school, the factory, and the asylum
are permissible machines which have become "fixed" or
sedimented and establish the lines of correct and incorrect
activity.

But desire is always productive, so it must run

that desiring production has actually produced the mechanisms
which repress the multitude of desiring-machines.

Before addressing this state of perpetual production, it
should be noted that some fairly obvious contradictions have
arisen.

It seems first of all that the plurality of

connections which are possible is a sort of undifferentiated,
infinite, metaphysical well from which ordering processes
draw whatever machines suit their purposes.

Are Deleuze and

Guattari drawing us a metaphysical map of the way in which
the social comes about, or describing a hierarchy in which
the schizophrenic core of desire (the undifferentiated,
connective, anorganic body) comes to be tamed and "made
social"?

If so, what distinguishes them from Freud, who

understood that the social relations of human life require
that the excessive state of desire (the id) be contained and
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harnessed by socio-psychological legislation?

Not only that,

but if they assert that the entire field of desire which is
schizophrenic (any connection can be made at any time) is the
first level, and that the organized socius represents a
secondary ordering process, are they not establishing levels
themselves?

These charges need to be addressed.

In order to do so, we

must look to the conception of the socius that Deleuze and
Guattari are forwarding.

"All laws, rights, values and orders can be created and destroyed by
society; none can stand outside as an origin or a goal. There can be no
absolute distinctions or boundaries imposed upon society because these
would need to be justified by some transcendent order...[D]esire,
forming relations between heterogeneous terms, can cross all boundaries.
Similarly, there are no pre-social instincts or drives, whether towards
aggression or sexual activity, that transcend society.
Indeed, the
fixing of such drives is a corollary of the formation of a fixed order
of society; the drive can only be formed as a desire for repetition of
territorial representation.
A fixed drive is formed as that which is
prohibited and excluded from society.
The drive only exists as a
'return of the repressed'; it is shaped by repression in the image of
the repressing structure."4

The fixed drives which serve psychoanalysis as a blueprint of
the unconscious are stalled desiring-machines, moments of
"anti-production" against which all productive capacities are
judged and moderated. For the authors of Anti-Oedipus, there
is nothing outside of the social, nothing escapes coding.
"There is only desire and the social, and nothing else."5

4 Ibid., p. 74.
5 A n ti-O ed ip u s, p. 29.

It
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is incorrect to say, along with Freud, that desire encounters
the social or the "real" and thereby is repressed, repressed
into citizenry and autonomy.

This type of desire that Freud

describes, the composite of drives which either want sex or
aggression, is a desire already bound, already repressed.

It

is desire conceived as lack, and while it operates nearly
everywhere within the social field, it has nothing in common
with the productive capabilities of the desiring-machines.

Desire is production, the production process of the real.
When Freud understands the drives of the id as unconscious
desires which are repressed when they bump up against the
tangible socius, he removes desire from its immanent
position; desire inheres in and as the social field.

Freud

situates desire "outside" of the socius and "inside" the
unconscious.

Deleuze and Guattari understand the unconscious

as the universal producer of the desiring-machines which
compose social reality.

One cannot "come into the social";

the socius is all that is the case.

We should be cautious here; it might sound as if the
framework being offered is yet another idealist metaphysical
model, a "stalled engine" itself.

If any form of mental

activity (consciousness, pre-consciousness, the unconscious)
is said to "construct" its own reality, we are face to face
with rationalist dogma.

It is not the case that mental

activity of any kind is at work here conjuring up the "real".
Whatever desire is, whatever the productive unconscious is,
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it has nothing to do with the rational, the self, the ego.
In fact, this is precisely the conception of desire that
Anti-Oedipus

wants to abandon.

Deleuze and Guattari admit

that one of the most outstanding contributions psychoanalysis
made was the discovery that desire is productive.

But once

the structural components of psychoanalysis are introduced
into this productive process, desire can produce only
fantasies, and once Oedipus makes himself known, even this
fantasy-production becomes a production of sublevels of the
ego .

Desire is not affiliated with the ego until repression is
involved; Oedipus is the model of the ego which reverses the
productive nature of desire and turns production into lack.
If Oedipus is the model employed by psychoanalysis to
"describe" the genesis of the ego, then this ego is a
secondary function.

It is born of Oedipalization.

the social, Oedipus creates subjects.

Within

This does not mean

that the organization of the ego brought about by Oedipus
belongs to another "level" than the free-space of desiringproduction; Oedipus is a connection, a social desiringmachine.

As we have seen, the possible connections available

in desiring-production are infinite and can always change; it
would thus be impossible to pin down from this assertion
regarding the multiplicitous and fragmentary nature of the
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socius a "metaphysical" position.6 Oedipus is a desiringmachine that has stalled; the "ego" that it produces (the
lacking ego) is a derivative and sedimented tool of
repression.

But to respond more directly to the charge of Idealism, we
need to elaborate what is meant by the locution "Oedipus".
The tale of Oedipus the King is well known, and the manner in
which the Oedipus complex prefigures the way that
psychoanalysis operates is also generally understood.
Deleuze and Guattari are saying is precisely this:
has become that which it is not.

What

Oedipus

The productive fantasy of

the Oedipal triangle may very well be real (that is, there is
no reason why desire could not organize itself around a lust
for the mother and take active offense at the threat of the
father).

However, the account this offers of the "passage

into selfhood" (which informs not only the psychoanalytic
procedure but which has now infiltrated every aspect of the
social sphere) is taken to be the model for desire .

When it is asserted that desire must organize itself around
6 Recall in Line One the discussion of the two different “moral” codes elaborated by Nietzsche. It should
be recognized that the “m achines” that produced the Aristocratic values and the m achines that produced
the priestly mentality were of vastly different orders. We would not say that one “evolved” out of the other,
nor would we attribute the “moralization of existence” to som e type of higher understanding; the
producing/product/producers w ere inherently different. There is nothing m etaphysical to be found which
“fuels” cultural shifts. This is why genealogy is a marvelous philosophical tool; by asking of any empirical
assem blage “W hat d oes it w ant?”, the genealogist se e k s only after the connections which hold values,
Ideals, beliefs, etc. in place. Deleuze considers himself both a materialist and an empiricist. He is a
materialist b ecau se the socius is physical; the process of production can be felt, seen, heard in every
case. He is an empiricist b ecau se he writes only what he s e e s , his own production/recording process
inscribes the observed couplings and connections that build and re-build politics, texts, shopping malls,
etc.
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that which it cannot have, then desire is given status only
as reactive, as a lack, and a conception of the self arises
which is

the Oedipal self, the lacking self.

"The fact is, from the moment we are placed within the framework of
Oedipus - from the moment we are measured in terms of Oedipus - the
cards are stacked against us, and the only real relationship, that of
production,
has been done away with.
The great discovery of
psychoanalysis was that of the production of desire, of the productions
of the unconscious.
But once Oedipus entered the picture, this
discovery was soon buried beneath a new brand of idealism:
a classical
theater was substituted for the unconscious as factory; representation
was substituted for the units of production of the unconscious; and an
unconscious which was capable of nothing but expressing itself - in
myth,
tragedy,
dreams
was
substituted
for
the
productive
unconscious."7

And now Oedipus bursts open upon the entire social surface.
God, or the priest, or the moral (deontological ethics uses
the locution "duty") is the paranoiac fathers

who tells the

desiring-believer that she cannot taste of forbidden
pleasures, cannot enjoy intoxication, or fornicate, or be
gluttonous, for something larger than herself (her soul, her
conscious, the welfare of her society) is at stake.

The

State becomes the father who stands between the citizen and
"his best interests", allowing him whatever falls within his
rights here, forbidding him whatever does not there.

The

desiring-believer and the desiring-citizen are radically
situated by the abstract father machines which repeatedly
remind them that they lack certain possibilities; they are
taught both what they want and that they cannot have it.

7 A nti-O ed ip u s, p. 24.
8 S e e Line Two for a treatm ent of the tyrannical figurehead of the Father.
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Desire as an internalized Oedipalized desire forms the
cement^like structure of the self or ego.

This ego is the

product of a neurotic desire; it is this neurotic
manifestation of desire, and it is convinced that it is
always situated, always limited, always lacking.

Capital is the most pernicious paranoiac father of all.
Capital regenerates itself as it reminds everyone, everywhere
that they are lacking.

And it employs every machine

available to continue this process of abuse and repression.
It employs media machines to remind us that we don't have the
best pair of basketball sneakers, the newest stereo system,
the fastest car or the most attractive lover.

It employs

business machines to remind us that we could always be more
productive, are never productive enough.

It is the body of

capital, the corporeal father which autoproduces itself
within the society of control, that abuses neurotic lack to
the point of lunacy.

And most importantly, capital is the

deterritorializing/reterritorializing father; it is
everywhere, and it is everywhere constructing new
connections, new machines which invest the social field and
(re)produce capital.

Anti-Oedipus

defines capitalism in terms of an absence of

limits and an axiomatic:

"Concerning capitalism, we maintain that it both does and does not have
an exterior limit: it has an exterior limit that is schizophrenia, that
is, the absolute decoding of flows, but it functions only by pushing
back and exorcising this limit. And it also has, yet does not have,
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interior limits:
it has interior limits under the specific conditions
of capitalist production and circulation, that is, in capital itself,
but it functions only by reproducing and widening these limits on an
always vaster scale.
The strength of capitalism indeed resides in the
fact that its axiomatic is never saturated, that it is always capable of
adding a new axiom to the previous ones.
Capitalism defines a field of
immanence and never ceases to fully occupy this field.
But this
deterritorialized field finds itself determined by an axiomatic, in
contrast to the territorial field determined by primitive codes.
Differential relations of such a nature as to be filled by surplus
value; as absence of exterior limits that is 'filled' by the widening of
internal limits; and the effusion of antiproduction within production so
as to be filled by the absorption of surplus value - these constitute
the three aspects of capitalism's immanent axiomatic."9

When Anti-Oedipus opposes "primitive codes" to the capitalist
axiomatic, it intends a much deeper division than we will go
into here.

Codes are the markings, for Deleuze and Guattari,

which actually inscribe the body of the socius, which write
the territories wherein we dwell.

What is really being

forwarded here is an attack upon the tyrannically repressive
nature of all forms of signification (we sense the
possibility here for a whole new philosophy of language).
For the sake of brevity and to preserve the specifically
political elements of this discussion, the scope of these
claims should be limited.

In "carving up" the socius, codes have a way of facilitating
an easily lived in social sphere.

As described in Line

Three, systems of codes assimilate to form the bodies of
factories, schools, homes, prisons, militaries, public and
private sectors where the model of discipline is employed and
internalized.

The axiomatic of capitalism, however, is not a

codifying structure (it does not set up or work within
9 Anti-Oedipus , p. 250.
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sedimentary complexes or "institutions"), rather it acts as a
deterritorializing agent for all of these sites.

Capitalism

knows that control is more effective than discipline, because
it divides everything up and makes everything a mobile
commodity; it shatters the realms of private and public space
and throws all modes of production into a state of spaceless,
mobile synergy.

Everything is filled.

Capitalism does not have to remind us that we lack; the
simple fact that three fourths of the world's population
lives below poverty level alerts us to that fact.

But there

is a lack imposed upon desire by capitalism; we lack none
other than capital itself,
have enough money.

we lack the father, we can never

We crave the very mother of repression,

the body of capital, the deterritorializing, paranoiac
father.

Here is Reich's answer:

to desire their own repression?

What could cause the masses
Capital, the force and flux

of repression, the instrument of internalized fascist
tendencies.

But more directly, how does Oedipus relate to capitalism?
That is, how does the accelerated Oedipal process from family
to ego to entire social sphere serve the agenda of
contemporary capitalism so profoundly that the two are nearly
indistinguishable?

Deleuze distinguishes between a logic of either/or and a
logic of both/and in reference to a concept that he borrows
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from Gregory Bateson, the double-bind. i°

The model of

genealogical critique fashioned by Nietzsche is, according to
Deleuze, an immanent critique.

The will-to-power analyzes

forces, can evaluate events, but only from within the context
of those very forces and events, indeed as a force and an
event.

As

thoroughly immanent critique, Deleuze sees

Nietzschean critique as a way of thinking motivated by the
paradoxical logic of an "inclusive disjunction."ii

This means that critique as force remains active, because it
is not separate from what it can do.

indeed, reaction, for

Deleuze, constitutes the moment of a machine being forced
back upon itself, made to choke on its own productive
mechanisms; reactive forces "separate active force from what
it can do . "12

This is precisely where revolution stagnates.

The moment that a vanguard organizes the masses into a
revolutionary machine, it strips them of their potency; it
channels chaotic revolutionary energy into a system of
logical activities which organize themselves around a set of
beliefs (We are oppressed and must change the conditions in
which we live) and a telos (liberation, utopia, the end of
capitalism).

Likewise, the moment that psychoanalysis

organizes the productive machines of the unconscious around
the "ego" (the structure of Oedipus) the mode of operation
for examination, process, problem, and cure is elaborated as
10 Jeffrey A. Bell Philosophizing the Double-Bind: Deleuze reads Nietzsche in Philosophy Today
Volume 39 4:4 Winter 1995 pps. 371-390.
11 S e e Nietzsche and Philosophy Section 2 ( Active and Reactive, pps. 39-72) and Section 3 (Critique,
pps. 73-110).
12 Ibid., p. 57.
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well.

The product or outcome of the psychoanalytic procedure

(a "healthy", normalized ego) is prefigured by the
structurally rigid organization imposed by the Oedipal
framework.

This is what Deleuze means by the double-bind.

In thinking

on revolution, communist strategy employs the logic of the
either/or (either we remain oppressed by the upper classes or
we wage full scale revolution).

As does psychiatry: either

the individual is neurotic or schizophrenic, healthy or sick;
either she can be cured or she can not, etc.

If the double-bind, which is really a sort of tool used to
describe the oppositional nature of all binary distinctions,
can be appropriated within a paradoxical both/and framework
(the inclusive disjunction), then theoretically revolution
can happen at any moment of daily life or the schizophrenic
can live out his days as an active social beings .

Jeffrey Bell describes Gregory Bateson's conception of the
double-bind:

"Bateson argues that a double-bind consists of two injunctions.
The
first or primary injunction says that one must or must not do so and so;
the second injunction is more general, or more 'abstract' and conflicts
with the first. For example, a mother might tell her son not to do so
13 The movem ent of anti-psychiatry, a practice championed by David Cooper, Thom as Szasz, R.D. Laing
and others was an attem pt to incorporate the radical ego-loss exhibited by som e schizophrenics into a sort
of “anti-model” for dealing with the insane. Laing actually lived for years among a group of schizophrenics
for whom he had established a commune, Kingsley Hall. Arguably, his attempt was a marginal success, if
judged statistically in reference to how m any of the inhabitants were actually “cured”. Laing considered
the project a failure, however, for the distinction betw een psychiatrist and patient could never fully be
broached, and that w as his primary task.
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and so, but then might, by her more general behavior - i.e., gestures,
intonation, or other non-verbal means of communicating - tell him not to
submit to her prohibitions. Regardless of what the son does, therefore,
he will be in the wrong."!4

The logic of either/or might here end in paranoia, a constant
brooding over the fact that neither choice is acceptable.
Bateson suggests that one can live with a kind of specific
attention to the double-bind, a "both/and" approach which is
not caught up in the specifically exclusive mode of choosing
orte member of a binary pair or another.

One can assimilate

both possibilities artd become creative; it is always possible
to establish new connections, within the logic of the two
injunctions, which lead elsewhere.

Schizophrenics sometimes

exhibit this type of reaction to double-bind situations.

Capitalism affixes a type of schizophrenic logic to the
social order.

For example, in the process of establishing

ever new attractive connections, the mechanics of advertising
attempt to ascertain how to manipulate the flows of desire
which both influence and are effects of subjective
Oedipalization.

A commercial for a credit card company

depicts Bob Dole attempting to write a check (a now outdated
form of currency) in his hometown in Kansas after a
homecoming parade put on in his honor.

After the counter

clerk asks him for three different forms of identification,
Dole stares sullenly into the camera and proclaims:
can't win."

Visa is everywhere you want to be.

14 Philosophizing the Double-Bind, p.376.

"I just
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In another commercial for a candy bar, a fake "condition" is
described in a deathly serious tone by "experts":

People who

eat this candy bar suddenly become catatonic, and wear a
perpetual smile.

It is suggested that these people are

having orgasmic-type experiences which cause them to leave
their corporeal bodies and party in alternate planes of
existence aboard alien space vessels.
this commercial sells product.

As an advertisement,

Yet it is almost

indistinguishable from the descriptions of hallucinations
given by schizophrenics.

Capitalism, as it cpnstantly makes new connections and
radically deterritorializes social spaces, always sets up new
limits which redefine the channels through which desire
flows.

It leaves these limits behind almost instantaneously,

as the schizophrenic leaves behind his table, or reappropriates them for some other purpose.

Thus its process

is one of loosing fixed territories (the double bind,
either/or), and re-establishing a myriad of alternatives
(becoming-creative).

in trying to answer how Oedipus relates to capitalism, we
need to keep this process in mind.

Oedipus is the structure

which locates and defines the contemporary subject.

In many

ways, it is an avatar of an outmoded disciplinary mentality.
There is a "divisionary" principle in operation in
disciplinary society, and the family is not excepted from
this process.

"[T]he institution of the family is regulated
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by ...a fixed conjugation between individuated persons, in
which desire is subordinated to reproduction, [and] leads to
the filiation of new individuals by exclusive disjunction."15
The "institution" of the family is localizable, its territory
marked, within a disciplinary social configuration.16

But

within a nexus of control mechanics, sites of confinement
branch out, pour over the social field and vastly expand
their domains while mutating to encompass new milieus where
they were previously inactive.

The obvious example is the

site of production, the factory, but the family also becomes
deterritorialized.

As noted above, the father is everywhere,

the figurehead of Oedipus is no longer confined to a physical
familial realm, but rather invests the entire social field.
This familial structure, operating in all realms of the
socius (business, the military, clinical institutions) is the
pure representative of the repressive tyranny of
signification.

"The best example of a purely signifying structure is the figure of
Oedipus produced in Lacanian psychoanalysis...For Lacan, the unconscious
is structured like a language; the triangular relationship of the family
is translated into a symbolic structure devoid of imaginary content.
The resolution of Oedipus means an internalization of its structure into
desire, and an acceptance that desire will always lack something, the
transcendental signified which restores it to reality.
By investing
itself in the search for the transcendental signified, desire lives out
the Oedipus complex.
The solution to this neurotic search is a
regression from the signified to the structure: when desire embraces the
oedipal structure as the law of society, it resolves and internalizes
Oedipus. The resolved and internalized Oedipus can then function as the
basis of both our participation in society and the way in which we
think. This structural version of Oedipus is taken by Deleuze and
15 Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of D e s ire , p. 88.
16 Recall the discussion in Line Three regarding sites of confinement, w here Deleuze noted that in
disciplinary societies the territories are plainly delineated. At school, the individual is told that he is not at
hom e anymore a and must act differently, in the workplace, he is told that he is not at school anymore, etc.
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Guattari to be the prime agent of repression in our society."17

The operations that this structural family performs upon
contemporary society are the very operations of control and
repression; this extended and representational Oedipus
separates the productive forces of desire from what they can
t

do; the entire socius must be striated and divided to fit the
Oedipal mold.

For Lacan, this internalization of the Oedipal

triangle marks the site of individuation, the birth of the
desiring-ego.

Deleuze and Guattari understand this model of

the individual as the origin of all repressive capabilities.
They see the struggle between desiring-machines and the
"Oedipal-narcissistic machine" as having primary political
importance.

"In order to understand the details of this struggle, it must be borne
in mind that the family relentlessly operates on desiring-production.
Inscribing itself into the recording process of dtesire, clutching at
everything, the family performs a vast appropriation of the productive
forces; it displaces and reorganizes in its own fashion the entirety of
the connections and the hiatuses that characterize the machines of
desire.
It reorganizes them all along the lines of the universal
castration that condition the family itself...but it also redistributes
these breaks in accordance with its own laws and the requirements of
social production.
The inscription performed by the family follows the
pattern of its triangle, by distinguishing what belongs to the family
from what does not.
It also cuts inwardly, along the lines of
differentiation that form global persons: there's daddy, there's mommy,
there you are, then there's your sister.
Cut into the flow of milk
here, it's your brother's turn, don't take a crap here, cut into the
stream of shit over there.
Retention is the primary function of the
family: it is a matter of learning what elements of desiring-production
the family is going to reject, what it is going to retain..."18

17 Deleuze and Guattari: An Introduction to the Politics of Desire p. 89.
18 Anti-Oedipus, pps., 124-5.
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The first thing that the schizo does is eradicate the ego;
this is, for Deleuze and Guattari, the moment of revolution
against the repressive structure of the "Holy Family"*9 .

The

figurehead of Oedipus is abandoned; and since Oedipus is the
structural model of social organization, the family, the
State, the self are also foregone.

All structure is

devastated by the purely differential element of couplings
and connections, productive desiring-machines. And the
schizo becomes a body without organs, a stalled engine.

In Line Three, a description of control was offered.

This

method of social organization ensures that subjects are
referenced according to position, are allowed or denied
access to everything from television programs to buildings to
administrative positions by distributing a mode of control
over the processes of gaining education, employment, status,
or goods.

The general model of the politically/economically

situated subject is the oedipalized subject.

This is the

subject which can be dominated, the subject that knows that
it lacks, that can be intoxicated, domesticated, controlled
and compelled by the deterritorializing processes of
contemporary capitalism.

But capitalism can do little or

nothing with the non-oedipalized or "schizophrenic"
individual.

The logic of capitalism and the logic of

schizophrenia are very similar, and they "work" according to
the same processes20.

The oedipalized subject is docile; he

19 This notion of schizophrenic rebellion against ego-izing oedipalization w as treated in Line Two.
20 The similarities betw een the logic of capitalism and the logic of schizophrenia w ere discussed in the last

part of Line Five, Schizophrenic S p a c e s .
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is controlled by the logic of either/or, and capitalism
proffers all of the choices on a smorgasbord of social
possibilities driven by the abuse of conceptual lack.
Capitalism understands lack so well and exploits it so easily
that the capitalist process and the lacking Oedipalized
subject are forced into a synthetic unity which dialectically
informs the entirety of social existence.

The Oedipalized

subject lives the perpetual "double-bind" in a passive state
of political and economic impotence; he is outside the social
and inside his own head; he lacks immanence; he is separated
from what he can do.

Capitalism utilizes this lack-*-structure to erect a complex
socius in which limits disappear and possibilities are
dangled in front of the faces of executants like the
proverbial carrot on a string.
China.

Buy a TV and experience

Take a pay cut and work in a new sector, and be

rewarded with an early retirement on seventy-five percent of
your salary.

Have virtual sex on line with a partner that

you create yourself (masturbation par excellence ).

Fly from

New York to London on the Concord for a business meeting with
Korean investors and be home for dinner with the family in
Long Island by six.

Capitalism schizophrenizes the sbcius by

filling in all spaces with infinite connective possibilities.
All spaces become virtual, all possibilities limitless.

In this accelerated framework, Oedipus lends stability to
existence.

The family is a supportive and comforting

160

institution; my senator is looking out for my needs in
Washington; I know what I already possess and what I still
need to obtain in order to succeed and thrive.
comfort of contemporary repression:

This is the

The world is too large

and at the same time too small; we want localizable fixed
spaces which will grant to life a pace, a rate of
progression, goals and dreams, etc.

We like to have limited

choices (either/or) and cannot think what it would be like to
choose everything
everywhere and

and create as well.

Capitalism connects

creates new sites of connection for itself;

it writes the blueprint for desire.

The oedipalized subject is produced and operated by the
capitalist process; it is a subject which belongs to
capitalist society, with no remainder.
that capitalism can own and control.

It is the subject
But our society also

produces schizophrenics:

"Our society produces schizos in the same way that it produces Prell
shampoo or Ford cars, the only difference being that schizos are not
salable.
How then does one explain the fact that capitalist production
is constantly arresting the schizophrenic process and transforming the
subject of the process into a confined clinical entity, as though it saw
in this process the image of its own death coming from within? Why does
it make the schizophrenic into a sick person, not only nominally but in
reality? Why does it confine its madmen and madwomen instead of seeing
in them its heroes and heroines, its own fulfillment? And where it can
no longer recognize the figure of a simple illness, why does it keep its
artists and even its scientists under such close surveillance - as
though they risked unleashing flows that would be dangerous for
capitalist production and charged with a revolutionary potential, so
long as these flows are not co-opted or absorbed by the laws of the
market?
Why does it form in turn a gigantic machine for social
repression - psychic
- repression,
aimed
at what
nevertheless
constitutes its own reality - the decoded flows?"21
21 Anti-Oedipus, p. 245.
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What Deleuze and Guattari mean by decoded flows are the
connections that outstrip the antiquated social order of
societies of discipline;

Sites of confinement operate

according to a system of codes which both the capitalist and
the schizophrenic: processes decode, eroding the autonomy of
the factory, the family, the church, the school.
question raised here is this;

The pivotal

If the processes driven by

capital and the schizophrenic processes are so similar in
kind, why does society manufacture institutional
schizophrenics, why does it fear its own logic, and why does
it monitor so closely the movements and flows of those who
participate in capitalist production processes (artists,
scientists, etc.)?

"The answer...is that capitalism is indeed the limit of all societies,
insofar as it brings about the decoding of flows that the other social
formations coded and overcoded.
But it is the relative limit of every
society; it effects relative breaks, because it substitutes for the
codes an extremely rigorous axiomatic that maintains the energy of the
flows in a bound state on the body of capital as a socius that is
deterritorialized, but also a socius that is even more pitiless than any
other.
Schizophrenia, on the contrary, is indeed the absolute limit
that causes the flows to travel in a free state on a desocialized body
without organs. Hence one can say that schizophrenia is the exterior
limit of capitalism itself or the conclusion of its deepest tendency,
but that capitalism only functions on condition that it inhabit this
tendency, or that it push back or displace this limit, by substituting
for its own immanent relative limits, which it continually reproduces on
a widened scale.
It axiomatizes on the one hand what it decodes with
the other. Such is the way that one must reinterpret the Marxist law of
the counteracting tendency. With the result that schizophrenia pervades
the entire capitalist field from one end to the other.
But for
capitalism it is a question of binding the schizophrenic charges and
energies into a world axiomatic that always opposes the revolutionary
potential of decoded flows with new interior limits...The flows are
decoded and axiomized by capitalism at the same time.
Hence
schizophrenia is not the identity of capitalism, but on the contrary its
difference, its divergence, and its death. Monetary flows are perfectly
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schizophrenic realities, but they exist and function only within the
immanent axiomatic that exorcises and repels this reality. The language
of a banker, a general, an industrialist, a middle or high-level
manager, or a government minister is a perfectly schizophrenic language,
but that functions Only statistically within a flattening axiomatic of
connections that puts it in the service of the capitalist order."22

The schizophrenic process is appropriated by capitalist
machinery in a very strange way; its capacity to loosen all
constricting parameters of social organization has immense
benefits, and capitalism seizes upon these possibilities.
But capitalism cannot be totally without form? it is
schizophrenic only up until that point at which the
perpetuation of its own economy is threatened, at which point
it lays out new rules for the game which look, deceptively
enough, like self-substantiating or pre-given social
conditions, i.e., axiomatics .

The social sphere is invested

by a logic of connections which has no real limits, a
schizophrenic logic.

This logic is fast and

incomprehensible, and it mutates quickly.

Its differential

element has the capability to foster full scale revolution or
integrated Global Capitalism.

The model of representation keeps the social field in check.
Democracy is born of this tendency towards representation, as
is Oedipus.
preservation.

Capital needs representation to ensure its own
The decoding schizophrenic process serves

capital only if it assures that new, more seductive, more

22 Ibid., pps. 245-6.
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complex and valuable images are available for public
consumption.

The model of the consumer is fashioned by

Oedipus, the ultimate signifier, representation par
excellence.

Thus the schizophrenic process employed by

capitalism continuously reinvents itself by way of
representational imaging; new models for desire become the
axiomatics by which the normalized individual judges his or
her capacity to perform, excel, compete. Oedipus is not
static, save in that it operates according to an economy of
lack.

The lacking subject is the structural component of

representation; capitalism feeds desire its own images.

Line Four makes explicit reference to the repressive
structure of representative

politics.

According to the

critical model put forth in Anti-Oedipus, any political
agenda established on the premise that any one thing can
operate in place of another is a politics which serves
repression.

But now it seems as if almost every condition

save some type of pure schizophrenic state would be an avatar
of fascistic tendencies; everything is born of lack and
lacunae.

Thus we are left with Lenin's question;

"What is

to be done?"

Even if we buy the central themes here elaborated, questions
remain; what can we do, what is it good for, what does it
want?

Anti-Oedipus should not be approached with the

question "Is it True?", for it has no response to this.
question then is, what can it do?

Where can it prompt

The
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change, how can it politically affect a control society?
Does it speak to technology, science, or any form of
progress?

And on a meta-level, does it serve well as an

experiment in theory which "keeps up" with the literally
blinding speed of contemporary culture and politics?

We should meet these questions on the front where
revolutionary thinking abandons Marxism.

It is not the case

that capital is here outlined as the form and function of
social repression.

Recall that power as it is appropriated

in the social field by desiring-machines is purely
productive.

Deleuze and Guattari go as far as to say that

any form of social "connection" is always productive.
repression is produced.

Even

Repression is the result of

Oedipalization, the stalled engine which is not abandoned as
the schizo abandons his table, but which is clung to
relentlessly by the neurotic socius, a socius that has
internalized the will to its own repression.

Anti-Oedipus

draws a compelling picture of modern existence.

In exploiting the lack-structure of the socius by
deterritorializing social spaces and re-establishing virtual
axiomatics, capitalism renders the schizophrenic impotent and
applies its unique brand of control to the entire social
surface.

There are many places such a theory can go, much

that it can do.

Deleuze and Guattari modestly claim that

they wanted only to separate the left from structural
psychoanalysis, for this axis is where they noticed the
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possibilities for a whole new order of fascism.
Schizoanalysis can take down the dominant paradigm of
structuralist psychoanalysis and serve as a shrewd watchdog
for any leftist party (it certainly keeps left thinkers from
straying too close to democracy, which is capitalism's mirror
image on vthe global circuit).

As a project which is

committed to seeking out all forms of social repression, it
is also a book of ethics, "the first book of ethics to be
written in France in quite a long time."23

Anti-Oedipus

counters dialectics in its insistence that man and nature and
God and State cannot be part of a larger synthesis, that all
are machinated cogs working their own little machines in and
about the socius.

It carries Nietzsche into a new era of

philosophy and revives an anarchist trend in radical politics
based upon an active way to engage an extremely unstable
social field.

"Desire never resists oppression, however local and tiny the
resistance, without the challenge being communicated to the
capitalist system as a whole, and playing its part in
bursting it open. "24

saying no to Oedipus is the political

vision; the methodology is yet to be elaborated.

But theory

needs radicals, because radicals keep the majoritarian order
and all vanguards on their toes.

What does the process of Anti-Oedipalization require?

23 Michel Foucault Preface to Anti-Oedipus p. xiii.
24 Felix Guattari Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations p. 19.
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requires speed and depth and cunning, for one thing.

The

possibility for action is lost on armchair political
activists who really believe that things are bad and that
change is possible; their effective engagement with the
social sphere evaporates before their eyes when they step
into the voting booth.

They see the problems of the social

sphere from well beyond it; they do not approach from within
but from without.

The problem with political activism is that it has forgotten
how well it knows its enemy.

Capitalism is

deterritorializing; it manufactures unheard of connections
which move across the social field and become obsolete almost
immediately.

Oedipus, the site of all representation and

keeper of the repressed ego, keeps us enthralled by such a
process, causing us to forget our own deterritorializing
machines.

We forget the wildly schizophrenic elements which

actually affect our own possibilities.

We forget not that we

can produce, but that we are production; this causes a rift
in the surface of all productive capacities, a rift which
causes the ego to cling with all of its might to the "really
good things" that it produces,

we forget to leave our

productions behind; this would exceed the limit of capital,
for even the immense production process of capitalism still
grounds itself by establishing its own axioms, its own
channels and rivulets of production.

In the Prologue to Thus

Spake Zarathrustra , Nietzsche reminds us that "one must have
chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star.
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I say unto you:

you still have chaos in

y o u r s e l v e s .25

«

But

can the schizophrenic be the new revolutionary?

The schizophrenic process does not offer a guide to political
involvement; it only offers up a perspective, a unique
perspective that has remained silent for quite a while.

This

perspective is not critical of capital from outside, from a
beyond which all too easily delineates its opposition; rather
schizophrenia is immanent within capitalism; the
schizophrenic is more capitalist than the capitalist. And if
this perspective offers up something useful, something which
might provide active and essential force to the molar
structure of culture and politics, then all the

better.

If

it does not, Deleuze and Guattari suggest that it be thrown
away:

"What matters is whether it works, and how it works, and who it works
for. It's a machine too. It's not a matter of reading it over and over
again, you have to do something else with it...We're not writing for
people who think psychoanalysis is doing fine and see the unconscious
for what it is. We're writing for people who think it's pretty dull and
sad as it burbles on about Oedipus, castration, the death instinct, and
so on.
We're writing for unconsciousness that have had enough.
We're
looking for allies.26 "

25 The Portable Nietzsche p. 129.
26 Gilles Deleuze Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari on Anti-Oedipus in Negotiations

p. 22.
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